Judge: Walter P. Schwarm, Case: 30-2018-01006334, Date: 2023-07-18 Tentative Ruling
Motion No. 1:
Defendant’s (Lyft, Inc.) unopposed Motion for Trifurcation of Trial (Motion), filed on 5-12-23 under ROA No. 714, is GRANTED.
Code of Civil Procedure section 598 states in part, “The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order, no later than the close of pretrial conference in cases in which such pretrial conference is to be held, or, in other cases, no later than 30 days before the trial date, that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case, except for special defenses which may be tried first pursuant to Sections 597 and 597.5. . . .”
Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (b), states, “The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of . . . any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.”
The Court grants the Motion for four reasons. First, Defendant—John Vianney Johnson (Johnson) is no longer in the case based on the Request for Dismissal filed on 1-6-23 under ROA No. 602. Defendant intends to present evidence that Johnson was not liable for the accident, and evidence that it had no responsibility for Johnson’s conduct under a vicarious liability theory. (Motion; 16:16-19.) Since Johnson is no longer a party in this action, comingling these issues may confuse the jury because there is a risk that a jury may consider Defendant’s liable just because Defendant is defending against Johnson’s negligence. A jury may confuse Defendant’s defense of Johnson’s negligence as a tacit admission that Defendant is vicariously liable for Johnson’s conduct assuming that Johnson’s liability is established.
Second, it appears that there will be some overlap in the evidence as to the scope of Johnson’s relationship with Defendant in terms of testimony regarding the accident. The overlap of this evidence is minimal considering there will be no overlap in the evidence regarding other aspects of Johnson’s relationship with Defendant as to Johnson’s scope of employment with Defendant.
Third, there is a concern that the significant evidence regarding Plaintiff’s damages could impact the jury in terms of liability. (Motion; 16:26-17:14.)
Finally, the Plaintiff and Defendant have agreed to trifurcation. (See Stipulation and Order electronically received on 7-6-23 under ROA No. 792.)
Based on the above, the court GRANTS Defendant’s (Lyft, Inc.) unopposed Motion for Trifurcation of Trial (Motion), filed on 5-12-23 under ROA No. 714.
Motion No. 2:
The court advances Defendant’s (Lyft, Inc.) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Motion), filed on 6-16-23 under ROA No. 770 and scheduled for hearing on 7-21-23, is advanced to 7-18-23 at 9:00 a.m. The court DENIES the Motion.
Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, filed on 6-16-23 under ROA No. 766, is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d).
Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (c)(1)(B) states, “If the moving party is a defendant, that either of the following conditions exist: [¶] (i) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint. [¶] (ii) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” Eckler v. Neutragena Corporation (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 433, 439 (Eckler), states, “ ‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings serves the function of a demurrer, challenging only defects on the face of the complaint.’ [Citation.] As with a demurrer, ‘[t]he grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the complaint or from a matter of which the court may take judicial notice.’ [Citation.]” County of Orange v. Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 21, 32 (County of Orange), states, “In reviewing the trial court's grant of the motions for judgment on the pleadings under Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (b)(1), we apply the same rules governing the review of an order sustaining a general demurrer. [Citation.] A defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted if, under the facts as alleged in the pleading or subject to judicial notice, the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] We accept the complaint's properly pleaded factual allegations as true and give them a liberal construction. [Citations.] We do not accept as true ‘any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein.’ [Citation.]”
The Motion states, “Plaintiff’s direct liability claims against Lyft have already been adjudicated via a motion for summary judgment. (RJN, Exh. A, at p. 9.) The only remaining claim against Lyft is vicarious liability. But Plaintiff dismissed Lyft’s alleged agent, Johnson, with prejudice. (RJN, Ex B.) And that dismissal is ‘on the merits,’ thereby barring Plaintiff from pursuing vicarious liability against Lyft as Johnson’s alleged principal.” (Motion; 3:6-10.) Plaintiff’s (Kinverly Castro Najera) Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Opposition), filed on 7-7-23 under ROA No. 795, states, “. . . if section 877 applies to our case . . . then plaintiff’s dismissal of Lyft’s agent with prejudice has no effect on her vicarious liability action against Lyft itself.” (Opposition; 5:5-8.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 877 states, “Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort, or to one or more other co-obligors mutually subject to contribution rights, it shall have the following effect: [¶] (a) It shall not discharge any other such party from liability unless its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater. [¶] (b) It shall discharge the party to whom it is given from all liability for any contribution to any other parties. [¶] (c) This section shall not apply to co-obligors who have expressly agreed in writing to an apportionment of liability for losses or claims among themselves. [¶] (d) This section shall not apply to a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment given to a co-obligor on an alleged contract debt where the contract was made prior to January 1, 1988.”
Ritter v. Technicolor Corporatio. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 152, 154 (Ritter), states, “We find inescapable the conclusion that under section 877, the liability of a principal for the tortious acts of his agent, even though wholly vicarious, survives release of the agent.”
Mayhugh v. County of Orange (1983) 141 Cal. App. 3d 763, 765-767 (Mayhugh), states, “The 1980 Legislature which added section 877.6 had Ritter v. Technicolor Corp., supra., 27 Cal.App.3d 152, before it. Accepted principles of statutory construction dictate we presume the Legislature had knowledge of existing judicial decisions and enacted statutes in light of decisions which bear directly upon the language at issue. [Citation.] The Legislature, in enacting section 877.6, did not overturn or modify Ritter. The overall policy previously expressed by statute necessitates we recognize a release or settlement with the employee does not release the employer. The addition of section 877.6 was not intended to modify the rights of plaintiffs and tortfeasors who may be jointly liable, but was enacted to statutorily clarify the principles enunciated in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 [146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899]. [¶] Section 877 resolves the differences between plaintiffs and tortfeasors and section 877.6 resolves the differences between tortfeasors inter se. We find no conflict between the two sections as they are designed to accomplish two different aims. We believe these sections were designed to clarify the liability of tortfeasors and to benefit the negligently injured plaintiff. The Legislature could not have intended that a settlement with one defendant which partially compensates the plaintiff for injuries sustained would effectively block the road to complete recovery. Release of the employer after settlement with the employee would accomplish such a road block and frustrate the purposes of the statute.”
Citing Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hospital (2012) 55 Cal.4th 291 (Leung), the Motion states, “. . . just like Leung, section 877 does not apply because the court has not made a good-faith determination.” (Motion; 4:1-2.) Leung states, “On balance, we conclude that here the settlement-with-contribution approach is preferable to the proportionate-share approach. Unlike proportionate share, settlement with contribution does not change the liability position of the parties from what it would be without a settlement; nor does it require modification of, or a new exception to, our established rule of joint and several liability. Also, the settlement-with-contribution method is, as explained earlier, superior to the proportionate-share approach in serving the policy of promoting settlements made in good faith.” (Id., at p. 307.) Leung does not hold that a court must determine whether a settlement is in good faith before applying Code of Civil Procedure section 877. Rather, Leung states, “We now consider our holding's effect on the apportionment of liability among joint tortfeasors when, as here, one tortfeasor's settlement, resulting in a release of liability, was determined by the trial court not to have been made in ‘good faith,’ thus rendering inapplicable the apportionment scheme under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.” (Id., at p. 302.) Thus, in Leung, the Court addressed the issue of apportionment rather than addressing whether Code of Civil Procedure section 877 applies in the absence of a determination of a good-faith settlement.
Based on the above, the court DENIES Defendant’s (Lyft, Inc.) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed on 6-16-23 under ROA No. 770.
Plaintiff is to give notice.