Judge: Virginia Keeny, Case: LC106864, Date: 2022-09-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: LC106864 Hearing Date: September 8, 2022 Dept: W
lucky’s two-way radios, inc. et al., v.
cannata
motion to COMPEL FURTHER DEPOSITION OF DR. MICHAEL
MOSES
Date of Hearing: September
8, 2022 Trial Date: March 13, 2023
Department: W Case No.: LC106864
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs
Lucky’s Two-Way Radios, Inc. and Buddy Corporation (“Plaintiffs”) allege that Frank J. Cannata (“Defendant”) was a consultant for Plaintiffs’ business pursuant
to a consulting services agreement. While consulting for Plaintiffs, Defendant
allowed or arranged for valuable company
property to be taken by “Mr. Recycling” without Plaintiffs’ consent. Plaintiffs
further claim that on December 8, 2017, Defendant improperly transferred proprietary information via
e-mail to personal accounts. Plaintiffs allege a loss of $500,000 in property.
Plaintiffs
filed a complaint on February 13, 2018. The Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”)
was filed on August 7, 2020, alleging: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Conversion;
(3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (4) Fraud and Fraudulent Concealment; (5)
Specific Performance; and (6) Permanent Injunction
On March
29, 2019, the court granted Defendant’s motion for leave to file a cross-complaint. Defendant
filed the first amended cross-complaint
against Plaintiffs on April 10, 2019.
Defendant filed a second amended cross-complaint (“SAXC”) on
August 2, 2019. The SAXC against Plaintiffs alleges several causes of action including breach of
contract, indemnity, labor code retaliation and wage and hour violations, false
pretenses, fraud, battery, stored communications violations, trespass, and
unfair competition.
On October 13, 2020, default was
entered against Defendant because he failed to file an answer to the SAC.
Default was set aside and vacated on December 17, 2020.
On July 8, 2022, Plaintiffs filed
this motion seeking to compel fact witness Michael Moses, Ph.D., to answer
further deposition questions regarding the following topics:
(a) Mr. Cannata’s communications with Dr. Moses
related to Mr. Cannata’s alleged psychological stress resulting from this
lawsuit; (b) Mr. Cannata’s conversations with Dr. Moses regarding Kathy Keller
being a percipient witnesses in this matter; (c) Mr. Cannata’s
conversations with Dr. Moses regarding his belief that the litigation may go on
for years despite confidence in his counsel; (e) that Dr. Moses
not read his notes privately to himself and then pick and choose what he can
discuss as they relate to the litigation as demanded by Mr. Lesches in order for the deposition to continue forward; and
(f) that Dr. Moses be ordered to refer to, decipher and state his medical
notes, findings and conclusions with regard to his psychological treatment of
Mr. Cannata, his alleged mental distress, the cause of said distress and identify
and explain how such mental distress, if any, relates to or was caused by
issues related to the ongoing litigation.
(Motion 2:7-17.) Plaintiffs also
seek $5,585 in monetary sanctions against Moses and Defendant’s counsel jointly
and severally.
Defendant opposes. Defendant also seeks
$2,750 in monetary sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel only, i.e., not also
against Plaintiffs themselves.
Moses does not oppose.
Plaintiffs filed a reply.
[Tentative] Ruling
I.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel a Further Deposition of Dr. Michael
Moses is GRANTED IN SUBSTANTIAL PART. Lesches is to pay $4,000 in monetary
sanctions to Plaintiffs through counsel within 20 days.
discussion
Request for
Judicial Notice
The parties filed the following
requests for judicial notice:
1. Plaintiffs’
Request for Judicial Notice submitted with the Motion (“Motion RJN”)
2. Defendant’s
Request for Judicial Notice submitted with the Opposition (“Opposition RJN”)
3. Plaintiffs’
Request for Judicial Notice submitted with the Reply (“Reply RJN”)
These documents are all various
court filings. Therefore, the court grants all of the requests.
Evidentiary Objections
Plaintiffs object to the Declaration of Frank J. Cannata in
support of his opposition to the motion.
The court overrules the objection
to the entire declaration. Although it appears that Defendant has filed an
untimely declaration in violation of procedural requirements through a notice
of errata, Plaintiffs have opposed on the merits and there is insufficient
prejudice. The court prefers to reach the merits and does so.
Legal
Standard
Once a party has been deposed, the other party seeking discovery may not
take a subsequent deposition of that deponent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.610,
subd. (a).)
