Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 23STCV30917, Date: 2025-02-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV30917    Hearing Date: February 21, 2025    Dept: 45

Sybil Jatta v. Los Angeles Unified School District

 

Demurrer to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint

 

Date of Hearing:         02/21/2025                              Trial Date: None Set  

Department:                45                                            Case No.: 23STCV30917                  

 

Moving Party:             Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District

                                   

Responding Party:      Plaintiff Sybil Jatta

 

 

BACKGROUND

 

Factual and Procedural Background -

            On December 19, 2023, Sybil Jatta (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against the Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD” or “Defendant”). The Complaint was followed by the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) which lists the following causes of action:

 

1.      Discrimination on the Basis of Race in Violation of Gov. Code §§12940 et seq.;

2.      Discrimination on the Basis of Disability in Violation of Gov. Code §§12940 et seq.;

3.      Retaliation in Violation of Gov. Code §§12940 et seq.;

4.      Failure to Prevent Discrimination & Harassment[1] in Violation of Gov. Code §12940(k);

5.      Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation in Violation of Gov. Code §§12940 et seq.;

6.      Failure to Engage in Good Faith Interactive Process in Violation of Gov. Code §§12940 et seq.; and

7.      Declaratory Judgment.

 

The SAC alleges as follows. Plaintiff is an African-American woman who began working at Franklin High School as an Assistant Principal. (SAC, ¶10.) Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor was Principal Regina Marquez-Martinez (“Marquez-Martinez”). Plaintiff contracted COVID-19 during the 2020-2021 school year, which led to her taking leave due to COVID-19 and blood clots. Plaintiff returned to campus for the 2022-2023 school year.

 

The SAC alleges that upon return, Plaintiff was subjected to terms of employment substantially different from that of her non-African-American colleagues or those who had been allowed to return to work earlier due to vaccination. These differing terms of employment included, but are not limited to: placement in a classroom instead of an office; sequestered placement in a back room without access to a phone or computer; hostility from fellow administration employees and Marquez-Martinez; lack of notice of faculty meetings; routine placement at the end of the faculty agenda and a lack of time to make her presentations; lack of payment for approved overtime; failure to provide keys to numerous buildings she should have access to; and denial of participation in meetings. (FAC, ¶14.)

 

On August 8, 2022, Plaintiff appealed to Marquez-Martinez, as well as emailing the District staff, who refused to do anything. Subsequently on September 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Uniform Complaint with the District. The SAC alleges that upon filing the complaint, Marquez-Martinez became even more hostile. (SAC, ¶15.) Plaintiff then filed suit.

 

            The motion now before the Court is Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer; Defendant files a reply.

 

Tentative Ruling

           

    Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part. The demurrer is sustained as to the second, third, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action. However, the demurrer is overruled as to the first and fourth causes of action. Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days leave to amend.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

 

ANALYSIS

             

A.     1st Cause of Action - FEHA Violation: Discrimination Based on Race

 

A plaintiff alleging discrimination must allege “that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)

 

            The FAC alleges the first element, that Plaintiff was a member of a protected class. She is African-American. (FAC, ¶11.) Plaintiff alleges the second element; she was competent in the position held. (FAC, ¶25.) As for the third element, the FAC alleges the adverse employment actions against Plaintiff included, but were not limited to: placement in a classroom instead of an office; sequestered placement in a back room without access to a phone or computer; hostility from fellow administration employees and Marquez-Martinez; lack of notice of faculty meetings; routine placement at the end of the faculty agenda and a lack of time to make her presentations; lack of payment for approved overtime; failure to provide keys to numerous buildings she should have access to; denial of participation in meetings. (FAC, ¶ 14.) As to the final element, the FAC alleges that none of Plaintiff’s non-African-American colleagues received any of the aforementioned mistreatment.

 

            Upon demurrer Defendant relies on Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028 and contends “Such actions by the District fail to rise to the level of ‘adverse employment actions’ by an employer as defined and recognized under FEHA.” (Moving Papers, 13:3-7.) Moreover, Defendant argues that the alleged actions amount to “trivial adverse actions” or “social slights”. (Moving Papers, 13:22-23.) Lastly, Defendants quote Thomas v. Department of Corrections (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 507, 511 (Thomas) stating “If every minor change in working conditions or trivial action were a materially adverse action then any ‘action that an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit.’”. The Court finds these contentions unpersuasive.

 

            One of the very cases Defendant cited – Thomas – counters Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s alleged adverse employment actions are insufficient:

 

“We believe adverse job action is not limited solely to loss or reduction of pay or monetary benefits. It can encompass other forms of adversity as well. For example, other courts have found adverse job impact, where there was no reduction in salary or benefits, in an employer's moving an employee's office to an undesirable location, transferring an employee to an isolated corner of the workplace, and requiring an employee to relocate her personal files while forbidding her to use the firm's stationary and support services.” (Ibid. quoting from Colins v. State of Ill. (7th Cir.1987) 830 F.2d 692, 703, emphasis added.)

 

            The same circumstances quoted in Thomas that qualify as adverse employment actions, are the same ones alleged in the FAC. Accordingly, the demurrer to the first cause of action is overruled.  

