Judge Virginia Keeny, Case Number: 24STCV13236, Date: 2025-04-04 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 24STCV13236, Date: 2025-04-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV13236 Hearing Date: April 4, 2025 Dept: 45

Worthman v. the lovesac company, et al.

demurrer to first amended complaint

Date of Hearing: 4/4/2025 Trial Date: None set

Department: 45 Case No.: 24STCV13236

Moving Party: Defendant The Lovesac Company

Responding Party: Plaintiff Ryan Phillip Worthman

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the employment relationship between Plaintiff Ryan Phillip Worthman (“Plaintiff”) and The Lovesac Company (“Lovesac”) for the period of March 4, 2024 through April 14, 2024. On September 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Lovesac and Nicole Baldwin (“Baldwin”) (collectively, “Defendants”) inclusive for: (1) Hostile Work Environment Harassment; (2) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention; (3) Constructive Discharge in Violation of Public Policy; (4) Failure to Provide Meal Periods; and (5) Failure to Pay Compensation Due Upon Separation.

The FAC alleges that Plaintiff worked as an Assistant Showroom Manager for Lovesac located at 21540 Hawthorne Blvd #408, Torrance, CA 90503 between March 4, 2024 through April 14, 2024, making $23.00 per hour. (FAC ¶¶11-12.) Plaintiff’s job duties included overseeing daily operations at the showroom, selling products, building quotes, calling potential buyers, and coaching other employees. (Id.) Plaintiff worked 40 hours per week, eight hours a day. (Id. at ¶13.) The FAC further alleges that Baldwin subjected Plaintiff and other employees to inappropriate comments about their romantic relationships, sexual experiences, and sexuality. (Id. at ¶¶14-19.) Plaintiff resigned on or about March 29, 2024. (Id. at ¶26.)

On July 1, 2024, Lovesac filed a Demurrer to the Complaint. The matter came for hearing on August 20, 2024, wherein the Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint no later than September 20, 2024. (Min. Order, 8/20/24.)

On March 27, 2025, Baldwin filed an Answer to the Complaint.

Lovesac now demurs to the first through fifth causes of action of the FAC. On March 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the demurrer, to which Lovesac replied on March 27, 2025.

[Tentative] Ruling

Defendant The Lovesac Company’s Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED as to the first, second and third causes of action. Demurrer is sustained to the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action.

LEGAL STANDARD

“The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.)¿

“A¿demurrer¿tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) The Court looks to whether “the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Id.) The Court does not “read passages from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we read the complaint ‘as a whole and its parts in their context.’ [Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.” (Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th p. 240.) “The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)¿¿¿

A general demurrer may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted or under section 430.10, subdivision (a), where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. All other grounds listed in Section 430.10, including uncertainty under subdivision (f), are special demurrers. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92, subd. (c).)¿¿¿

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)¿¿

ANALYSIS

Defendant The Lovesac Company (“Lovesac”) demurs to the first cause of action on the grounds that the FAC fails to state facts showing that the alleged harassment was because of Plaintiff’s membership in a protected class, i.e., gender.

First Cause of Action for Hostile Work Environment Harassment

To establish a claim for hostile work environment based on sexual harassment plaintiff must prove: “(1) plaintiff belongs to a protected group; (2) plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) the harassment complained of was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment; and (5) respondeat superior.” (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 608.) “Whether the sexual conduct complained of is sufficiently pervasive to create a hostile or offensive work environment must be determined from the totality of the circumstances. (Id. at 609.) “The plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct would have interfered with a reasonable employee'swork performance and would have seriously affected the psychological well-being of a reasonable employee and that she was actually offended.” (Id. at 609–610.)

The court finds that the facts alleged in the FAC are sufficient to state a cause of action for hostile work environment based on sexual harassment against Lovesac.

Here, the FAC alleges that Plaintiff is an openly Bisexual man and the only male identifying employee during his employment at Lovesac. (FAC ¶¶16, 20.) Baldwin was Plaintiff’s direct supervisor and made comments about having a “Hoe Phase,” her spouse liking women with “fat asses,” and having sexually experimented with women included oral copulation to Plaintiff on March 19 and March 27, 2024, respectively. (Id. at ¶¶17-19.) Baldwin also told Plaintiff, “You should go to an orgy or a sex party. I have been a few times. If you need the hook up, I got you! They are a lot of fun.” (Id.) The FAC further alleges that these comments made Plaintiff feel distressed, disturbed, and afraid to report due to prior experience with workplace retaliation. (Id. at ¶¶20-23, 25.) Plaintiff was barely eating or sleeping. (Id.)

Therefore, the demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED.

Second Cause of Action for Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention

Lovesac demurs to the second cause of action on the grounds that (1) it is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act pursuant to Labor Code Section 3600 and (2) the FAC fails to allege facts showing that Lovesac knew or should have known that Defendant Nicole Baldwin (“Baldwin”) was unfit or incompetent.

“Under workers’ compensation an employer is liable for injuries to its employee arising out of and in the course of employment. (Lab. Code, § 3600.) Where the conditions of workers’ compensation exist, the right to recover such compensation is the employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer for such injuries.” (Spratley v. Winchell Donut House, Inc. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1408, 1411.) “However, the existence of an injury not compensable under workers’ compensation does not without more abrogate the workers’ compensation act’s exclusive remedy provisions.” (Id. at 1414.) “A failure of workers’ compensation law to include an element of damages recoverable at common law is a legislative, not a judicial, problem.” (Id.) Thus, in determining whether a claim is barred by the worker’s compensation exclusivity, the relevant inquiry is “whether the acts complained of were a ‘normal part of the employment relationship,’ or, whether the acts were incidents of the employment relationship.” (Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1429.)