“If a
deponent fails to answer any question . . . the party seeking discovery may
move the court for an order compelling that answer . . . .” (Id.,
subd. (a).)
“If the
court determines that the answer or production sought is subject to discovery,
it shall order that the answer be given or production sought is subject to
discovery, it shall order that the answer be given or the production be made on
the resumption of the deposition.” (Id., subd. (i).)
For good cause shown, the court may grant leave for a subsequent
deposition of that deponent. (Id., § 2025.610, subd. (b).)
Discussion
Overview
of Motion and Deposition Questions at Issue
This motion arises from Defendant’s
SAXC, which includes a claim that he
suffered extreme emotional distress as a result of the alleged terrible work
experience and mistreatment caused by Plaintiffs. Dr. Moses is Defendant’s
therapist and treated Defendant before, during, and after this work experience.
Plaintiffs are trying to obtain evidence of Defendant’s emotional distress,
seeking to determine if the emotional distress he claims is because of: (1) the
terrible work experience; (2) the lawsuit arising out of his work experience;
and/or (3) other factors, including his life experiences.
The issue of Dr. Moses’ deposition
has been litigated before the court before, including most notably the court’s
minute order issued on February 14, 2022. In that order, the court ordered a
second deposition of Dr. Moses because he failed to produce all documents
required to be produced, the documents produced were illegible and/or provided
in an inconsistent format, and additional time was necessary for Plaintiffs’
counsel to review the documents as necessary for the deposition.
The issue is now before the court
after Dr. Moses appeared for that deposition on April 18, 2022 in Buffalo, New
York.
At the deposition, Sheldon Smith,
Plaintiffs’ New York counsel, deposed Dr. Moses, who was not represented by
counsel, and Levi Lesches, Defendant’s counsel, was present. Lesches, made many
objections based on privilege and privacy, instructing Dr. Moses, who is not
his client, to not answer. Dr. Moses followed that advice and refused to answer
certain questions. The parties[1]
dispute whether those objections have merit. In addition, Plaintiffs argue that
Lesches’ conduct caused the time granted by the court to conduct this
deposition to expire, and therefore, Plaintiffs seek additional time to
complete the deposition, specifically to allow Dr. Moses to read his session
notes into the record and respond to questions about those notes.
The court summarizes the five
questions at issue:
1. Dr.
Moses and Defendant had two telephone conversations outside of their regular
sessions and they spoke about the instant lawsuit. What did they discuss?
2. Defendant
has a friend name Kathy Keller. What did Defendant mention about her being a
witness in this case?
3. Dr.
Moses read his session notes from November 21, 2018, which stated that “Patient
feels his attorney confident. Will be seeing him then and go on years.” Did “[w]ill
be seeing him then and go on years” refer to litigation going on for years?
4. Dr.
Moses read his session notes from January 31, 2021, which stated ““Discussion
legal situation.” What was said about the legal situation?
5. When
Dr. Moses was about to read his session notes from December 2021, Smith wanted
Dr. Moses to read his notes into the record, while Lesches wanted Dr. Moses to
review his notes first and (a) skip answering questions relating to this
litigation and/or (b) read his notes to the court reporter for transcription
and then Lesches would review it and release any unprivileged transcription of
the notes, with any privileged portions to be itemized with a privilege log. Should
Dr. Moses have read the session notes from December 2021 without pre-review?
The court rules on each question
separately, though certain issues overlap. Before ruling on the questions
individually, the court rules on certain issues as raised by the parties.
Judicial
Estoppel
As a threshold matter, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are barred
by judicial estoppel.
Judicial
estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that
is contrary to a position previously taken in the same or some earlier
proceeding. (Gottlieb v. Kest (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 110, 130-131.)
California courts consider five factors, applying it when “‘(1) the same party
has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or
quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in
asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or
accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5)
the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.’”
(Id. at p. 131)
Defendant argues that this motion
is contrary to Plaintiffs’ prior position in moving to limit Defendant’s
Hartford subpoena, when Plaintiffs argued that they had not waived privileges
through sharing documents with adversarial insurance counsel for purposes of
prosecuting Plaintiffs’ insurance claim. (Opposition RJN Ex. 1.) The court
disagrees. Nothing in plaintiffs’ position with respect to the Hartford
subpoena has any bearing on the issue of whether plaintiffs are entitled to
depose Mr. Canata’s treating psychologist about information divulged to him by
his patient.
