Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: BC714118, Date: 2025-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC714118    Hearing Date: April 10, 2025    Dept: 45

RAMOS v. sanchez, et al.

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYs’ FEES

Date of Hearing:        April 10, 2025                        Trial Date:       None set

Department:              45                                            Case No.:        BC714118

Moving Party:            Cross-Complainants Joel Sanchez and Armando Sanchez

Responding Party:     Unopposed

BACKGROUND

This action arises from a claim for quiet title to the real property located at 225-227 W. 97th  Street, Los Angeles, CA 90003 (the “Property”). On March 16, 2018, Plaintiff Maria Margarita Ramos (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Joel M. Sanchez, Armando Sanchez (“Defendants”), and all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the Property. The Complaint alleged two causes of action: (1) Quiet Title and (2) Injunctive Relief.

On August 7, 2018, Defendants filed the operative First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FACC”) against Plaintiff, Jorge Ramos Raygoza, Ernesto Fernando Ramos Raygoza, Anabel Ramos Raygoza, Roberto Carlos Ramos Raygoza, and all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the Property . The FACC alleged five causes of action: (1) Quiet Title; (2) Cancellation of Instruments; (3) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; (4) Accounting; and (5) Fraud and Deceit.

On August 16, 2023, the court entered summary judgment on the Complaint in favor of Defendants.

On September 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Answer to the FACC.

On September 26, 2024, a bench trial was held on the FACC and judgment was awarded in favor of Defendants Joel M. Sanchez and Armando Sanchez (hereinafter, “Cross-Complainants”) against Plaintiff Maria Margarita Ramos (hereinafter, “Cross-Defendant”) and all of her aka’s.

[Tentative] Ruling

Cross-Complainant Joel M. Sanchez and Armando Sanchez’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is GRANTED in the amount of $106,018.00.

DISCUSSION

Cross-Complainants/Defendants Joel M. Sanchez and Armando Sanchez move the court for an order for attorney fees against Cross-Defendant/Plaintiff Maria Margarita Ramos Raygoza, as Trustee of The Living Trust of the Rito Ramos Rodriguez Dated November 03, 2017.

“The definition of prevailing party is not uniform under California law, and many attorney fees statutes contain a technical definition applicable to the particular statutory scheme.” (Zuehlsdorf v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 249, 257.) “In the absence of legislative direction in the attorney fees statute, the courts have concluded that a rigid definition prevailing party should not be used.” (Ibid., citation omitted.) “Rather, prevailing party status should be determined by the trial court based on an evaluation of whether a party prevailing on a practical level, and the trial court’s decision should be affirmed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” (Ibid., internal quotations omitted.) “Among the factors the trial court must consider in determining whether a party prevailed is the extent to which each party has realized its litigation objectives.” (Sharif v. Mehusa, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 185, 192.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 provides that “[p]revailing [p]arty includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) “If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the prevailing party shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) “Typically, a determination of no prevailing party results when both parties seek relief, but neither prevails, or when the ostensibly prevailing party receives only part of the relief sought. In other words, the judgment is considered good news and bad news as to each of the parties[.].” (Deane Gardenhome Assn v. Denktas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1398.) 

Attorneys’ fees are “computed in accordance with the familiar lodestar method.” (Cruz v. Fusion Buffet, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 221, 237.) Under the lodestar method, a trial court “tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Ibid.) “[A] party must present some evidence to support its award request.” (Ibid.) “The declaration of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case may be sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.) “[S]ufficient evidence to support an attorney fee award may include [d]eclarations of counsel setting forth the reasonable hourly rate, the number of hours worked and the tasks performed.” (Ibid.) “There is no requirement that an attorney provide time records or billing statements.” (Id. at p. 238.)

