Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 24STCP01645, Date: 2025-01-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCP01645 Hearing Date: January 15, 2025 Dept: 45
CHA HOLLYWOOD MEDICAL CENTER, LP v.
CHINO STEEL INC.
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYs’ FEES
Date of Hearing: 1/15/2025 Trial
Date: None set
Department: 45 Case
No.: 24STCP01645
Moving Party: Petitioner
CHA Hollywood Medical Center, L.P.
Responding Party: Respondent Chino Steel Inc.
BACKGROUND
This action arises from a claim of
mechanic’s lien as to a property located at 1300-1322 North Vermont Ave., Los
Angeles, California 90027 (the “Property”). On May 21, 2024, Petitioner Cha
Hollywood Medical Center, L.P. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition to Release
Property from Mechanic’s Lien (the “Petition”) against Respondent Chino Steel,
Inc. (“Respondent”).
The Petition alleges that on or about
July 20, 2023, Respondent “caused to be recorded a duly verified Claim of
Mechanics Lien against the Property in the amount of $750,000, Instrument
Number 20230478110.” (Petition at p. 2:12-15.) Petitioner demanded that
Respondent release the lien; however, Respondent did not release the lien.
(Petition at p. 3:4-11.) Petitioner also requested reasonable attorneys’ fees.
(Petition at p. 3:18-21.)
On May 28, 2024, Petitioner filed a
Notice of Hearing on Petition to Release Property from Mechanic’s Lien.
On July 24, 2024, Petitioner filed a
Notice of Non-Opposition to Petition to Release Property from Mechanic’s Lien.
On July 30, 2024, at the hearing on the
Petition, Petitioner’s counsel informed the Court that the mechanic’s lien was
released by Respondent and the only pending issue was the issue of attorneys’
fees. (Min. Order, filed 7/30/24.) The Court ruled that the Petition was moot.
(Id.) The Court also advised Petitioner’s counsel “to file a declaration
that informs the Court that the mechanic’s lien has been released and to file a
motion for attorney’s fees.” (Id.) There was no appearance by or for
Respondent at the hearing. (Id.) Petitioner was ordered to give notice.
(Id.)
On October 8, 2024, Petitioner filed
the instant Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to Civil Code Section 8488.
Petitioner requests “that the Court issue an [o]rder awarding attorneys’ fees
in its favor and as against Respondent” in the amount of $10,857.00. (Not. of
Mot. at p. 2:3-8.) On October 24, 2024,
Respondent filed an opposition to the motion, to which Petitioner replied on
October 29, 2024.
On November 6, 2024, at the hearing on
the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, the parties submitted to the Court’s tentative
ruling to continue the hearing to January 15, 2025. (Min. Order, filed
11/6/24.) The Court ruled Petitioner was the “prevailing party” for purposes of
attorneys’ fees, however, Petitioner failed to present any billing records or
invoices substantiating the work done by Petitioner’s counsel in connection
with the instant action. (Id.) As such, the Court ordered Petitioner’s
counsel to file and serve 9 court days before January 15, 2025, a supplemental declaration
or declarations setting forth the reasonableness of the tasks performed and
time spent, and to provide the Court will billing records for the work done in
this case. (Id.) The Court also ordered any responsive declaration or
declarations be filed and served 5 court days before January 15, 2025. No reply
declaration or declarations were permitted. (Id.)
On January 2, 2025, Petitioner filed
two supplemental declaration in support of the instant motion. On January 8,
2025, Respondent filed a responsive declaration in support of its opposition.
The Court now reviews the supplemental filings
of the parties to determine whether the requested fees are reasonable.
[Tentative] Ruling
1. Petitioner
CHA Hollywood Medical Center, L.P.’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED in
the amount of $10,454.50.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Where a petition is filed to release a
mechanic’s lien “[a]t the hearing both (1) the petition and (2) the issue of
compliance with the service and date for hearing requirements of this article
are deemed controverted by the claimant. The petitioner has the initial burden
of producing evidence on those matters. The petitioner has the burden of proof
as to the issue of compliance with the service and date for hearing
requirements of this article. The claimant has the burden of proof as to the
validity of the lien.” (Civ. Code, § 8488, subd. (a).)
“If judgment is entered in favor of the
petitioner, the court shall order the property released from the claim of
lien.” (Civ. Code, § 8488, subd. (b).) “The prevailing party is entitled to
reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Civ. Code, § 8488, subd. (c).)
