Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 24STCV24395, Date: 2025-03-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV24395 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: 45
SERENA PINA-WALKER V. DISNEY
WORLDWIDE SERVICES, INC., ET AL.
MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE TO ORANGE COUNTY SUPERIOR
COURT
Date of Hearing: March 7, 2025 Trial
Date: Not set.
Department: 45 Case
No.: 24STCV24395
Moving
Party: Defendants Walt Disney
Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc.; Disney Worldwide Services, Inc.; and The Walt
Disney Company
Responding
Party: Plaintiff Serena Pina-Walker
BACKGROUND
On September 19, 2024, Plaintiff Serena Pina-Walker filed a
Complaint against Defendants Disney Worldwide Services, Inc. (“DWWS”); The Walt Disney Company (“TWDC”);
Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc. (“WDPR”); Casey Black; William Garcia;
Trevor Michaels; Theresa Madrigal; and Does 1 to 100, inclusive, alleging
causes of action for: (1) Discrimination in Violation of FEHA; (2) Hostile Work
Environment Harassment in Violation of FEHA; (3) Retaliation in Violation of
FEHA; (4) Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodations in Violation of FEHA;
(5) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of FEHA; (6) CFRA
Leave Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation; (7) Failure to Prevent
Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; (8) Violation
of Labor Code § 232.5; (9) Whistleblower Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code
§ 1102.5; (10) Violation of Labor Code § 6310; (11) Wrongful Termination of
Employment in Violation of Public Policy; and (12) Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress.
On November 12, 2024, Defendants DWWS, TWDC, and WDPR
(“Moving Defendants”) filed and served the instant Motion to Transfer Venue to
Orange County Superior Court.
On November 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants TWDC; Disney Parks, Experiences,
and Products, LLC; Disney Human Resources Services Co., LLC; Casey Black; and
WDPR alleging causes of action for: (1) Discrimination in Violation of FEHA;
(2) Hostile Work Environment Harassment in Violation of FEHA; (3) Retaliation
in Violation of FEHA; (4) Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodations in
Violation of FEHA; (5) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in
Violation of FEHA; (6) Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment, and
Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; (7) Violation of Labor Code § 232.5; (8)
Whistleblower Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5; (9) Violation of
Labor Code § 6310; (10) Wrongful Termination of Employment in Violation of
Public Policy; and (11) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
On February 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the
motion to transfer venue, to which Moving Defendants replied on February 28,
2025.
[Tentative] Ruling
Defendants Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc.; Disney
Worldwide Services, Inc.; and The Walt Disney Company’s Motion to Transfer
Venue to Orange County Superior Court is GRANTED.
LEGAL
STANDARD
“If it appears from the complaint or affidavit, or
otherwise, that the superior court or court location where the action or
proceeding is commenced is not the proper court or court location for the
trial, the court where the action or proceeding is commenced, or a judge
thereof, shall, whenever that fact appears, transfer it to the proper court or
court location, on its own motion, or on motion of the defendant . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 396a, subd. (b).) A party moving to transfer venue “must
overcome the presumption that the plaintiff has selected the proper
venue.” (Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 830, 836.) “[I]t is the
moving defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s venue selection
is not proper under any of the statutory grounds.” (Ibid.) A plaintiff, in opposition to a motion to
transfer venue, “may bolster . . . her choice of venue with counter affidavits
consistent with the complaint’s theory of the type of action but amplifying the
allegations relied upon for venue.” (Ibid.) “Venue is determined based on the complaint
on file at the time the motion to change venue is made.” (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37
Cal.3d 477, 482 (Brown).)
Gov. Code § 12965(c)(3) states the following as it pertains
to venue in a FEHA action:
“The superior courts of the State of California shall have
jurisdiction of actions brought pursuant to this section, and the aggrieved
person may file in these courts. An
action may be brought in any county in the state in which the unlawful practice
is alleged to have been committed, in the county in which the records relevant
to the practice are maintained and administered, or in the county in which the
aggrieved person would have worked or would have had access to the public
accommodation but for the alleged unlawful practice, but if the defendant is
not found within any of these counties, an action may be brought within the
county of the defendant’s residence or principal office.”
(Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(3).)
A defendant “is entitled to have
an action tried in the county of his or her residence unless the action falls
within some exception to the general venue rule.” (Brown, supra, 37 Cal.3d 477,
483.) “[T]he FEHA venue statute
establishes an exception to section 395.” (Id. at p. 484.) Gov. Code § 12965(c)(3) “affords a wide
choice of venue to persons who bring actions under the FEHA. This choice maximizes the ability of persons
aggrieved by employment discrimination to seek relief from the courts, and it
facilitates the enforcement of the FEHA."
(Id. at p. 486.) “[T]he
special provisions of the FEHA venue statute [articulated in Gov. Code §
12965(c)(3)] control in cases involving FEHA claims joined with non-FEHA claims
arising from the same facts.” (Id.
at p. 487.)
ANALYSIS
Parties’
Positions
In
the moving papers, Moving Defendants contend that venue is proper only in
Orange County under Gov. Code § 12965(c)(3). Moving Defendants further contend that
Plaintiff’s expected arguments as to joint employer allegations are immaterial
to the application of the FEHA venue statute.
In
opposition to the motion, Plaintiff raises the following arguments: (1) venue
in Los Angeles is presumptively proper and Moving Defendants did not meet their
burden of making an affirmative showing to the contrary; (2) Moving Defendants
have no fundamental right to transfer a matter to a county other than their
principal place of business; (3) FEHA’s venue statute affords a wide choice of
venue to persons who bring actions under the FEHA; (4) Moving Defendants’
request for sanctions must be denied; and (5) Moving Defendants should be
ordered to reimburse Plaintiff for reasonable costs and fees incurred in
opposing the motion.
On
reply, Moving Defendants contend that: (1) FEHA’s venue statute governs and
mandates transfer to Orange County; (2) Plaintiff’s joint employer theory is
irrelevant and baseless; (3) Moving Defendants have met their burden in
demonstrating that only Orange County is the proper venue; (4) Plaintiff’s
“found” argument should be rejected; and (5) contrary to Plaintiff’s claim,
Moving Defendants are not seeking sanctions.
Evidentiary
Objections
The
Court SUSTAINS Moving Defendants’ evidentiary objections numbers 1, 3, 5, 6,
and 7 to the declaration of Plaintiff submitted in opposition to the motion on
the grounds of inadmissible lay opinion.
Plaintiff is informed that in a FEHA case, a plaintiff’s “personal
beliefs or concerns are not evidence.” (McRae
v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th
377, 396.)
The
Court SUSTAINS Moving Defendants’ evidentiary objection number 2 to the
declaration of Plaintiff submitted in opposition to the motion on the grounds
of hearsay. (Evid. Code § 1200.)
The
Court SUSTAINS Moving Defendants’ evidentiary objection number 4 to the
declaration of Plaintiff submitted in opposition to the motion on the grounds
of relevance. (Evid. Code §§ 351, 352.)
The
Court SUSTAINS Moving Defendants’ evidentiary objections numbers 10 and 12 to
the declaration of Aaron Shahmaram (“Shahmaram”) submitted in opposition to the
motion on the grounds of hearsay. (Evid.
Code § 1200.)
The
Court SUSTAINS Moving Defendants’ evidentiary objections numbers 8 and 11 to
the declaration of Mr. Shahmaram submitted in opposition to the motion on the
grounds of relevance. (Evid. Code §§
350, 351.)
The
Court OVERRULES Moving Defendants’ evidentiary objection number 9 to the
declaration of Mr. Shahmaram submitted in opposition to the motion.