Here, Cross-Complainants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was granted as to the underlying Complaint in this case on August 16, 2023. (Order Re: Summary Judgment, 8/16/23; Judgment, 11/20/23.) Likewise, the court ruled in favor of Cross-Complainants’ following the bench trial on the FACC held on September 26, 2024. (Statement of Decision, 11/14/24.) As such, Cross-Complainants prevailed in this case on both the underlying Complaint and Cross-Complaint, which awarded Cross-Complainants attorneys’ fees pursuant to motion.

Therefore, Cross-Complainants are the prevailing parties in this case and entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

Reasonableness of Cross-Complainants’ Claimed Attorneys’ Fees

Cross-Complainants’ seek $102,600.00 in fees and $3,418.00 in costs against Cross-Defendant Ramos Raygoza, for a total amount of $106,018.00. Cross-Complainants contend the requested attorneys’ fees and costs are reasonable.

Cross-Complainants’ present the declaration of their counsel of record, Cuauhtemoc V. Martin (“Martin”) in support of the instant motion. Mr. Martin attests to expending (1) 34.5 hours in client meetings and conferences; (2) 4.5 hours concerning document retrieval; (3) 16.5 for legal research; (4) 8.5 hours regarding correspondence from 2018 through 2022; (5) 69.0 hours preparing pleadings and other court filings; (6) 22.0 hours involving discovery matters; (7) 11.5 hours for mediation matters; and (8) 39.0 hours for trial, for a total of 205.5 hours at an hourly rate of $400.00. (Martin Decl., ¶4.) Mr. Martin also attest to making 17 appearances at $1,200.00 each, totaling $20,400.00. These court appearances were for various case management conferences, trial setting conferences, final status conferences, hearings on ex parte filings, order to show cause hearings, and the three-day bench trial. (Id.)

In light of the declaration in support, the court finds that the requested attorneys’ fees are reasonable given the time spent on this matter and hourly rate charged by Cross-Complainants’ counsel.

Although Mr. Martin does not include any billing entries or invoices, he provides an itemization of the fees incurred and refers to specific dates of the court filings, court appearances, and the tasks performed reasonably identifiable. For example, Mr. Martin avers that he spent 2.5 hours on Cross-Complainants’ response to Cross-Defendant’s Demand for Production in the underlying Complaint. (Martin Decl., ¶4, § D(6).) Furthermore, the time expended by Mr. Martin spans over the course of the case, which was initially filed in 2018 before disposition of the FACC via bench trial in September 2024, for a total of six years. Moreover, Mr. Martin has over 42 years of litigation experience involving criminal and civil matters including civil appeals. (Id. at ¶3.)

Reasonableness Costs Claimed by Cross-Complainants

“A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.”(Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1700, subd. (a)(1).)

To recover a cost, it must be reasonably necessary to the litigation and reasonable in amount. (Perko’s Enterprises, Inc. v. RRNS Enterprises (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 244.) If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-74.)¿ On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Id.)¿¿¿

Here, Cross-Complainants timely served and filed their memorandum of costs on December 4, 2024, which is about eight (8) days after the notice of entry of judgment and order, and filing of statement of decision were served per California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, subdivision (a)(1). Cross-Complainants’ seek costs for filing and motion fees, service of process fees, models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits, electronic filing fees, and mediation costs. (Mem. of Costs, filed 12/4/24.) The filing and motion fees, service of process fees, models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits, and electronic filing fees are allowable costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1033.5, subdivision (a). Thus, these are proper charges. However, mediation costs are neither expressly authorized or prohibited, thus the award of such costs are subject to the discretion of the court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(4). The court also notes that even though Cross-Complainants seek attorneys’ fees incurred for mediation such as preparing the mediation brief, it did not include payment to the mediator, which is sought via the cost memorandum. Likewise, Mr. Martin attests to attending the mediation for three hours, which indicates the cost of the mediator was actually incurred.

Therefore, the costs claimed by Cross-Complainants were reasonably necessary to the litigation of this matter.

Based on the foregoing, Cross-Complainant Joel M. Sanchez and Armando Sanchez’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is GRANTED in the amount of $106,018.00.