 

B.     2nd Cause of Action – FEHA Violation: Discrimination on the Basis of Disability

 

In order to plead a violation of FEHA based on disability, a plaintiff must allege the following: (1) that plaintiff suffered from a disability, (2) plaintiff could perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodations, and (3) plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability. (Glynn v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 47, 53.)

 

            The FAC alleges Plaintiff’s disability was the diagnosis of COVID-19, and the blood clots she suffered from. (FAC, ¶34.) For purposes of the first element, Gov. Code §12926(m) defines a physical disability as having a physiological disease that affects a bodily system and limits a major life activity like working. (Gov. Code §1296(m)(1)-(m)(iii).) The FAC alleges Plaintiff’s illness necessitated a leave of absence from the Fall 2021 semester until the 2022-2023 school year. (FAC, ¶¶13-14.) This fulfills the first element. The FAC alleges Plaintiff could perform the essential job duties upon return with or without reasonable accommodations, fulfilling the second element. However, the third element is where the cause of action fails. The FAC lacks sufficient detail as to the nexus between the adverse employment actions alleged, and Plaintiff’s alleged disability. Plaintiff alleges that the treatment she was received was different from her colleagues who had been allowed to return to work earlier due to vaccination. (FAC, ¶14.) However, this statement alone is insufficient. The FAC provides no further information on how Plaintiff’s disability, which appears to have been alleviated upon her return to campus, was the motivation for the mistreatment suffered. Without more, the demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained.   

           

C.     3rd Cause of Action – Retaliation

 

“California cases hold that in order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.)

 

Here, the third cause of action fails on the third element because the FAC does not articulate a causal link between the protected activity and the retaliation that allegedly took place, primarily because the allegations indicate the mistreatment took place before the protected activity and not after. (FAC, ¶14.) The FAC indicates the alleged mistreatment began on August 1, 2022 when Plaintiff returned to campus for the 2022-2023 school year. After the mistreatment began, Plaintiff appealed to Marquez-Martinez on August 8, 2022. On September 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Uniform Complaint with LAUSD. Plaintiff alleges that after filing the complaint the mistreatment continued. However, these facts do not constitute retaliation. Therefore, the demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.                  

 

D.    4th Cause of Action - Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Harassment

 

“To state a claim for failure to prevent harassment, a plaintiff must show: (1) “plaintiff was subjected to discrimination, harassment or retaliation;” (2) “defendant failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, harassment or retaliation;” and (3) “this failure caused plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm.” [Citation].

 

“The causation element of a section 12940(k) claim requires an employee show that the discriminatory conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ in causing his harm.” [Citation]. Further, this section applies to “ ‘an employer who knew or should have known of discrimination or harassment’ and ‘fail[s] to take prompt remedial action.’ ” [Citation].” (Andrade v. Arby’s Restaurant Group, Inc. (2016) 225 F.Supp.3d 1115. Also see CA BAJI 2527.)

 

As aforementioned, Plaintiff’s claim of race-based discrimination withstands demurrer. Therefore, the first element has been plead sufficiently. After the mistreatment began, Plaintiff appealed to Marquez-Martinez on August 8, 2022. On September 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Uniform Complaint with LAUSD. However, the FAC alleges that LAUSD staff refused to do anything.

 

Defendant bases their demurrer to this cause of action on their argument that no discrimination took place at all. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff has plead their first cause of action appropriately, which permits this fourth cause of action to be plead. Consequently, the demurrer to the fourth cause of action is overruled.

 

E.     5th Cause of Action - Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation

 

A claim for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation has three elements: (1) that the plaintiff suffers from a disability as defined in the FEHA; (2) that she be qualified for her position, i.e., that she can perform the essential functions of her position with a reasonable accommodation; and (3) that the employer fails to provide such reasonable accommodation. (Hernandez v. Rancho Santiago Community College District (2018) 22 Cal. App. 5th 1187, 1194.)

 

The fifth cause of action for failure to provide reasonable accommodation fails because the FAC lacks detail as to what accommodation was requested. Upon opposition, Plaintiff adds that although it was arranged for her to work remotely while ill, upon return Defendant failed to provide her with the tools necessary for her position. This is not a failure to accommodate a disability but rather failure of the employer to provide the resources necessary to complete the required job duties. Moreover, after Plaintiff returned from her leave of absence, it is unclear what disability Plaintiff possessed that required an accommodation. Therefore, the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is sustained.

 

F.     6th Cause of Action - Failure to Engage in Good Faith Interactive Process

 

FEHA requires an employer “to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with [an] employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee...with a known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.” (Gov. Code § 12940(n).) Failure to engage in the interactive process is a separate cause of action from failure to reasonably accommodate, which itself is separate from disability discrimination. (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 371.)

 

Because the FAC lacks any detail as to the accommodation requested, the demurrer to the sixth cause of action is sustained.

 

G.    7th Cause of Action – Declaratory Judgment

 

The seventh and final cause of action requests declaratory relief. The demurrer to the seventh cause of action is sustained because “injunctive and declaratory relief are equitable remedies, not causes of action.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 173.)

 

Leave to Amend

 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”]. As there is reasonable possibility of successful amendment, Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days leave to amend.

 

CONCLUSION

 

            Accordingly, Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part. The demurrer is sustained as to the second, third, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action. However, the demurrer is overruled as to the first and fourth causes of action. Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days leave to amend.