Requests
for Judicial Notice
Moving
Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the following
documents: (1) a copy of Plaintiff’s complaint filed on September 3, 2024 in
Orange Conty Superior Court under case number 30-2024-01423274-CU-WT-NJC (the
“Orange County Action”) (Exhibit A); (2) a copy of the court order granting
Plaintiff’s requested dismissal of the Orange County Action (Exhibit B); (3) a copy
of the ruling in the matter of Arturo Chavez Ascencion v. Walt Disney Parks
and Resorts U.S., Inc., et al., LASC Case No. 20STCV18112, dated September
2, 2020 (Exhibit D); (4) a copy of the Appellate Court’s denial of the petition
for writ of mandate in Arturo Chavez Ascencion v. Walt Disney Parks and
Resorts U.S., Inc., et al., LASC Case No. 20STCV18112, dated October 1,
2020 (Exhibit E); (5) a copy of the ruling in the matter of Douglas Keith
Harris v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., et al., LASC Case No. 20STCV22722,
dated December 4, 2020 (Exhibit F); and (6) a copy of the dictionary
definitions of the word “administer” (Exhibit G).
The
Court GRANTS Moving Defendants’ request for judicial notice. The court takes
judicial notice of the existence of the documents. (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins.
Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.) However, the “court will not
consider the truth of the document’s contents unless it is an order, statement
of decision, or judgment.” (Id. at p. 374-375.)
Plaintiff
requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following documents: (1)
Secretary of State Statement of Information filed by Disney Human Resources
Services Co, LLC on October 3, 2024 (Exhibit 1); (2) Secretary of State
Statement of Information filed by The Walt Disney Company on March 12, 2024
(Exhibit 2); (3) Secretary of State Statement of Information filed by Disney
Parks, Experiences, and Parks, Inc. on September 9, 2024 (Exhibit 3); (4) Secretary
of State Statement of Information filed by Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S.,
Inc. on March 12, 2024 (Exhibit 4) ; (5) Secretary of State Amendment to
Articles of Organization filed by Disney Human Resources Services Co., LLC on
August 31, 2021 (Exhibit 5); (6) the October 5, 2020 declaration of Lynn
Lindquist submitted in the matter of Harris v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts
U.S. (Case No. 20STCV22722) (Exhibit 6); (7) the LinkedIn profile of Lynn
Lindquist accessed on February 23, 2025 (Exhibit 7); (8) the LinkedIn profile
of Casey Black accessed on February 23, 2025 (Exhibit 8); and (9) the ruling on
Defendants’ motion to transfer venue in the matter of Jose Luis Sanchez,
et al. vs. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., et al., LASC
Case No. 20STCV03170 (Exhibit 9).
The
Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. The court takes judicial
notice of the existence of the documents. (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage,
supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.) However, the “court will not consider
the truth of the document’s contents unless it is an order, statement of
decision, or judgment.” (Id. at p. 374-375.)
Inconsistencies
in Plaintiff’s Various Pleadings
Initially,
the Court will address Moving Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff filed the
instant action to forum shop. (Mot. at
p. 4:14-15.) Moving Defendants contend
that Plaintiff has omitted all references to Orange County from the complaint
in the instant action. (Mot. at p.
4:14-15.)
“Under
the sham pleading doctrine, admissions in a complaint that has been superseded
by an amended pleading remain within the court’s cognizance and the alteration
of such statements by amendment designed to conceal the fundamental
vulnerabilities in a plaintiff’s case will not be accepted.” (Nguyen v. Western Digital Corp. (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1536.) “A judicial
admission is an unequivocal concession of the truth of the matter and may be
made in a pleading.” (Humane Society
of U.S. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1249.) A “complaint’s allegations are a judicial
admission that concede the truth of [the] matter and have the effect of
removing it from the issues.” (Shirvanyan
v. Los Angeles Community College District (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 82, 100
[internal quotations omitted].)