Accordingly, the court reaches the
merits.
Relevance
of the Sought Testimony
Plaintiffs argue that the sought
testimony is relevant. The court agrees.
Code of Civil Procedure section
2017.010 states that the permissible scope of discovery depends on three
factors of whether the information is: (1) “relevant to the subject matter
involved;” (2) admissible or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence;” and (3) privileged. Additionally, courts should
construe discovery statutes liberally in favor of discovery. (Williams v.
Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540-541.)
For discovery purposes,
information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the
case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)
Plaintiffs generally want to
evaluate Defendant’s emotional distress claim. Is it traceable to the
underlying alleged misconduct by Plaintiffs, the lawsuit, or something else?
The cause of the emotional distress is relevant because it relates to the
damages Defendant is claiming.
Additionally, one question
involves a non-attorney who spoke with Defendant about his case, i.e., Keller. Although
this communication may be entirely unimportant, plaintiffs are entitled to
enquire as to everything that was said, as it may reveal whether Mr. Canata
thought she was a credible witness, or whether there might be a relationship
between Canata and Keller that would indicate potential bias.
Privilege
Objections to Sought Testimony
The parties dispute whether
Defendant asserts valid privilege objections.
“The burden of establishing that a
particular matter is privileged is on the party asserting that privilege
[citation].” (San Diego Professional Ass’n v. Superior Court of San Diego
County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 194, 199.)
Defendant argues that there are
two separate legal doctrines that protect against disclosure of communications
for mental-health treatment for purposes of assisting with litigation
pressures.
First, Defendant invokes Evidence
Code section 912, subdivision (d), which states:
A
disclosure in confidence of a communication that is protected by a privilege
provided by . . . 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), . . . when
disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for
which the . . . psychotherapist . . . was consulted, is not a waiver of the privilege.
However, that section has no
application, where the party has placed his or her mental health at issue. (Evidence
Code section 1016, subdivision (a) [“There is no privilege under this article
as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the mental or emotional
condition of the patient if such issue has been tendered by: (a) The patient.”])
Second, Defendant invokes Evidence
Code section 952, which states:
As
used in this article, “confidential communication between client and lawyer”
means information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the
course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than
those who are present to further the interest of the client in the consultation
or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is
consulted, and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the
lawyer in the course of that relationship.
(Evid., Code, §
952, emphasis added.)
Generally, Defendant argues that communications
he had with his counsel as shared with Dr. Moses are privileged. But even under
Section 952, that privilege was waived when disclosed to Dr. Moses. There is no evidence that Mr. Canata shared
this information with Dr. Moses “for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer [was] consulted.” Dr. Moses was not his lawyer, an assistant to
his lawyer, or working for his lawyer.
If Mr. Canata shared communications with Dr. Moses about what he had
learned from his attorney, he waived the privilege as to those
communications. Simply because a
response may possibly relate to a communication Defendant had with Lesches or
relates to the litigation in general is insufficient to support the objections
made.
Defendant’s arguments involving
Plaintiffs’ improper reliance on Seahaus La Jolla Owners Assn. v. Superior
Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 754 (Seahaus) is confusing. Plaintiffs
do not cite Seahaus in their motion. Defendant’s attempt to distinguish Seahaus
is irrelevant. In any event, here, Plaintiffs seek testimony regarding
Defendant’s statements regarding his emotional feelings and how the litigation
was affecting him, which is not the same as litigation strategy that merits
protection.
Plaintiffs are trying to obtain
discovery into the emotional damages suffered as a result of Plaintiffs’
alleged misconduct. Plaintiffs are permitted to inquire into the origins of the
emotional damages. The subject questions are proper inquiries. They are not
solely made to examine whether the litigation itself is causing Plaintiffs’
damages. In any event, Plaintiffs cannot be faulted if the questioning might
elicit that testimony because the subject questions are focusing on Dr. Moses’
notes and there is no way to separate the inquiry into what caused Defendant
the emotional damages. In any event, to the extent the questions reveal a cause
of litigation stress, that evidence is still relevant as it relates to the
evaluation of the severity of the emotional distress and treatment of that
distress in comparison to the distress caused by Plaintiffs’ misconduct that
gave rise to the litigation.
Question No.
1
The court grants the motion as to this question.
The question seeks general
evidence about what they discussed, which Plaintiffs believe will focus on
Defendant’s emotional damages suffered from the underlying alleged misconduct.
