Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: BC615598, Date: 2025-01-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC615598    Hearing Date: January 16, 2025    Dept: 45

KARIAVANDAN RAJU v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES & DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH

Motion FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Date of Hearing:          January 16, 2025                     Trial Date:  September 13-25, 2024

Department:               45                                            Case No.:  BC615598

Moving Party:             Plaintiff Kariavandan Raju

Responding Party:       Defendant County of Los Angeles

BACKGROUND

This case was an employment action alleging whistleblower and Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)-based discrimination claims.

On April 1, 2016, Plaintiff Kariavandan Raju (Plaintiff) initiated the instant action.

On September 28, 2018, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint.

On December 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint (3AC) against Defendants County of Los Angeles (County) and Department of Mental Health (Mental Health) (collectively, Defendants), alleging causes of action for (1) Whistleblower Retaliation, (2) Retaliation for Complaining about Unlawful Discrimination, (3) Failure to Prevent Discrimination, (4) Failure to Take Corrective Action, and (5) Failure to Investigate.

From September 13, 2024 through September 25, 2024, the Court held a jury trial on two causes of action within the 3AC - Retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 and Retaliation under FEHA.  On October 23, 2024, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against County for damages of $567,756.50, based on the cause of action for Retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5.

Plaintiff now moves for attorney fees.

[Tentative] Ruling

Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED in the amount of $1,289,659.75.

LEGAL STANDARD

The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.)

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿¿ 

In determining whether the requested attorney’s fees are “reasonable,” the Court’s “first step involves the lodestar figure—a calculation based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the lawyer’s hourly rate. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of facts specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774 [internal citations omitted].) In determining whether to adjust the lodestar figure, the Court may consider the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (EnPalm LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “‘The reasonable market value of the attorney's services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate. [Citations.] This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represent the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel. [Citations.]’” (Center For Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 619.) 

JUDICIAL NOTICE

Plaintiff is requesting the Court to take judicial notice of the following pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452 and 453:

1.      The Department of Justice/USAO Attorney’s Fees [Laffey] Matrix (2015-2021).

2.      Winston v. County of Los Angeles, 2024 WL 5114891, *1-6 (December 13, 2024), (Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 8 – Case No. B323392)

3.      Special Verdict Form (Signed by the Presiding Juror on September 25, 2024) for Raju v. County of Los Angeles, LASC Case No. BC615598.

4.      Judgment entered for Raju v. County of Los Angeles, LASC Case No. BC615598

5.      Trial Court’s August 9, 2019, Ruling on Motions in Limine (Raju v. County of Los Angeles – LASC Case No. BC615598).

The Court grants Plaintiff’s request in its entirety.

County is requesting the Court to take judicial notice of the following pursuant to Evidence Code sections 450, 452(d),(h) and 453:

1.      Joint Stipulation and Order to Continue Trial and All Trial Related Dates filed on May 17, 2021.

2.      Substitution of Attorney filed on September 8, 2021.

3.      Final Status Conference Minute Order dated May 10, 2022.

4.      Court’s Order denying Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for an Order to Continue the September 22, 2022, trial date dated August 10, 2022.

5.      Plaintiff’s Request for Dismissal dismissing ONLY the following claims: failure to prevent race/national origin discrimination; failure to promote; and failure to take corrective action on the basis of race/national origin, dated August 11, 2022.

6.      Minute Order granting Defendant, County of Los Angeles’ Stipulated Ex Parte Application for an Order Continuing the Final Status Conference date from 10/27/2022 to 3/1/2023 and Trial date from 11/7/2022 to 3/6/2023, dated October 14, 2022.

7.      Minute Order re: Jury Trial dated March 6, 2023.

8.      Minute Order dated June 5, 2023.

9.      Minute Order re: Final Status Conference / ExParte Application to Continue Trial dated January 22, 2024.

10.   Order to Continue Trial dated August 1, 2024.

11.   Defendant, County of Los Angeles’ Trial Brief dated August 23, 2024.

12.   Order on Motions in Limine heard on August 8, 2019 dated August 9, 2019.

13.   Defendant’s Motion for Non-Suit dated September 16, 2024.

14.   Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Non-Suit dated September 18, 2024.

15.   Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendant’s Amended (Proposed) Special Jury Instructions.

16.   Court’s Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication as to Issue Nos. 1-5, 10-13, and 15-18, and denying Issue Nos. 6-9, 14, 19, 20 and 21 dated March 28, 2018.

The Court grants County’s request in its entirety.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTION

Plaintiff objects to the Declaration of Grant Stiefel in support of Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees on the basis that it violates a prior court order precluding Defendant from introducing any expert testimony whatsoever. Plaintiff contends that this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Number 1 and expressly precluded Defendant from introducing any expert testimony.

However, the Court’s order in granting the motion in limine did not specify whether the motion only applied to expert testimony produced at trial. The Court finds that the Court’s order granting the motion in limine to preclude County from introducing expert testimony did not extend to post-trial motions.