Crux
of the Orange County Action
Here,
the Court notes that the Orange County
Action was filed on September 3, 2024.
(Moving Defendants’ RJN at Exh. A.)
Moving Defendants, as well as the other defendants named in the initial
complaint in the instant action, were named as defendants in the Orange County
Action. (Moving Defendants’ RJN at Exh.
A.)
In
the Orange County Action, Plaintiff alleged that upon her hire with defendants,
she disclosed her disabilities—a severe cinnamon allergy and systemic lupus
erythematosus—to Disney in the hope that, when necessary, defendants would
accommodate her through medical leaves, intermittent leaves, and assigning her
to workstations away from cinnamon.
(Moving Defendants’ RJN, Exh. A at p. 8:13-16.) On February 26, 2023, Plaintiff alleged that
she arrived at work early and was assigned to a kitchen which was serving
cinnamon pretzels. (Id. at p.
8:17-19.) Plaintiff notified her
supervisor, Casey Black (“Black”), to reassign her to a station without
cinnamon; however, Black thought Plaintiff was lying or exaggerating and
refused to reassign her to a different post.
(Id. at p. 8:21-22.)
Despite wearing a face mask, Plaintiff suffered a visible allergic
reaction that made breathing difficult and caused her to suffer from
hives. (Id. at p. 8:22-24.) Black is alleged to have needed further
convincing from Disney’s nurse and, even then, Black asked whether Plaintiff
really needed to go home. (Id. at
p. 8:24-26.) Plaintiff alleged that she
reported the incident and suffered retaliation including social isolation and
the cold shoulder from supervisors who ignored her requests for help, including
her requests for accommodations. (Id.
at p. 8:27-9:2.) Plaintiff alleged that,
due to her cinnamon allergy reaction, her lupus began to flare up, which made
it incredibly difficult to accomplish basic life activities such as getting out
of bed. (Id. at p. 9:2-3.) Plaintiff alleged that Disney used her
lupus-related absences as grounds to terminate her employment even though she
provided medical documentation excusing her absences. (Id. at p. 9:4-5.)
Plaintiff
alleged that WDPR, TWDC, and DWWS had their place of business in Orange County
at 1313 Disneyland Drive, Anaheim, California 92802. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleged that the causes of action
asserted in the complaint in the Orange County Action all took place in Orange
County. (Id.) Moreover, the other named defendants in the
Orange County Action were all alleged to have been residents of Orange County,
California. (Id., ¶¶
3(a)-(d).)
Crux
of the Complaint and the FAC in the Instant Action
The
complaint in the instant action arises from the same acts alleged in the Orange
County Action. (See Compl., at pp.
1-2.) However, the complaint indicates
that WDPR, TWDC, and DWWS have their principal place of business in Los Angeles
County. (Compl., ¶ 2.) Moreover, the complaint changed the
allegations that the other named defendants were residents of Orange County and
merely indicate that such defendants are residents of California. (Compl., ¶¶ 3(a)-(d).)
The
operative FAC arises from the same acts as alleged in the Orange County Action
and the initial complaint filed in this action.
(FAC at pp. 1-2.) However, the
FAC alleges that WDPR and TWDC have their principal places of business at 500
South Buena Vista Street, Burbank, CA 95121.
(FAC, ¶ 2.) Black is now alleged
to be a resident of Los Angeles County.
(FAC, ¶ 3(a).) DWWS is not named
as a defendant in the FAC. Moreover,
William Garcia, Trevor Michaels, and Theresa Madrigal—although being named as
defendants in the Orange County Action and the complaint in this action—are not
named as defendants in the FAC. Plaintiff
alleges that at all times alleged in the FAC, she was a resident of Los Angeles
County. (FAC, ¶ 1.)