Attorneys’ fees are “computed in
accordance with the familiar lodestar method.” (Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc. (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 221, 237.) Under the lodestar method, a trial court “tabulates
the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours
reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community
for similar work.” (Ibid.) “[A] party must present some evidence to
support its award request.” (Ibid.) “The declaration of an attorney as
to the number of hours worked on a particular case may be sufficient evidence
to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time
records.” (Ibid.) “[S]ufficient evidence to support an attorney fee
award may include [d]eclarations of counsel setting forth the reasonable hourly
rate, the number of hours worked and the tasks performed.” (Ibid.)
“There is no requirement that an attorney provide time records or billing
statements.” (Id. at p. 238.)
ANALYSIS
Prevailing
Party Status
“The definition of prevailing party is not uniform under California
law, and many attorney fees statutes contain a technical definition applicable
to the particular statutory scheme.” (Zuehlsdorf v. Simi Valley Unified
School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 249, 257.) “In the absence of legislative
direction in the attorney fees statute, the courts have concluded that a rigid
definition prevailing party should not be used.” (Ibid., citation omitted.)
“Rather, prevailing party status should be determined by the trial court based
on an evaluation of whether a party prevailing on a practical level, and the
trial court’s decision should be affirmed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”
(Ibid., internal quotations
omitted.) “Among the factors the trial court must consider in determining
whether a party prevailed is the extent to which each party has realized its
litigation objectives.” (Sharif v. Mehusa, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th
185, 192.)
Code Civ. Proc. § 1032 provides that “[p]revailing [p]arty includes the
party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is
entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief,
and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief
against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) “If any party
recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified,
the prevailing party shall be as determined by the court, and under those
circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if
allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides
pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd.
(a)(4).) “Typically, a determination of no prevailing party results when both
parties seek relief, but neither prevails, or when the ostensibly prevailing
party receives only part of the relief sought. In other words, the judgment is
considered good news and bad news as to each of the parties[.].” (Deane
Gardenhome Assn v. Denktas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1398.)
On November 6, 2024, at the hearing on the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees,
the Court found that Petitioner was the “prevailing party” on the Petition to
Release Property From Mechanic’s Lien (“Petition”). (Min. Order, filed 11/6/24;
Order re Ruling, filed 11/6/24.) The hearing was continued for supplemental
briefing regarding the reasonableness of the fee requested. The Court’s
analysis on the reasonableness of the requested fee is set forth in more detail
below.
Reasonableness of Petitioner’s
Claimed Attorneys’ Fees
Petitioner seeks $10,857.00 in attorneys’ fees against Respondent.
Petitioner contends that its requested attorneys’ fees are reasonable.
Respondent asserts that the fee request is unreasonable, excessive, and
inflated.
Supplemental
Declarations in Support of the Motion
Petitioner presents supplemental declarations from Paul V. Rayburn and
Haik Gasparyan in support of the instant motion.
Supplemental Declaration of Paul V. Rayburn
Mr. Rayburn attests to expending at least (1) 1.1 hours reviewing and
revising the Petition and (2) 1.3 hours reviewing and revising the Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to Civil Code Section 8488 (“Fee Motion”). (Rayburn
Decl., ¶2.) In support of these claimed hours, Mr. Rayburn has provided his
billing entries and firm’s invoices. (Id. at ¶¶3-4, Ex. A.)
According to the billing entries, Mr. Rayburn billed 0.6 hours for
revising the Petition including supporting papers [5/14/24], 0.80 hours for
analyzing the litigation plan [5/16/24], 0.50 hours for revising the Fee Motion
[9/23/24], 0.80 hours for revising the Fee Motion [9/24/24], and 1.1 hours for
further revising the Fee Motion including supporting declarations. (Id. at ¶3.) These were all
billed at an hourly rate of $805.00 in this matter and amount to $3,059.00.
(Rayburn Decl., Ex. A.)
Mr. Rayburn also avers that the amount of time spent on each entry is
reflected in the adjustments in the “hours” and “amount” columns in the
invoices. (Id. at ¶4,
Ex. A.). Mr. Rayburn has over 25 years of experience practicing law in Los
Angeles handling construction cases, including complex public and private works
matter. (Id. at
¶5.) Mr. Rayburn attest that based on his experience, the time spent on the
tasked performed were reasonable and necessary in this action with regard to
the Petition and Fee Motion. (Id.)
Supplemental Declaration of Haik Gasparyan
Mr. Gasparyan attest to expending approximately 35 hours on this matter
between May 3, 2024 and November 6, 2024 at an hourly rate of $425.00.