Thus, Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff is seeking attorney fees in the amount of $2,636,878.50 as the prevailing party against County. Plaintiff is seeking attorney fees pursuant to California Labor Code Section 1102.5 subdivision (j).

1.      Entitlement to Fees

Labor Code section 1102.5 subdivision (j) authorizes the Court to award reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff who brings a successful action for a violation of 1102.5. While this subsection was added to the Code on January 1, 2021, the latest version of the subsection became effective on January 1, 2024.   The Courts of Appeal have held “that in the absence of express legislative intent to the contrary, ‘a new statute authorizing an award of attorney fees’ or a statute ‘increasing or decreasing litigation costs, including attorneys' fees’ applies to actions pending at the time of enactment.” (USS-Posco Indus. v. Case (2016) 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 791, 810.)

Because the subsection(j), which authorizes an award of attorney fees for violation of provisions within Labor Code section 1102.5, was added to the Code while the instant action “was not yet final at the time [the subsection became] effective,” Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees. (California Hous. Fin. Agency v. E.R. Fairway Assocs. I (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1513; see also Hogan v. Ingold (1952) 38 Cal.2d 802, 814 (“[S]tatutes either increasing or decreasing the allowable costs, including attorney fees, are consistently applied to litigation pending when such statutes became effective, unless a contrary intent clearly appears from the statute.”)].)

2.      Reasonableness of Fees

“If a plaintiff has prevailed on some claims but not others, fees are not awarded for time spent litigating claims unrelated to the successful claims, and the trial court should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained. (Citation).” (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 989.) Although fees are not reduced when a plaintiff prevails on only one of several factually related and closely intertwined claims (citation), under state law as well as federal law, a reduced fee award is appropriate when a claimant achieves only limited success. (Citation).” (Ibid.) Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation.... In these circumstances the fee award should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit. [Citation.]” (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 440.)

In Wysinger, the prevailing party alleged eight causes of action, but prevailed on two causes of action, including a retaliation-based cause of action. (Wysinger v. Auto. Club of S. California (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 413, 430.) The Wysinger Court affirmed the trial court’s award to the prevailing party, even though the losing party contended that award should have been reduced because the prevailing party succeeded on some but not all causes of action. (Ibid.)

The Court finds that like in Wysinger, the cause of action on which Plaintiff did not prevail is “common to another and intertwined” with the cause of action on which Plaintiff did prevail. Both causes of action were pled in the 3AC based on the same facts, and involved the same allegations premised upon the retaliation plaintiff experienced for being a whistleblower and opposing unlawful employment practices, including disparate treatment due to his race. “[E]mployment discrimination cases, by their very nature, involve several causes of action arising from the same set of facts.” (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 486.) Thus, Plaintiff’s fee award should not be reduced on the basis that Plaintiff’s FEHA claim is completely distinguishable from the section 1102.5 claim on which he prevailed.

Plaintiff is requesting attorney fees in the amount of $2,636,878.50.

Plaintiff argues that over the last six-and-a-half years of litigation, since Counsel for Plaintiff was retained, the instant case has been heavily and judiciously litigated by Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s counsel states that the following litigation events have transpired: Plaintiff propounded nine (9) sets of written discovery on Defendant, totaling 110 written requests; Defendant propounded eleven (11) sets of written discovery on Plaintiff, totaling 180 written requests; thousands of pages of documents were exchanged, reviewed, and analyzed; between the parties, sixty-one (61) motions/ex parte applications, oppositions/objections, and/or replies were drafted and filed, and the parties attended the associated hearings; between the parties, numerous pretrial documents (witness lists, jury instructions, exhibit lists, trial briefs, etc.) were drafted and filed with the court (the number of such documents approximates (71) seventy-one); the parties drafted motions in limine and in connection with said motions, sixty-nine (69) motions, oppositions, and/or replies were drafted and filed by the parties; and the parties attended a mediation and an MSC. Then, after all of the foregoing, Plaintiff and his counsel were engaged in five weeks of jury trial, where testimony/evidence was submitted, a motion for nonsuit was opposed; and after careful deliberation, the jury ultimately rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on his Labor Code section 1102.5 retaliation claim. (Felahy Decl., ¶ 12.)

Counsel for Plaintiff seeks the following:

As stated similarly above, the party seeking attorney fees and costs “bear[s] the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates” to show that the fees incurred were allowable and reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320-22.) To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended.  (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.)

A party seeking attorney fees is “not automatically entitled to all hours they claim in their request for fees. They must prove the hours they sought were reasonable and necessary.” (El Escorial Owners' Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1366.) “A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether. (Citation)." (Christian Research Institute, supra, 165 Cal.App.4^th at p. 1321-22.)

The Court is cognizant of the amount of time Plaintiff’s counsel expended on litigating the instant action, which spanned multiple years, that came to a fortunate conclusion for Plaintiff in the form of a judgment for $567,756.50. However, the Court finds that the amount of attorney fees requested by Plaintiff’s counsel to still be excessive.