Plaintiff
Appears to be Forum Shopping
Plaintiff
does not raise any argument in the opposition to rebut the contention that she
is forum shopping. Critically, Plaintiff
offers no explanation as to why the allegations as to the principal places of
business have changed from the filing of the Orange County Action to the filing
of the instant action. The Court has
taken judicial notice of the complaint in the Orange County Action. Such allegation as to all the named defendants
in the Orange County Action either having their principal place of business or
residency in Orange County constitute judicial admissions.
The
Court has concerns with the timing of the filing of the FAC. The FAC was filed two days after the motion
to transfer venue was filed by Moving Defendants. Plaintiff has the right to file an amended pleading
once as a matter of right without leave of court “to facilitate prompt
correction of errors or deficiencies in the original pleading.” (Hedwall v. PCMV, LLC (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 564, 574.) However, the
Court infers that such filing may have been a preventative measure to overcome
any arguments raised in the moving papers and an attempt to substantiate venue
in Los Angeles County.
Evidence
in Support of the Motion
Moving
Defendant submit numerous declarations in support of their motion to transfer
venue to Orange County.
Declaration
of Daniel Grossman
Daniel
Grossman (“Grossman”), who is the Senior Vice President and Assistant Treasurer
of Defendant TWDC, declares that TWDC does not own, operate, lease, manage, or
maintain the Disneyland Resort, which is located in Anaheim, California in
Orange County. (Grossman Decl., ¶
4.) From November 5, 2022, to June 1,
2023, Plaintiff was employed by WDPR and not by TWDC, DWWS, or any other
affiliate of TWDC. (Grossman Decl., ¶
5.) During the relevant time period,
Plaintiff worked at the Disneyland Resort in Orange County. (Grossman Decl., ¶ 5.) The individual defendants in this matter are
and have exclusively been employed by WDPR, and not by TWDC, DWWS, or any other
affiliate of TWDC. (Grossman Decl., ¶
5.) Theresa Madrigal was and is employed
by WDPR, and not DWWS or TWDC. (Grossman
Decl., ¶ 6.) TWDC has never employed
Plaintiff or any of the intended individual defendants in this action. (Grossman Decl., ¶ 7.)
Declarations
of Harriet Santana
Harriett
S. Santana (“Santana”), who is the Vice President—Human Resources—Disneyland
for Defendant WDPR, corroborates the facts set forth in the declaration of Mr.
Grossman. (Santana Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.) Defendants DWWS and TWDC did not employ,
supervise, or were involved in Plaintiff’s employment termination. (Santana Decl., ¶ 8.) WDPR documents related to employees who work
at the Disneyland Resort including, but not limited to, new hire documents,
WDPR policies, attendance records, discipline forms and memos, and medical
leave forms used for certifying leaves of absence and requesting accommodations
or work restrictions are found in Anaheim, Orange County and the electronic
records may be accessed by WDPR employees in Orange County. (Santana Decl., ¶¶ 9-10.) Any in-person communications regarding
discipline, accommodations, and other employment-related discussions with
Disneyland Resort Cast Members are held by WDPR management employees at the
Disneyland Resort in Anaheim, Orange County.
(Santana Decl., ¶ 11.) To the
extent a Cast Member needs to be accommodated due to a disability, that
accommodation would occur at the Disneyland Resort in Orange County. (Santana Decl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff was trained, managed, counseled,
and disciplined by managers at the Disneyland Resort in Orange County. (Santana Decl., ¶ 11.) Termination decisions for Disneyland Resort
employees, like Plaintiff, are made in Orange County. (Santana Decl., ¶ 12.) Documents relevant to Plaintiff’s attendance
and her attendance history were created and administered in Orange County and
not Los Angeles County. (Santana Decl.,
¶ 12.) Any accommodation requests by
Disneyland Resort employees are submitted in Orange County, if submitted in
person. (Santana Decl., ¶ 12.) But for Plaintiff’s termination of
employment, she would have continued working at the Disneyland Resort in Orange
County. (Santana Decl., ¶ 13.)
