Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 24STCV10609, Date: 2025-02-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV10609 Hearing Date: February 13, 2025 Dept: 45
KIEHL V. BIRNBAUM, ET AL.
DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT
Date
of Hearing: February 13, 2025 Trial
Date: N/A
Department: 45 Case No.: 24STCV10609
Moving
Party: Defendants George
Birnbaum and Annie Melloul
Responding
Party: Plaintiff
Jennifer Kiehl
BACKGROUND
This is a landlord-tenant dispute. Plaintiff Jennifer Kiehl
(“Plaintiff”) sued defendants George Birnbaum (“Birnbaum”), Annie Melloul
(“Melloul”), and 825 South Sherbourne LLC aka 825 S. Sherbourne LLC
(“Sherbourne LLC” or “the LLC”) on April 29, 2024, asserting claims for:
1. Breach of
Contract,
2. Avoidance of
Contract,
3. Unfair
Competition,
4. False
Advertising,
5. Breach of
the Implied Warranty of Habitability,
6. Restitution
based on Quasi-Contract/Unjust Enrichment,
7. Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,
8.
Fraud/Concealment,
9.
Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation,
10. Breach of
the Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment,
11. Negligence,
12. Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress,
13. Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress, and
14. Civil
Harassment (Civ. Code § 1940.2).
Plaintiff asserts all her causes of action against Birnbaum and
Sherbourne LLC. Of those, she also asserts the third, fourth, eighth, ninth,
and eleventh against Melloul. This leaves the first second, fifth, sixth,
seventh, tenth, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteen asserted against Birnbaum and
the LLC only.
As alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint and accepted as true upon
demurrer:
Plaintiff rented a residential property located at 825 S.
Sherbourne Drive, Los Angeles, Unit #100 (“the Property”), from defendant
Sherbourne LLC, its owner. The Property was not registered for residential
rental with the proper authorities. It was also not maintained in habitable
condition. When Plaintiff attempted to assert her rights as a tenant, Birnbaum
and/or Melloul (“the Individual Defendants”) harassed her to prevent her from
doing so. Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that “[825 Sherbourne]
and Mr. Birnbaum share a unity of interest such that a separateness of the LLC
has ceased to exist and recognition of the individuality of the LLC would
promote injustice.” (Compl., ¶ 4.) Melloul signed Plaintiff’s lease as agent
for Sherbourne LLC. (Id., ¶ 9.)
On June 6, 2024, Birnbaum and Melloul demurred to various causes
of action in the complaint.
Birnbaum demurs to the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth,
tenth, and twelfth causes of action. Melloul demurs to the third, fourth,
eighth, and twelfth.
Plaintiff filed her opposition on January 31, 2025.
[Tentative] Ruling
The demurrer is sustained in its entirety with thirty (30) days’
leave to amend.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Where
pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. (Coyne
v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests
whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
(Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10; Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
209, 220.)
When
considering a demurrer, a court reads the allegations stated in the challenged
pleading liberally and in context, and “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all
material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law.” (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Put
differently: for purposes of demurrer, the court treats all facts alleged – but
only the facts alleged – in the complaint as true. (Picton v.
Anderson Union High School District (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.) “The only issue
involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands,
unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
MEET & CONFER
“Before filing a demurrer ... , the demurring party shall meet and
confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is
subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be
reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).)
Defendant’s counsel attests she sent a single email to Plaintiff’s
counsel stating the grounds for Defendants’ demurrer, and Plaintiff failed to
respond. (Long Decl., ¶ 3.). A single email to Plaintiff does not satisfy
meeting-and-conference requirements, regardless of Plaintiff’s purported
failure to respond. The Code requires meeting and conference in person, by
telephone, or by videoconference.
Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s declaration in support of her opposition
shows further effort by both counsel to confer by phone. (G. Murai Decl., Exh.
A.) Due to both counsel’s efforts, the Court forgives the oversight and
proceeds to the merits. The Court recommends counsel make better effort moving
forward to avoid unnecessary continuances.
ANALYSIS
Evidentiary
Matters
Plaintiff submitted evidentiary material in support
of her opposition; the Court may not consider extraneous evidence upon demurrer.
(See Hahn v. Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) Although some of
Plaintiff’s exhibits could feasibly be subject to judicial notice, Plaintiff
did not request as much. The Court considers the materials only to the extent
they demonstrate the capacity to cure the complaint by amendment.
Notice of
Demurrer
Although Defendants have construed their moving
papers broadly by category – discussing, e.g., “each cause of action predicated
on breach of any express or implied obligations of the alleged contract” (MPA,
6:1-3) – they have only challenged specific causes of action in their Notice of
Demurrer. The Notice of Demurrer controls the scope of their pleading challenge.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320.)
As a result, Birnbaum has not challenged the first,
second, third, ninth, or eleventh causes of action, and this ruling does not
apply to those claims. Melloul has not challenged the eleventh cause of action,
and this ruling does not apply to that claim.
Discussion
Claims against Melloul
The third, fourth, and eighth causes of action
against Melloul fail. Plaintiff alleges nothing as to Melloul except that
Melloul signed her lease as the LLC’s agent. (Compl., ¶ 9.)
The twelfth cause of action is not alleged against
Melloul; she does not have standing to challenge it. But Birnbaum does, and his
challenge is successful, for reasons discussed below.
Melloul’s demurrer to the third, fourth, and eighth
causes of action is sustained with leave to amend.
Claims against Birnbaum
As to Birnbaum, Plaintiff alleges, by conclusion
only, that 825 Sherbourne is Birnbaum’s alter ego; she alleges no facts to
support this conclusion. (See Compl., ¶ 4.) Thus, her challenged contract
claims - the fifth, seventh, and tenth - fail as to Birnbaum.
Plaintiff alleges no other facts specific to
Birnbaum except that he illegally entered her Property. This allegation is
unrelated to claims for false advertising, quasi-contract, or fraud. By itself,
it is insufficiently outrageous to sustain a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. (See Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. in City
of New York (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1242 [conduct “ ‘ “exceed[ing] all
bound of that usually tolerated in a civilized society” ’ ”].)
Birnbaum’s demurrer is sustained in its entirety
with leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
The
Individual Defendants’ demurrer is sustained in its entirety with thirty (30)
days’ leave to amend.