Judge: Walter P. Schwarm, Case: 30-2021-01234579, Date: 2022-07-26 Tentative Ruling
Defendant’s (Jonathan R.DeLeon) Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint (Demurrer), filed on 2-10-22 under ROA No. 17, is SUSTAINED.
“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or the facts alleged. . . . To the extent there are factual issues in dispute, however, this court must assume the truth not only of all facts properly pled, but also of those facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged in the complaint. [Citations.]” (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) Code of Civil Procedure section 452, states, “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” Perez v. Golden Empire Transportation Transit District (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238, provides, “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant. [Citations.]” C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School District (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 (C.A.), provides, “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged. [Citation.]”
The Demurrer challenges the first, second, and third causes of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e).
First Cause of Action (Breach of Contract):
San Luis Obispo Local Agency Formation Commission v. City of Pismo Beach (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 595, 600 (San Luis Obispo), states, “A contract requires consideration. [Citation.] Consideration consists of either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. [Citation.] A promise to do something the promisor is legally bound to do is not consideration. [Citation.]”
The Demurrer states, “. . . Plaintiff’s Complaint is completely devoid of any specifics as to what agreement the parties entered into, when they entered into it, when was it to be performed, and what consideration was given.” Plaintiff’s (Jose Alberto Molina) Complaint, filed on 12-6-21 under ROA No. 1 sets forth the terms of the agreement for the purpose of determining breach. (Complaint, ¶¶ 21 and 47.)
The Complaint does not adequately plead consideration in terms of the benefit that Defendant received in exchange for Defendant’s agreement to “. . . finance the Subject Property. . . .” (Complaint, ¶ 17.) Therefore, the court SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the first cause of action for failing to adequately plead consideration.
Second Cause of Action (Fraud):
CACI No. 1900 sets forth the elements for Intentional Misrepresentation. Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 (Lazar), states, “ ‘The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.’ [Citations.] [¶] ‘Promissory fraud’ is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. A promise to do something necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable fraud. [Citations.]” “In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. [Citations.] ‘Thus “ ‘the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings . . . will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect.’ ” [Citation.] [¶] This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.’ [Citation.] A plaintiff's burden in asserting a fraud claim against a corporate employer is even greater. In such a case, the plaintiff must ‘allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 645; Italics in Lazar.)
The Complaint pleads: (1) “. . . Defendant and his mother knew the representations that they would transfer title upon final payment made by Plaintiff were false, and they were made for the purpose of inducing Plaintiff to provide payments in excess of approximately $20,000.00.” (Complaint, ¶ 64.); (2) “. . . [T]hat the false representations were made to him orally and in writing by Defendant’s mother while Defendant had full knowledge of this as he had been instructed to deal directly with Defendant’s mother with regards to the monthly payments. . . .” (Complaint, ¶ 65.); and (3) Defendant— Aida Coronado DeLeon was at all times acting as an agent for Defendant Jonathan DeLeon. (Complaint, ¶ 62).
These allegations do not sufficiently allege when the representations alleged in the Complaint were made. Therefore, the court SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the second cause of action.
Third Cause of Action (Quiet Title):
Code of Civil Procedure section 761.020 sets forth the requirements to plead a cause of action for quiet title.
The Complaint sufficiently alleges that Plaintiff’s right to the property is based on his performance of a contract (Complaint, ¶¶ 46-50, 56, 60-63, 69-70, and 76). The Complaint, however, fails to allege the usual location of the vehicle or the date sought for the determination of quiet title. Since these are required elements under Code of Civil Procedure section 761.020, the court SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the third cause of action.
Based on the above, the court SUSTAINS Defendant’s (Jonathan R.DeLeon) Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed on 2-10-22 under ROA No. 17, with 15 days leave to amend from the date of service of the notice of the court’s ruling. (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.)
Defendant is to give notice.