In
her rebuttal declaration submitted with the reply brief, Ms. Santana relevantly
states that DWWS, TWDC, Disney Human Resources, Co. (“DHRSC”), nor Disney
Parks, Experiences, and Products (“DPEP”) ever employed, supervised, or were
involved in Plaintiff’s employment termination.
(Santana Reply Decl., ¶ 4.)
Declaration
of Shanna Steed
Shanna
Steed (“Steed”), who is the Assistant Secretary of Defendant DWWS, corroborates
the facts set forth in the declaration of Mr. Grossman. (Steed Decl., ¶¶ 4-6.) DWWS has never employed Plaintiff or any of
the intended individual defendants in this action. (Steed Decl., ¶ 6.)
Declaration
of Jennifer Hunt
Jennifer
Hunt (“Hunt”), who was the Area Manger, Food and Beverage, at Avengers Campus
at the Disneyland Resort from August 2022 to July 2024 provides a
declaration. (Hunt Decl., ¶ 2.) Ms. Hunt states that she is familiar with
Plaintiff and Plaintiff worked in her area at the Disneyland Resort in Anaheim,
California. (Hunt Decl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff reported directly to Stage Manager,
whom Ms. Hunt oversaw. (Hunt Decl., ¶
3.) Ms. Hunt declares that all
activities concerned with Plaintiff’s employment such as discipline,
scheduling, orientation, training, generating of disciplinary memos, and
accommodation requests were all done in Orange County. (Hunt Decl., ¶¶ 6-10.) Plaintiff worked at the Disneyland Resort in
Orange County during her period of employment.
(Hunt Decl., ¶ 4.) Ms. Hunt was
involved in Plaintiff’s employment termination due to her attendance and
tardiness, and such decision was made and administered in Orange County. (Hunt Decl., ¶ 11.) Further, if Plaintiff needed to see a Cast
Health nurse, she would see that nurse in Orange County. (Hunt Decl., ¶ 10.) Ms. Hunt states that she believes the
convenience of the witnesses would be significantly promoted by transferring
the lawsuit to Orange County. (Hunt
Decl., ¶ 13.)
Declaration
of Kevin Nozaki
Kevin
Nozaki (“Nozaki”) who is the Director of eDiscovery for DWWS declares that
various documents related to WDPR employees who work at the Disneyland Resort
in Anaheim are stored in various systems.
(Nozaki Decl., ¶ 3.) The systems storing the personnel files, employee
relations files, labor relations files, health services files, worker’s comp
files, accommodations/leave files, and casting/recruitment files of WDPR
employees who work at the Disneyland Resort are not located in Los Angeles
County. (Nozaki Decl., ¶ 3.) Although some of the documents are stored in
the cloud, the physical equipment related to the cloud is not located in Los
Angeles County either. (Nozaki Decl., ¶
3.) Some of the information may be
stored on systems that are owned by third-party vendors; however, their systems
are also not located in Los Angeles County.
(Nozaki Decl., ¶ 3.)
Declaration
of Emma Luevano
Emma
Luevano (“Luevano”), who is counsel for Moving Defendants, provides a
declaration which sets forth the procedural history of the Orange County
Action. (Luevano Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.) Counsel also sets forth a recitation of meet
and confer discussions with Plaintiff’s counsel concerning the transfer of the
instant action back to Orange County.
(Luevano Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.)
Ms.
Luevano provides a rebuttal declaration in support of the reply. Counsel states that no proofs of service as
to the FAC have been filed as to Defendants DPEP and DHRSC. (Luevano Reply Decl., ¶ 3.)
Evidence
in Opposition to the Motion
Declaration
of Plaintiff
In
opposition to the motion, Plaintiff declares that she suffers from disabilities
including cinnamon allergies and lupus.
(Pina-Walker Decl., ¶ 2.)
