Judge Virginia Keeny, Case Number: 25STCV00883, Date: 2025-06-04 Tentative Ruling

defendants jose arana and yolanda arana’s demurrer to the complaint with motion to strike

On January 14, 2025, Plaintiff George Nnodim filed a complaint against Defendants Jose Arana and Yolanda Arana for (1) Negligence; (2) Wrongful Eviction; (3) Tenant Harassment; (4) Violation of the Los Angeles Rental Unit Registration Ordinance; (5) Breach of Contract; (6) Nuisance; (7) Unfair Business Practices; and (8) Trespass. Plaintiff alleges Defendants acted in an illegal eviction scheme as well as failed to provide habitable premises.

Defendants Jose Arana and Yolanda Arana Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED, in part; OVERRULED, in part. Defendants’ Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

Defendants Jose Arana and Yolanda Arana demur to the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth causes of action on the grounds each cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a claim against Defendants. Defendants also move to strike Plaintiff’s reference to ‘punitive damages’ and request for attorney fees.

Defendants demur to the first cause of action for negligence on the grounds Plaintiff’s allegations do not allege a breach of a landlord’s duty to use due care or even allege what the legal duty is.

The elements for negligence are: (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)

The court agrees Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a duty and a breach of that duty. Plaintiff alleges Defendants owed a duty as owners and/or managers of a residential rental property and breached that duty by “refusing to provide habitable premises, . . . making illegal entries, issuing illegal rent increase notices, and by recovering possession without cause.” (Compl. ¶26.) These allegations are sufficient to support a claim for negligence, even if some of their other allegations are vague (e.g., failure to follow industry standards.)

Defendants demur to the fifth cause of action for breach of contract on the grounds the alleged rental agreement is not attached nor does the complaint indicate on its face whether the contract is written, oral or implied by conduct.

“The standard elements of a claim for breach of contract are: ‘(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff therefrom.’” (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.) “A cause of action for breach of implied contract has the same elements as does a cause of action for breach of contract, except that the promise is not expressed in words but is implied from the promisor’s conduct.” (Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 172, 182.)

The complaint alleges implied in Plaintiff’s rental agreement for the Subject Unit is an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, which includes the right to be free from unlawful eviction and harassment as well as a promise to inspect and maintain the units in a clean, safe, and habitable condition. (Compl. ¶53.) Plaintiff met his obligations under the lease including paying rent. (Compl. ¶54.) However, Defendants breached the covenant by failing to inspect and maintain the unit in a clean, safe, peaceful, undisturbed, and habitable condition. (Comp. ¶¶55-58.)

The court finds these allegations insufficient. While Plaintiff need not attach the agreement or plead the terms of the agreement, Plaintiff must at least allege the legal effect of the contract. (See Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Insurance Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-99.) “In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.’ (Id., § 480, p. 573.)” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.) Plaintiff alleges implied terms of the contract, but not clearly that it is written or oral. Moreover, the complaint should be clear that Defendant breached explicit terms of the contract if that is what Plaintiff is arguing. If Plaintiff is only alleging breach of implied warranty of habitability, it should clearly say so.

Based on the foregoing, the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Defendants demur to the sixth cause of action for nuisance on the grounds any allegations supporting interference are manifestly unsubstantial and conclusory.

“The essence of a private nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyment of land.” (Friends of H Street v. City of Sacramento (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 152, 160.) Thus to allege a cause of action for private nuisance, the plaintiff must allege injury specific to the use and enjoyment of his land. (See Adams v. MHC Colony Park Limited Partnership (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 601, 610.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendants committed a nuisance when Defendants “issued illegal demands to recover possession, illegal rent increases, entered the Subject Unit illegally, refused to provide working kitchen facilities, and created ongoing nuisances through their wrongful recovery of possession of the Subject Unit.” (Compl. ¶65.) These allegations sufficiently allege "substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the premises not merely de minimis interference.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 920.)

Defendants demur to the seventh cause of action for unfair business practices on the grounds there is no specific factual allegations regarding any “unfair” practice and although Plaintiff references various City of Los Angeles’ ordinances, Plaintiff provides neither the particular section or portion of any ordinance on how the Defendants violated such.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues they pled that Defendants engaged in unlawful and unfair business practices by recovering possession of the Subject Unit without following the law, by collecting rent without ever filing necessary paperwork with the City of Los Angeles, and by failing to provide habitable premises as required by law, including by refusing to provide a stove. (Compl. 75.) By collecting rent for a unit that was not fit for residential occupancy, Plaintiff argues Defendants were unjustly enriched. (Compl. ¶76.)

The court finds these allegations sufficient. The complaint alleges Defendants violated the Just Cause for Eviction Ordinance and Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance. Plaintiff also alleges by doing so, Defendants were unjustly enriched.

Based on the foregoing, the demurrer to the seventh cause of action is OVERRULED.

Defendants demur to the eighth cause of action for trespass on the grounds the allegations are nothing but legal conclusions. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants “would enter the Subject Unit to collect rent through unannounced visits or require Plaintiff to meet the Defendants at home to drop off rent” show that entry was authorized, defendants contend.

“The elements of a common law trespass are (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant’s intentional, reckless, or negligent entry on the property; (3) lack of permission to enter the property, or acts in excess of the permission; (4) actual harm; and (5) the defendant’s conduct as a substantial factor in causing the harm.” (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 8 (2010) 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 88, 93, reversed on other grounds by 55 Cal.4th 1083.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues they have sufficiently alleged that Defendants intentionally entered the Subject Unit Plaintiff’s bedroom, that this conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm and suffered from loss of the use of enjoyment of his unit. Moreover, any claim by Plaintiff that entry was consensual is a trial defense and not grounds for a demurrer.

The court agrees. The allegations are sufficient for the purposes of a demurrer.

Based on the foregoing, the demurrer to the eighth cause of action is OVERRULED.

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s allegations regarding punitive damages and attorney fees on the grounds the fourth cause of action for retaliatory eviction in violation of Civil Code section 1942.5 fails to plead facts sufficient to seek and obtain punitive damages and Plaintiff has not cited to or specified a contractual or statutory basis for recovery of attorney fees.

The court GRANTS the motion to strike. The court finds Plaintiff has not alleged more than the mere commission of a tort. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-95.) The complaint does not sufficiently allege oppression, fraud or malice. Moreover, the complaint should allege the basis for attorney fees.

[1] Plaintiff argues Defendants failed to meet and confer adequately. Plaintiff’s counsel states Defense counsel called them to offer a settlement and threatened to a demurrer if they did not accept. (Popal Decl. ¶5.) After pushback on what the specific grounds for demurrer were, Plaintiff’s counsel states Defendant made arguments on the fly and stated that the reasons would be listed in the demurrer itself. (Popal Decl. ¶5.) While the meet and confer may have been insufficient, a determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (CCP §430.41(a)(4).) The court admonishes Defense counsel for its failure to substantively meet and confer. The purpose of meeting and conferring before filing the demurrer is to encourage open communication in goals of reaching an agreement that resolves the objections to the complaint.