Firstly, Plaintiff’s counsel has only provided the Court with a summary sheet of work that each employee completed during the course of litigation. (Felahy Decl., Exhibit 4.) The work performed is separated into distinct categories “A” through “I,” with descriptors attached to each category (ie, “Amendments to Pleadings; Motions to Amend; Admin. Filings/Gov't Claim(s); Oppositions/Briefing, Research & Hearings Related to Challenges to Pleadings,” “Depositions and Related Deposition Prep,” or “Jury Selection.” (Ibid.) While an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records, Plaintiff still has the burden of providing the Court with an explanation as why the hours sought are reasonable and necessary. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal App.4th 1363, 1375.)

For Category D, which reflects “Pre-Trial Work including Preparation of Pre-Trial Documents, Trial Exhibits, Meetings with Clients and Witnesses, preparation of deposition summaries and testimony outlines, work on pre-trial motions/ex partes,” Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 1766.6 hours. County has provided the declaration of Attorney Fees Expert Grant Stiefel. Stiefel opines that ““most of the depositions in this case were very short” with “the average deposition time [being] less than two hours,” which should not have taken more than “2-3 hours to summarize.” (Stiefel Decl., ¶¶ 72-76.) Additionally, because most depositions were attended by two of Plaintiff’s lawyers, “the time taken to summarize [transcripts of those depositions] is duplicative and not reasonable.” (Superior Form Builders v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply, 881 F.Supp. 1021, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1994). Expert Steifel states he “cannot conceive how Plaintiff’s counsel could have reasonably spent nearly a year of full-time billable work on the limited tasks enumerated in Category D, which should have taken a few hundred hours at most.” (Stiefel Decl., ¿ 77.) For these reasons, the Court will reduce the request reflected in Category D by 75%. (Stiefel Decl., Exhibit G.)

For Category A(2), which reflects “Depositions and Related Depo Prep,” Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 547 hours. However, most of the depositions in this case were very brief: aside from Plaintiff Raju’s deposition, which spanned five sessions. The average time of each deposition appearance was just one hour and fifty-two minutes (1:52). (Stiefel Decl., ¿ 80 [Exhibit E (Summary of Deposition Length).) The total time Counsel spent in actual deposition was just under 40 hours, meaning that 507 hours were purportedly billed for deposition preparation. This means that for every hour on the record, the Felahy firm billed for twelve hours of prep time. This is unreasonable. (Stiefel Decl., ¿¿ 80-82.) The Court finds that the ratio of 12:1 for preparation for deposition to be excessive. For these reasons, the Court will reduce the request reflected in Category A(2) by 75%. (Stiefel Decl., Exhibit G.)

For Category A(3), which reflects “Review of documents & evidence produced by Defendant(s) and analysis & investigation,” Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 702.6 hours. However, Plaintiff produced around 855 pages of documents, while County produced 2,536 pages. For the number of hours Plaintiff has requested, this equates to about thirteen (13) minutes of review time for each page produced. Courts have held that six minutes to review a single document is unreasonable and that “approximately two and a half minutes… is a more reasonable estimation of the time it would take an attorney to review a one-page, routine document.” (Fryar v. Saul, No. 7:19-CV-198-RJ, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 26, 2021).) For these reasons, the Court will reduce the request reflected in Category A(3) by 75%. (Stiefel Decl., Exhibit G.)

For Categories E and F, County contends that Attorney Farbod Nourian’s hourly rate should be reduced to $225.00 an hour because Mr. Nourian’s role at trial was more akin to paralegal work, as he purportedly “did not participate in voir dire, did not address the jury, and did not question any witnesses.” The Court does not agree with this reduction.

For Categories A(1), A(3), A(4), B(2), C, F and I, County contends, based on Expert Stiefel’s recommendation, that a 40% discount is warranted for “vagueness and block billing,” as to internal conferencing and communications among counsel. Expert Stiefel states that “it not possible to determine how much time was attributed to internal attorney conferencing, because any billing entries that might reflect such intra-office communications has been subsumed within Plaintiff’s vague, block-billed summary of work.” (Stiefel Decl., ¶ 91.) Because Plaintiff has not provided the court with billing records, the Court cannot discern how much of the time billed was duplicative or unnecessary. Additionally, Expert Stiefel states that in his experience, ten people billing time to this matter is excessive. (Id. ¶ 93.) For these reasons, the Court will reduce these entries by 40%. (Stiefel Decl., Exhibit G.)

Plaintiff also seeks 120.2 hours of work for three legal secretaries. County also contends that all work done by legal secretaries in this matter to be eliminated as Plaintiff “is not entitled to be compensated for administrative work.” (See Davis v. City and County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 1992) 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 “[“time spent on clerical matters should not have been included in the attorneys’ fee award”]; Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989) [“purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them”].) Because of the lack of information provided by Plaintiff, the Court cannot distinguish what work done by the legal secretaries was purely for clerical purposes. The Court denies compensation for unspecified work done  by the legal secretaries.

Therefore, the Court will award as follows:

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED in the amount of $.