Similarly, in Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1595, the court held “[A]ny claim for mere negligence by [Appellant] would be barred here by the workers’ compensation laws, since [Intervener] was the employee of [Appellant] and may not sue for its allegedly negligent or improper supervision.” (Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1595, 1606.) “[Appellant] agrees with the principle that negligence occurring during [Intervener’s] employment would be barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity principles, except for intentional acts of sexual harassment in violation of public policy, uninsurable under section 533, which (unlike employer negligence) are not an expected part of the employment relationship.” (Id.)

The court finds that the second cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention is not barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”) because the acts of sexual harassment alleged here are not an expected part of the employment relationship. Plaintiff cites to no legal authority supporting that a negligent hiring, supervision, and

Therefore, the demurrer to the second cause of action is overruled.

Third Cause of Action for Constructive Discharge in Violation of Public Policy

Lovesac demurs to the third cause of action on the grounds that the FAC fails to plead sufficient facts showing that Lovesac either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee’s resignation that a reasonable employer would realize that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would be compelled to resign.

“[A]n employee who is forced to resign due to actions and conditions so intolerable or aggravated at the time of his resignation that a reasonable person in the employee's position would have resigned, and whose employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the intolerable actions and conditions and of their impact upon the employee and could have remedied the situation, but did not, is constructively discharged.” (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1245.) Essentially, “the resignation must be employer-caused and against the employee's will. Consistent with this principle, the employer must either deliberately create the intolerable working conditions that trigger the resignation or, at a minimum, must know about them and fail to remedy the situation in order to force the employee to resign.” (Id. at 1249–1250.)

The court finds that the FAC alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action for constructive discharge in violation of public policy.

Here, the FAC alleges that on or about March 29, 2024, Plaintiff texted Baldwin letting her know he was resigning. (FAC ¶26.) On or about March 30, 2024, Plaintiff submitted his letter of resignation and gave his two weeks’ notice, stating the hostile work environment created by Baldwin was intolerable. (Id.) On or about April 2, 2024, Plaintiff complained about Baldwin’s conduct to the District Manager, Jordan Nazareno and requested that Nazareno not discuss anything until closer to his last day of work to avoid any hostile confrontation. (Id. at ¶28.) The FAC further alleges that Nazareno pulled Baldwin into the breakroom and reprimanded her right away. (Id.) Baldwin was allowed to further harass and berate Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff was forced to work with Baldwin alone on multiple occasions. (Id.)

These facts, when examined in the context of the broader allegations of hostile work environment harassment, are sufficient to state a claim for wrongful constructive discharge.

Fourth Cause of Action for Failure to Provide Meal Periods and Failure to Pay Compensation Due Upon Separation

Lovesac demurs to the fourth and fifth causes of action on the grounds that they were improperly added to the FAC. Specifically, Lovesac contends the original Complaint subject to its previous demurrer contained only three causes of action for: (1) Hostile Work Environment Harassment; (2) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention; and (3) Constructive Discharge in Violation of Public Policy.

“Following an order sustaining a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend, the plaintiff may amend his or her complaint only as authorized by the court's order.” (Harris v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.) “The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so, unless the new cause of action is within the scope of the order granting leave to amend.” (Id. compare Patrick v. Alacer Corp.(2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 995, 1015 (acknowledging rule but finding it inapplicable where new cause of action “directly responds” to trial court's reason for sustaining the demurrer when the court sustained the demurrer to the prior complaint on the grounds the plaintiff failed to allege standing as a shareholder to bring derivative claim and the new cause of action for declaratory relief sought a declaration that the plaintiff had a community property interest in the shares and was a cause of action by which the plaintiff may prove her standing to sue derivatively). “It is the rule that when a trial court sustains a demurrer with leave to amend, the scope of the grant of leave is ordinarily a limited one.” (Community Water Coalition v. Santa Cruz County Local Agency Formation Com. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329.) “It gives the pleader an opportunity to cure the defects in the particular causes of action to which the demurrer was sustained, but that is all.” (Id.)

On August 20, 2024, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint no later than September 20, 2024. (Min. Order, 8/20/24.) This order was granted following the review of Lovesac’s demurrer concerning the Complaint, which contained only three causes of action. There is no indication that the court permitted Plaintiff to add two new causes of action. As such, the fourth and fifth causes of action were not within the scope of the order granting leave to amend. Furthermore, the case cited by Plaintiff is inapplicable here. In Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, the court held that trial courts had discretion to allow amendments to pleadings in the furtherance of justice. (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488.) However, Plaintiff did not file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint per Code of Civil Procedure Section 473 nor Section 576 as required.

Therefore, Lovesac has shown that the fourth and fifth causes of action were improperly added to the FAC. To the extent that Plaintiff intends to amend the FAC to add two new causes of action, Plaintiff must file a motion for leave to file such amendment.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant The Lovesac Company’s Demurrer to the First through Third Causes of Action are overruled. The demurrer to the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action is sustained. Plaintiff must seek leave to amend if he wants to add these new causes. The court orders the parties to meet an confer about whether these new causes can be added by stipulation so as to avoid further expense and delay.