Plaintiff began her employment with Disney in or around October 2022 and
remained employed continuously until her termination in or around June 1,
2023. (Pina-Walker Decl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff declares that she “received a
notice to employee as to change in [s]tatus my termination in or around
(sic).” (Pina-Walker Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff received the Walt Disney Company
U.S. Policy Manual while employed by Disney and, when provided with the Manual,
she was under the impression that the policies, rules, and guidelines therein
applied to her and her employment with Disney.
(Pina-Walker Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff
received email correspondence from Disney in relation to her request for
accommodations for her disability.
(Pina-Walker Decl., ¶ 6.) On or
around June 2, 2023, Plaintiff received a “Notice to Employee as to Change in
Status” and such document notified Plaintiff of her termination. (Pina-Walker Decl., ¶ 8.) On or around July
11, 2023, after her termination, Plaintiff received an email from “TWDC Global
HR Operations” with her W-2 Wage and Tax Statements. (Pina-Walker Decl., ¶ 9; Exh. 6.)
Declaration
of Aaron Shahmaram
Plaintiff’s
counsel, Aaron Shahmaram (“Shahmaram”), declares that Plaintiff’s fees opposing
the instant motion are estimated to amount to at least $3,500.00. (Shahmaram Decl., ¶ 3.) Mr. Shahmaram presents Statements of
Information filed with California Secretary of State which show that DWWS,
TWDC, and DPEP have their principal places of business in Burbank,
California. (Shahmaram Decl., ¶¶ 7-9; Exs.
9-11.) WDPR has its principal place of
business in Florida and its mailing address in Burbank, CA. (Shahmaram Decl., Ex. 12.)
Venue
is Proper in Orange County
The
Court finds that a discussion of Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Superior Court (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 306 (Ford) is appropriate. In Ford, defendant Ford and two of its
supervisory employees (collectively, Ford) were sued by plaintiffs Jeffrey and
Anita Danford for racial discrimination, hostile work environment, and
retaliation in violation of the FEHA. (Ford,
supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 306, 308.)
The Ford court noted that all of the alleged wrongs perpetrated
against plaintiffs were alleged to have occurred in Sacramento County. (Ibid.) The plaintiffs, however, filed their initial
complaint in Los Angeles County, which is where the plaintiffs resided at the
time of filing the complaint. (Ibid.) Ford moved to transfer venue to Sacramento
County on the grounds that “(1) the alleged discrimination occurred there; (2)
the records relevant to the case were maintained there; and (3) it was the
county in which plaintiffs would have worked but for defendants’ alleged
unlawful conduct.” (Ibid.) The trial court denied Ford’s motion. (Ibid.)
Ford
then appealed the trial court’s order denying the motion to transfer venue and
the Second District Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate as the Ford
court agreed that “the respondent court abused its discretion in denying
[Ford’s] motion for a change of venue from Los Angeles to Sacramento
County.” (Ibid.) The Ford court stated that “[i]f none of the three enumerated
criteria are satisfied [under the FEHA venue statute], then venue rests in the
county of the defendant’s principal office or residence.” (Id. at p. 310.) The Ford court held that venue was
mandatory in Sacramento County because: (1) the unlawful practices were alleged
to have been committed in Sacramento County; and (2) the records relevant to
the action were maintained there. (Ibid.) Thus, where one of the criteria articulated
by Gov. Code § 12965(c)(3) are met, a court cannot deny a defendant’s motion to
change venue. (Ibid.)
The
Court references the respective evidence presented by the parties articulated
above and incorporates it herein. Here,
the operative FAC is silent on whether the alleged wrongful actions occurred in
Los Angeles County. (See FAC at pp.
1-24.) However, the Court finds that
Moving Defendants have provided sufficient admissible evidence that: (1)
Plaintiff worked solely in Orange County at the Disneyland Resort; (2) all
activities and decisions concerning Plaintiff’s employment occurred in Orange
County; (3) the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment occurred in Orange
County; (4) all employment related documents may be accessed by employees in
Orange County; (5) all in-person communications occur in Orange County and any
accommodation requests must be submitted in Orange County; (6) Plaintiff was
only employed by WDPR and not another entity; and (7) Plaintiff would have
continued working at the Disneyland Resort in Orange County but for her
termination.
