Judge: Walter P. Schwarm, Case: 30-2020-01155181, Date: 2022-08-16 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs’ (Marti Garza and Brian Garza) Motion for Payment of Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs and Expenses (Motion), filed on 4-6-22 under ROA No. 36, is GRANTED as set forth below. (The Notice for this Motion was filed on 4-6-22 under ROA No. 39.)

Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), states, “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” 

Reynolds v. Ford Motor Company (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1112 (Reynolds), states, “In determining the methodology to be used to award attorney fees under the Song-Beverly Act, the appellate courts have unanimously concluded the lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees is appropriate for two reasons: (1) ‘the lodestar adjustment method is based on actual, reasonable attorney time expended as the objective starting point of the analysis,’ and (2) ‘the lodestar adjustment method is the prevailing rule for calculation of statutory attorney fees unless the statute expressly indicates a contrary intent, and no such contrary intent is apparent. . . .’ [Citations.]” [¶] A trial court assessing attorney fees using the lodestar adjustment method ‘begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the “careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . .  involved in the presentation of the case.” ’  [Citations.] Reasonable hourly compensation is based on ‘prevailing hourly rates’ in the community, thereby ‘anchoring the calculation’ to an objective standard. [Citation.] Once the touchstone or lodestar figure (reasonable hours multiplied by reasonable rates) is calculated as ‘the basic fee,’ ‘it may be adjusted by the court [by applying a multiplier] based on factors including . . ., (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award [Citation.] The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.’ [Citation.]

“In referring to ‘reasonable’ compensation, we indicated that that trial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation. [Citation.]”  (Ketchum v. Moses (Ketchum) (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132; Italics in Ketchum.)

Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (Syers) (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698–700 (Syers Properties III, Inc.) explains, “It is well established that ‘California courts do not require detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court's own view of the number of hours reasonably spent. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] . . . [¶] ‘Because time records are not required under California law . . ., there is no required level of detail that counsel must achieve. See, e.g., PLCM Group[, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p.] 1098, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 198, 997 P.2d 511 (“We do not want ‘a [trial] court, in setting an attorney's fee, [to] become enmeshed in a meticulous analysis of every detailed facet of the professional representation. It . . . is not our intention that the inquiry into the adequacy of the fee assume massive proportions, perhaps dwarfing the case in chief,’ ” quoting Serrano v [.] Unruh (Serrano IV) (1982) 32 C[al.]3d 621, 642 [186 Cal.Rptr. 754, 652 P.2d 985]). See, e.g., . . . Jaramillo v [.] County of Orange (2011) 200 [Cal.App.] 4th 811, 830 [133 Cal.Rptr.3d 751] (noting that records included very general descriptions, e.g., ‘trial prep,’ ‘T/C-Client’); City of Colton v [.] Singletary (2012) 206 [Cal.App.] 4th 751, 784 [142 Cal.Rptr.3d 74] (declaration stating time spent on various activities); [citation].’ [Citation.]” (Footnotes 3, 4, and 5 omitted.) 

Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1322, provides, “ ‘To the extent a trial court is concerned that a particular award is excessive, it has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether.’ [Citation.]”  In re Marriage of Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 67, 695-696 (Nassimi), states, “ ‘ “To that end, the court may require [a] defendant[ ] to produce records sufficient to provide ‘ “a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.” ’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] ‘The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]  ‘ “The court . . . may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]  [¶] Block billing presents a particular problem for a court seeking to allocate between reimbursable and unreimbursable fees, and trial courts are granted discretion ‘to penalize [block billing] when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not.’ [Citations.]”

“We think, however, necessary support services for attorneys, e.g., secretarial and paralegal services, are includable within an award of attorney fees.”  (Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 914, 951.)

