Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 25STCV00263, Date: 2025-06-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV00263    Hearing Date: June 3, 2025    Dept: 45

DAVONTE TRUITT vs BEACH HOUSE GROUP SALES, LLC

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Date of Hearing:        June 3, 2025                          Trial Date:       None set

Department:              45                                            Case No.:        25STCV00263

Moving Party:            Defendant Beach House Group Sales, LLC

Responding Party:     Plaintiff Davonte Truitt

BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2025, Plaintiff Davonte Truitt, individually, and on behalf of the State of California and other aggrieved persons, filed a complaint against Beach House Group Sales, LLC for Civil Penalties under PAGA. Plaintiff alleges Defendant committed numerous labor code violations under state law.

[Tentative] Ruling

Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is GRANTED.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant Beach House Group Sales, LLC requests this court take judicial notice of (1) The Class Action Complaint in the case Davonte Truitt v. Beach House Group Sales, LLC, et al., Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 24STCV25158 (Exh. A); and (2) The Minute Order dated March 27, 2025, granting BHGS’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings in the case entitled Davonte Truitt v. Beach House Group Sales, LLC, et al., Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 24STCV25158 (Exh. B).

The court GRANTS the request for judicial notice as to the existence of these documents.

DISCUSSION

Defendant Beach House Group Sales, LLC moves this court for an order (1) compelling Plaintiff Davonte Truitt to arbitrate his individual claim under the Private Attorneys General Act; and (2) staying his remaining non-individual PAGA claim pending completion of arbitration. Defendant makes the motion on the grounds Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a valid, enforceable, and irrevocable arbitration agreement governed by the FAA.

Parties may be compelled to arbitrate a dispute upon the court finding that: (1) there was a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) said agreement covers the controversy or controversies in the parties’ dispute.¿ (CCP § 1281.2; Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004)¿118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) Because the right to arbitration depends upon contract, the party seeking arbitration bears the initial burden of proving that the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the instant dispute.  (Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754, 761.)  If the moving party does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that the subject agreement is unenforceable.  (Id. at 761.)  The court “sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.”  (Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.)¿¿ 

Defendant presents evidence of an arbitration agreement that Plaintiff signed. (Wolfe Decl., Exh. A.) Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement. Rather, Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s delegation clause on the grounds that it and the employment agreement it is part of are unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.

First, Plaintiff argues the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable because the agreements were offered to Plaintiff on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as a condition of employment with no opportunity for negotiation. Moreover, Plaintiff is not a sophisticated litigant well-versed in legal terminology and the small font using complex legal terminology shows unconscionability. Plaintiff also argues the delegation clause is procedurally unconscionable because it is embedded in a contract of adhesion.

The court finds there is a slight level of procedural unconscionability, which Defendants ultimately do not deny. The arbitration agreement was presented as mandatory, but this alone does not render the agreement unconscionable. (See Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127.) Similarly, in the absence of “surprise or other sharp practices, Courts do not recognize that “adhesive” arbitration agreements in the employment context establish a high degree of procedural unconscionability. (Baltazar v. Forever 21 Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1246; Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 248; [the fact that an arbitration agreement is presented as a “take-it-or-leave-it” contract of adhesion in the employment context, alone only establishes a modest degree of procedural unconscionability].) The agreement was presented in English and in average-sized font and given to plaintiff a week before he started his employment. (Wolfe Decl., Exh A.)

Based on the foregoing, the court finds the Arbitration Agreement is minimally procedurally unconscionable.  However, as discussed below, the court finds the arbitration agreement is not substantively unconscionable.   

Plaintiff argues there is a high degree of substantive unconscionability in the employment agreements and delegation clause because of lack of mutuality, imposition of fees and costs unique to arbitration, arbitration of non-arbitrable sexual harassment claims, representative PAGA action waiver, and non-solicitation and non-compete provisions in violation of Business & Professions Code §§ 16600 & 16600.1. Plaintiff cites Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, 491 to support their contention. Regarding mutuality, the court finds the provision in Alberto is not similar to the one in the instant case. In Alberto, the Agreement required Alberto to “acknowledge” that unauthorized use or disclosure of the company’s proprietary information “would cause irreparable injury to the Company,” and to “consent to the order of an immediate injunction, without bond, from any court of competent jurisdiction, enjoining and restraining” Alberto from “violating or threatening to violate” the agreement. (Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, 487.) Here, the provision states the company “will be entitled to seek extraordinary relief” including temporary restraining orders and injunctions. Unlike Alberto, the agreement here is not waiving the employer’s need to show irreparable harm, only that they are entitled to seek relief.

Next, Plaintiff argues the agreement specifically requires Plaintiff to pay half of the fees and administrative costs charged in arbitration if he asserts any claim other than for discrimination or wrongful termination in violation of public policy or if Defendant sues him. As a result, this creates the impression that employees like Plaintiff will have to pay significant costs if they file an arbitration claim for anything other than discrimination or wrongful termination in violation of public policy, or if they get sued by Defendant. The court disagrees. The agreement clearly states that where an employee is not only bringing a claim for discrimination in employment but for a public  policy claim arising under a statute or otherwise required by law to achieve the enforceability of this agreement, the company shall pay all the fees and administrative costs charged by the arbitrator and JAMS.

As for Plaintiff’s violation of the EFAA claim, as noted by Defendant, the arbitration agreement pre-dates the EFAA. (See Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 505.)  Regarding Plaintiff’s argument that the provision “Employee may only bring claims under this Agreement in her individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding” improperly asks Plaintiff to waive their PAGA claims, the court disagrees. The arbitration agreement says it is only for Plaintiff’s individual claims, not that Plaintiff cannot bring PAGA claims.

Lastly, the court finds the non-solicitation and non-compete provisions valid. Unlike Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 564, the provisions here do not prevent former employees for a period of time from rendering services, directly or indirectly, to any competitor using the employer’s confidential information. Instead, the agreement stops employees from soliciting other employees or using ideas suggested to the company within one year following termination. This does not restrain Plaintiff from practicing their chosen profession.

Based on the foregoing, the court finds the agreements are not substantively unconscionable.

Accordingly, the court compels Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims and stays the non-individual PAGA claims until arbitration is complete.