(Gasparyan Decl., ¶2, Ex. B.) Mr. Gasparyan also avers the firm billed a total
of $19,125.00 for the hours spent in connection with the Petition and Fee
Motion but only seeks to recovery $10,857.00, giving Petitioner a $8,000.00
discount for the work completed. (Id.)
Furthermore, Mr. Gasparyan
states it took 4.0 hours to prepare the Petition and supporting because
he had to review and evaluate Respondent’s mechanic’s lien to confirm it was
indeed invalid; conduct legal research to ensure compliance with Civil Code
Section 8480 et seq. and identifying all necessary information and documents to
obtain and include in the Petition; obtain and review all the required
information in the Petition including a certified copy of Respondent’s lien per
Civil Code Section 8484, subdivision (a), review property reports to identify
and include the legal description of the property subject to the claim of lien
per Civil Code Section 8484, subdivision (d); review Respondent’s corporate
records and agent information to ensure proper notice and service; draft the
Petition and supporting documents; and draft the amended notice of hearing. (Id. at ¶3.)
Moreover, Mr. Gasparyan states it took him 8.5 hours to prepare the
present Fee Motion because he had to spend time drafting additional background
facts and dedicate an argument section to Respondent’s claim that Petition was
not a “prevailing party” since the mechanic’s lien was released prior to the
hearing on the Fee Motion. (Gasparyan
Decl., ¶¶4-5, Ex. C.) Mr. Gasparyan also states he spent time preparing
detailed declarations and compilation of exhibits in support of the Fee Motion.
These tasks amounted to approximately 29 hours of work between July 30, 2024
through November 6, 2024 for which Petitioner only seeks to recover 12 hours of
work completed. (Id. at ¶6.) Mr. Gasparyan avers the time spent on these tasks were
reasonable and necessary due to the lien’s substantial dollar amount,
procedural complexities, and Respondent’s conduct. (Id. at ¶7.)
Responsive
Declaration in Support of Opposition
In opposition of the motion, Respondent’s counsel, Lauren B. Stec
(“Stec”) states that Mr. Gasparyan block billed a substantial amount of his
time, which makes it difficult for the Court to confirm how much time was
actually spent drafting the three and half page Petition. (Stec Decl., ¶13.)
Ms. Stec further states that it is not realistic for Mr. Rayburn, a Partner to
have spent an hour reviewing a two page
Petition and one page declaration, when it was completed by a seventh-year
attorney. (Id. at
¶14.) Similarly, Ms. Stec states Mr. Rayburn and Mr. Gasparyan overbilled for
the Fee Motion because it is a standard motion and the issue of a prevailing
party was not novel or complex. (Id. at ¶¶17-23.)
The Court finds that the time spent by Petitioner’s counsels of record
on this matter to be reasonable. Here, Mr. Gasparyan attests to having to
review the Mechanic’s Lien giving rise to the Petition, obtaining and reviewing
documents to include in the Petition, reviewing property reports, reviewing
corporate records ensure compliance with service requirements, and drafting the
Petition. These tasks demonstrate why it took Mr. Gasparyan four hours to
prepare and draft the Petition. Likewise, Mr. Gasparyan attests to having to
conduct additional research to address the “prevailing party” status argument,
compiling exhibits, drafting and revising declarations in connection to the Fee
Motion, which comprised of ten-pages and was fully briefed by the parties. Although
Respondent argues the hours spent on the Petition constitutes block billing, it
is not objectionable per se. (See Minser v. Collect Access, LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
781, 797.) Moreover, the billing entries show how much time Mr. Gasparyan and
Mr. Rayburn spent on each task performed relating the Petition and Fee Motion,
respectively. However, the Court does note that Mr. Rayburn attest to expending
1.1 hours on the Petition but the billing entry only supports 0.6 hours.
(Rayburn, Decl., Ex. A, at p. 6.) Further, Mr. Rayburn indicates he spent 0.80
hours to “Analyze litigation plan,” but it is unclear if it was related to this
matter as the other entries actually state for “Chino Steel Lien.” (Id.) These discrepancies
warrant a reduction in the requested fee amount of Mr. Rayburn from $1,932.00 =
1.1 + 1.3 x ($805) to $1,529.50 = 0.6 + 1.3 x ($805).
CONCLUSION
Based on the
foregoing, Petitioner CHA Hollywood Medical Center, L.P.’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $10,454.50.