Plaintiff seeks $42,398.50 as attorney’s based on 97.10 hours expended on this case, $2,040.27 in costs and expenses, and an enhancement of $12,719.55. (Motion; 15:24-26 (Myers Decl., ¶ 4 and Exhibit A.).) The hourly rates for the four attorneys listed in the billing records range from $375.00/hour to $685.00/hour. (Myers Decl., ¶ 48.)  The law clerk and paralegal hourly rate was $195.00/hour.  (Myers Decl., ¶ 48.)  Based on the “Total Hours Billed,” it appears that Mr. Myers was the lead attorney on this case for Plaintiff.  (Myers Decl., ¶ 6 and Exhibit B.)  Mr. Myers billed for 73.2 hours.  (Myers. Decl., ¶ 6 and Exhibit B.)  The next closest attorney to Mr. Myers in terms of “Total Hours Billed” was Nicolas Dillavou who billed for 6.8 hours.  (Myers Decl., ¶ 6 and Exhibit B.)  Since this was not a complex case and Mr. Myers performed the majority of attorney time on the case, the court finds that $435.00 is a reasonable hourly rate (Myers Decl., ¶ 4, 6, and 48, and Exhibits A and B) for the hours billed by Mr. Myers, Brian J. Bickel, and Jordan K. Sannipoli.  $435.00 is a reasonable hourly rate in light of  the experience of Attorneys—Bickel, Sannipolli, and Myers in Song-Beverly cases. (Myers Decl., ¶ 48.) The court finds that $375.00 is a reasonable hourly rate for the hours billed by Nicolas Dillavou.  (Myers Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6, 48, and Exhibits A and B.)  The court finds that $145.00 is a reasonable hourly rate for the time expended by the law clerks, paralegals, and legal assistants. (Myers  Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6, 48, and Exhibits A and B.)

In light of the above rules, the court has reviewed the billing entries submitted by Plaintiff.  (Myers Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6, 48, and Exhibits A and B.)  Based on this review, the court reduces the amount of attorney hours to 84.5 (97.10 – 16.6 = 80.5.)  The reduction in hours represents the court’s finding that the hours expended on this Motion are excessive.  Specifically, the declaration of Matthew Proudfoot attaches a Motion for Payment of Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs and Expenses that is substantially similar to this Motion. (Proudfoot Decl., ¶ 10 and Exhibit C.)  Also, the entries in the billing records are sufficiently specific to allow the court to determine the compensable tasks performed by Plaintiffs’ attorneys and staff.  Thus, the court awards $31,463.00 as attorney fees.

The court DENIES Plaintiff’s request to apply a multiplier to the amount awarded. (Motion; 15:1-22.) Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (Center) (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 866, 899, provides, The lodestar amount “ ‘ “may be adjusted by the court based on factors including . . . (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” ’ [Citations.] [¶]  ‘[T]he purpose of a fee enhancement is primarily to compensate the attorney for the prevailing party at a rate reflecting the risk of nonpayment in contingency cases as a class.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he unadorned lodestar reflects the general local hourly rate for a fee-bearing case; it does not include any compensation for contingent risk, extraordinary skill, or any other factors a trial court may consider. . . . The adjustment to the lodestar figure, e.g., to provide a fee enhancement reflecting the risk that the attorney will not receive payment if the suit does not succeed, constitutes earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather, it is intended to approximate market-level compensation for such services, which typically includes a premium for the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment of attorney fees.’ [Citation.] . . .” (Italics in Center.)  In considering the above factors, the court notes that this case was not a complex case.  This case did not present difficult or novel issues, and Plaintiff has not sufficiently shown that this case precluded Plaintiff’s attorneys from other employment.

As for costs, Defendant’s (Ford Motor Company) Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses (Opposition), filed on 8-3-22 under ROA No. 55, does not contest the costs requested by Plaintiffs in their Memorandum of Costs attached Exhibit C. to Mr. Myers’ declaration. (Myers Decl., ¶ 7.)  Therefore, the court GRANTS the Motion as to costs in the amount of $2,040.27.

In summary, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ (Marti Garza and Brian Garza) Motion for Payment of Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs and Expenses, filed on 4-6-22 under ROA No. 36, by awarding $31,463.00 as attorney’s fees and $2,040.27 as costs. 

Plaintiff is to give notice.