The question does not otherwise expressly ask for Dr. Moses to testify about
any litigation strategy as advised by Defendant’s counsel. It is premature for
the court to sustain an objection based on speculation that it might lead to
that testimony. If Dr. Moses testifies
that they discussed the litigation, Mr. Lesches cannot prohibit Dr. Moses from
testifying about those communications. The privilege was waived by disclosure
to Dr. Moses.
Question
No. 2
The court grants the motion as to
this question.
The question seeks evidence about
whether Defendant disclosed to Dr. Moses how he thought Keller might serve as a
witness in the case, i.e., whether she will serve as a witness to Defendant’s
claim of emotional distress. Plaintiffs
can enquire as to any communications Mr. Canata had with Dr. Moses about any
witness in this case, including Keller.
Question
No. 3
The court grants the motion as to
this question.
The question seeks evidence of
Defendant’s mental state why he might be believing he would be speaking to his
counsel for an extended period of time. It is not clear why Defendant’s mental
state as to this issue is material, but it does not otherwise invade into any
attorney-client communication. The court errs on the side of disclosure.
Question
No. 4
The court grants the motion as to
this question.
Dr. Moses testified that he had “no
idea” and “[did not] know” what the legal situation was about. However, plaintiffs are entitled to a full response,
without interruption or objection by Mr. Lesches, about what Mr. Cannata told
Dr. Moses about the litigation, what he thought about it, how it was affecting
him, and the like.
Question No.
5
The court grants the motion as to this question.
Similar as to the rulings before,
there is no evidence that reading these notes would reveal litigation strategy.
The notes are relevant to the evaluation of Defendant’s emotional damages. To
the extent that they reveal a cause of litigation stress, that evidence is
still relevant as it relates to the evaluation of the severity of the emotional
distress and treatment of that distress in comparison to the distress caused by
Plaintiffs’ misconduct that gave rise to the litigation.
In making this ruling, the court
rejects Defendant’s argument that this issue is outside the scope of the notice
of motion and is an improper motion for reconsideration. The motion here is to
seek further deposition answers as objected to. This motion is not a motion to
reconsider a prior court ruling. Nor does Plaintiffs’ rejection of a
stipulation on how to address these notes means the motion is now a
reconsideration motion. Plaintiffs had a right to reject the offered compromise
and insist a full reading of Dr. Moses’ notes.
Whether
Lesches’ Conduct Requires an Additional Deposition
Plaintiffs ague that Lesches’
conduct, i.e., arriving late, interrupting, making lengthy speaking objections,
and ending the deposition, merits a further deposition on its own because Dr.
Moses did not complete his testimony regarding his session notes.
In light of the fact that the
court grants the deposition as set forth above, Lesches’ conduct is only
relevant to the court’s evaluation of monetary sanctions. Nevertheless, the
court does generally agree that Lesches’ conduct at times went beyond zealous
advocacy and was improper, especially as it relates to speaking objections and
interruptions. Both counsel could have approached the deposition better in
order to maximize time without needing an additional day for a deposition.
The Burden of a Continued
Deposition
Defendant argues that there is an
undue burden to another deposition, in part because of travel costs and a lack
of kosher food. (Lesches Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.) Defendant fails to explain why Lesches must
appear in person for a deposition, when a video appearance is sufficient and
would eliminate these issues.
Monetary Sanctions
In light of Lesches’ improper
objections, the court finds monetary sanctions appropriate. The court declines
to order monetary sanctions against Dr. Moses himself, though he was warned that
following Lesches’ advice would subject himself to sanctions. The court finds
the more appropriate party to pay sanction is Lesches because he was the one
who made the objections in the first place.
Plaintiffs seek $5,585 in monetary
sanctions at a $425 hourly rate for 7 hours to prepare the motion, 4 hours to
review the opposition and prepare a reply, and 2 hours to appear at the
hearing. (Crossing Decl. ¶
19.) Plaintiffs also seek a $60 filing fee. (Ibid.) The court slightly reduces
the sought monetary sanctions for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiffs do not
provide an explanation of counsel’s experience to justify the sought rate; (2) and
(3) two hours for appearance time is excessive when Plaintiffs can appear
remotely. Accordingly, the court only awards a total of $4,000 in monetary
sanctions payable by Lesches to Plaintiffs through counsel within 30 days.
The court denies Defendant’s own
request for monetary sanctions because the court generally grants Plaintiffs’
motion.