Based
on the evidence presented by Moving Defendants, the Court finds that this
action is similar to the Ford case.
Moving Defendants have presented evidence that the records relevant to
Plaintiff’s employment were maintained in Orange County and that no action
related to Plaintiff’s employment occurred in Los Angeles County. Moreover, Moving Defendants have presented
evidence that but for her termination, Plaintiff would have continued to work
in Orange County. Thus, under Ford,
although Moving Defendants DWWS and TWDC have their principal places of
business in Los Angeles County, such fact is irrelevant as Moving Defendants
have made a showing that venue is proper in Orange County under Gov. Code §
12965(c)(3).
The
Court finds that Plaintiff has not submitted sufficient admissible evidence to
show that Moving Defendants either maintained and administered relevant records
in Los Angeles County or engaged in unlawful practices in Los Angeles County by
and through their Los Angeles-based entities.
(Opp’n at pp. 11-12.) Even if the
Court had deemed as admissible all the evidence submitted in support of the
opposition, the Court would have found that Plaintiff did not make such a
showing.
Plaintiff
also argues that Moving Defendants’ residence in Los Angeles County prevents
the possibility of transfer of venue. The
Court rejects such argument. Plaintiff’s
reliance on the concurring opinion of Justice Kaus in Brown, supra,
37 Cal.3d 477, 490 is inapposite. The
concurrence of Justice Kaus did not state that there is a fourth prong of the
FEHA venue statute for the position which Plaintiff advances that “FEHA also
authorizes venue in the defendant’s residence or principal office if the defendant
is not found within any of the three counties addressed by the first three
prongs.” (Opp’n at p. 13:12-14.) Moreover, the sole issue in Brown was
whether the special venue provisions control over the general venue provisions
in CCP § 395(a) where FEHA and non-FEHA claims are alleged. (Brown, supra, 37 Cal.3d 477,
480.) Ford, supra, 50
Cal.App.4th 306, 310 stands for the proposition that if any of the three
criteria articulated in the FEHA venue statute are met, then the principal
place of business of a defendant is irrelevant to the venue analysis and does
not come into play. Here, Moving Defendants have made such a showing.
The
Court also finds that Plaintiff’s reliance on the declaration of Lynn Lindquist
(Shahmaram Decl., ¶ 12; Exh. 14) does not support Plaintiff’s position as to
venue. Such declaration does not even
reference Plaintiff and was not executed in connection with the instant action,
as it appears to be a declaration that was presented in connection with another
action. In fact, the declaration of Ms.
Lindquist appears to rebut Plaintiff’s position as to venue as she states that
no processing of disciplinary documents, change of status, new hire processing,
or termination of employment documentation is processed in Burbank or Los
Angeles County. (Shahmaram Decl., ¶ 12;
Exh. 14 at ¶¶ 5-9.)
In
sum, Moving Defendants have presented sufficient admissible evidence to meet
their burden that venue is proper in Orange County pursuant to Gov. Code §
12965(c)(3). Plaintiff, however, has not
presented sufficient admissible evidence to rebut the showing that venue is inappropriate
in Orange County.
As
to monetary sanctions, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for sanctions. The Court also finds that Plaintiff’s
argument that Moving Defendants seek sanctions is inaccurate. (Opp’n at p. 14:13-26.) Moving Defendants did not request sanctions
as to the instant motion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants Walt Disney Parks and
Resorts U.S., Inc.; Disney Worldwide Services, Inc.; and The Walt Disney
Company’s Motion to Transfer Venue to Orange County Superior Court is GRANTED.
Moving party to give notice.