Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: 25STCV06583, Date: 2025-06-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25STCV06583 Hearing Date: June 13, 2025 Dept: 45
JOHN MMD DOE,
et al. vs LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.
demurrer to the complaint
Date of Hearing: June
13, 2025 Trial
Date: None
set.
Department: 45 Case
No.: 25STCV06583
Moving Party: Defendant
Los Angeles Unified School District
Responding Party: Plaintiffs
John MMD Doe and Jane MPG Doe
Meet and Confer: Yes.
(Gonzalez Decl.)
BACKGROUND
On
March 7, 2025, Plaintiffs John MMD Doe and Jane MPG Doe filed a complaint
against Los Angeles Unified School District and Mark Berndt for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligence, negligent supervision, negligent
retention/hiring, negligent failure to warn, train or educate, breach of
fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, sexual battery and sexual assault.
Plaintiffs allege Defendant Berndt sexually harassed, molested and abused
Plaintiffs while attending Miramonte Elementary School. Plaintiffs further
allege LAUSD negligently failed to supervise Berndt and provide adequate
warning to Plaintiffs of Berndt’s dangerous propensities and unfitness.
[Tentative] Ruling
Defendant Los Angeles Unified School
District’s Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED
DISCUSSION
LAUSD demurs to the first (intentional
infliction of emotional distress), sixth (breach of fiduciary duty) and seventh
(constructive fraud) causes of action on the grounds that Plaintiffs fail to
state facts sufficient to state each cause of action against the School
District and each cause of action is uncertain and not pled with sufficient
particularity.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress
The necessary elements for intentional
infliction of emotional distress are: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant;
(2) which was intentional or reckless in nature; (3) severe emotional distress;
and (4) causation. (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon
Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.)
LAUSD demurs to the first cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the grounds the
California Supreme Court has expressly held that a school district cannot be
held vicariously liable for the sexual misconduct of its employees, because
such conduct is necessarily beyond the scope of their duties. (See John R.
v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal. 3d 438, 441, 447-453; see
also C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School District (2012) 253 Cal.
4th 861, 865 and 879.)
In opposition, Plaintiff argues the
complaint sufficiently alleges LAUSD and Miramontes administration knew or
should have known about the dangers of Berndt, yet supervisory personnel failed
to act. As a result, LAUSD can be liable for its own direct negligence in failing
to properly hire, train and supervise Berndt and in failing to prevent him from
harming Plaintiffs.
The court finds the first cause of
action fails to state a claim against LAUSD. Generally, a school may not be
held vicariously liable for the intentional torts of its employees where the
conduct at issue falls outside the scope of employment.¿ (See John R. v.
Oakland (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 447.) The only way a school district may be
held liable under those circumstances must be “premised on its own direct
negligence in hiring and supervising the teacher.” (Id. at 453.)
The court notes Plaintiff’s citations
to Lawson v. Superior Court (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1372 and Phyllis
P. v. Superior Court (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1193. The court finds the facts
in those cases distinguishable from the facts at hand. In Lawson, the
court upheld the claim on the basis of vicarious liability under Government
Code Section 815.2. Again, “[t]he only way a school district may be held liable
must be ‘premised on its own direct negligence in hiring and supervising the
teacher.’” (Steven F. v. Anaheim Union High School Dist. (2003) 112
Cal.App.4th 904, 909.) In Phyllis, the court allowed a parent of a child
who had been molested by a fellow student to bring a claim for IIED where the
school affirmatively concealed from the parent that the parent’s child had
reported having been repeatedly molested by a fellow student, as well as the
fact that it had instituted a program of psychological counseling for the
victim. (Id. at 1195-1196.) Here, the claim is by the students against
the district and there are no allegations that LAUSD concealed the assault of
Plaintiffs.
Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is
SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The elements of a cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of
the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach. (Ash v.
N. Am. Title Co. (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1258, 1276.)
LAUSD demurs to the sixth cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty on the grounds here is no basis in
California law to claim that a school district has a fiduciary relationship
with students. (See Thomas v. Board of Education of Brandywine School
District (2010) 759 F. Supp. 2d 477, 503-04.)
In opposition, Plaintiff argues a
fiduciary relationship does exist as the law required that Plaintiffs be in the
custody and care of Miramonte during school hours. (Education Code §48200.)
Because they were in in loco parentis with Plaintiffs, LAUSD entered into a
confidential, fiduciary, and special relationship with Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
cite to Barbara A. v. John G. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 369 and Board of Education v. Weiland (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 808 for the contention that a
confidential relationship may be founded in a moral one, similar from attorney
and client to teacher and their pupils.
The court finds the sixth cause of
action fails to state a claim against LAUSD. LAUSD owes a duty of reasonable
care to its students, not a heightened “fiduciary duty”. (C.A. v.
William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2010) 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 283,
292.) The cases cited by Plaintiff do not establish this heightened
relationship between students and the schools.
Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is
SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Constructive Fraud
“Constructive fraud' arises from a
breach of duty by one in a confidential or fiduciary relationship to another
which induces a justifiable reliance by the latter to his prejudice. (CC §
1573; Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School. Dist. (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 123,
129.)”
LAUSD demurs to the seventh cause of
action for constructive fraud on the grounds here is no basis in California law
for alleging a school district has a fiduciary relationship with students, this
cause of action should be dismissed. Moreover, the Plaintiffs have not alleged
specific facts supporting their constructive fraud claim. Specifically, Plaintiffs
allege no facts to indicate any advantage that the School District obtained
over them based on any specific representation nor have Plaintiffs pled any
facts demonstrating that the School District made any affirmative false
representation of material fact or misrepresentation to them, or that the
School District gained any advantage over them by any alleged concealment or
misstatement.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues the
complaint sufficiently alleges despite being a fiduciary relationship with
Plaintiffs, concealed previous sexual assaults committed by Berndt and
continued to allow numerous children, including Plaintiffs, to be in private,
secluded locations with Plaintiffs, in spite of their knowledge of the danger Berndt
posed. (Compl. ¶¶108-121.) Moreover the allegations support the fact that LAUSD
gained an advantage, by not having to fire Berndt, and allow him to remain at
Miramonte, and pass-on the risk to the Plaintiffs.
As noted above, Plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that this “special relationship” between a School District and a student
gives rise to “fiduciary duties”. Nor has Plaintiff alleged a confidential
relationship sufficiently. Plaintiff
generally alleges the existence of one. In addition, Plaintiffs fail to allege
the advantage gained by LAUSD.
Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is
SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.