Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 24STCV12828, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV12828 Hearing Date: February 19, 2025 Dept: 45
JEFFREY ALAN ROSS v. DUTTON PROPERTIES III, LLC, et
al.
DEFENDANT Jill
DUTTON’S MOTION TO quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction
based on IMPROPER SERVICE
Date of Hearing: February
19, 2025 Trial
Date: None Set
Department: 45 Case
No.: 24STCV12828
Complaint Filed: May 21, 2024
Moving Parties: Defendant
Jill Dutton
Responding Party: None
Notice: Proper
BACKGROUND
On May 21, 2024, Plaintiff Jeffery Alan Ross (“Plaintiff”) filed a
complaint against Defendants Dutton Properties II, LLC (“Dutton”), Howard
Management Group (“Howard”), Jill Dutton, erroneously named as Jill Hutton (“Jill”)
and Does 1 through 100. The complaint alleges (1) breach of contract; (2) negligence;
(3) negligence per se; (4) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (5)
breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (6) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (7) violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5; (8) violation of Cal. Civ.
Code § 1942.4; (9) violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.2; and (10) violation of
Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.
On July 10, 2024, Jill filed the instant Motion to Quash Service of Summons.
On October 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed proof of
service of summons and complaint as to Jill.
As of February 11, 2025, no opposition has
been filed.
[Tentative] Ruling
Jill’s Motion
to Quash Service of Summons is DENIED as moot.
LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may serve and file a
notice of motion to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the court over him or her. (Code Civ. Proc. §418.10(a).) Code
of Civil Procedure section 418.10 provides the exclusive procedure for
challenging personal jurisdiction at the outset. (Roy v. Sup.Ct. (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 337, 342.) The court may dismiss without prejudice the
complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to
Section 418.10. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (h).)
"A court
of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of this state or of the United States." (Code Civ. Proc., §
410.10.) "The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest
in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has
established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations."' (Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471-472.) A state court may not
exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (Asahi
Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987)
480 U.S. 102, 113.)
When a defendant moves to quash
service of the summons and complaint, the plaintiff has “the burden of proving
the facts that did give the court jurisdiction, that is the facts requisite to
an effective service.” (Coulston v. Cooper (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 866,
868.) The plaintiff must establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance
of the evidence. (Aquila, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556,
568.) “When a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
all necessary jurisdictional criteria are met. [Citation.] This burden must be
met by competent evidence in affidavits and authenticated documentary evidence.
An unverified complaint may not be considered as an affidavit supplying
necessary facts.” (Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1054-55.)
A court lacks
jurisdiction over a party if there has not been proper service of process. (See Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997)
53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) “[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for
service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction.
[Citation.]” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th
1426, 1444.) “[T]he filing of a proof of
service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper” but only
if it “complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.” (Id.
at 1441-1442.)
“The complaint
must be served on all named defendants and proofs of service on those
defendants must be filed with the court within 60 days after the filing of the
complaint.” (Cal. Rules of Ct. Rule 3.110 subd. (b).) “The court, on its own
motion or on the application of a party, may extend or otherwise modify the
times provided in (b)-(d). An application for a court order extending the time
to serve a pleading must be filed before the time for service has elapsed. The
application must be accompanied by a declaration showing why service has not
been completed, documenting the efforts that have been made to complete
service, and specifying the date by which service is proposed to be completed.”
(Cal. Rules of Ct. Rule 3.110 subd. (e).)
ANALYSIS
Defendant Jill
moves to quash Plaintiff’s purported service of summons and complaint upon her
on the grounds of a lack of personal jurisdiction based on improper service.
Timeliness
“A defendant,
on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further
time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of
motion for one or more of the following purposes: ¶ To quash service of summons
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)
A defendant
has 30 days after the service of the summons, or 40 days if service was
effectuated by substitute service, to file a responsive pleading. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 412.20, subds. (a)(3), (b).)
Here, Jill
filed the instant motion on July 10, 2024, before Plaintiff served her with the
summons and complaint on August 21, 2024 or filed proof of service on October
10, 2024. Jill argues that she filed the instant motion to quash any purported
service “to make sure that no sneak default is filed.” However, at the time of
filing the instant motion, the clock did not yet start on Jill’s responsive
pleading as Plaintiff had not yet served her or filed proof of service. Further,
at the time of filing of the instant motion, no default was sought or entered against
Jill. When the instant motion was filed, there was no service of summons to be
quashed. The fact that Plaintiff has since filed proof of service does not cure
the mootness of the instant motion. Jill must file a new motion addressing any
purported defects in the subsequently filed proof of service.
Accordingly, Jill’s
motion is moot. The court note that the
proof of service subsequently filed appears to show valid service. The proof of
services indicates that the summons and complaint was personally served on Jill
L. Dutton, in her individual capacity. The proof of service appears to comply
with the statutory requirements. Thus, Plaintiff’s filing of a proof of service
creates a rebuttable presumption that service was proper as to Jill.
CONCLUSION
Jill’s Motion
to Quash Service of Summons is DENIED as moot.
Moving party to give notice.