Judge Walter P. Schwarm, Case 30-2021-01234680 2022-08-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Walter P. Schwarm, Case: 30-2021-01234680, Date: 2022-08-09 Tentative Ruling

Defendant’s (Tiffany Rose Arnold Raffaele) Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Punitive Damages (Motion), filed on 4-8-22 under ROA No. 13, is DENIED.

Code of Civil Procedure section 436, states, “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: [¶] (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. [¶] (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” Code of Civil Procedure section 435, subdivision (b)(1), states, “Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file, a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342, explains, “Preliminarily, we note a motion to strike is generally used to reach defects in a pleading which are not subject to demurrer. A motion to strike does not lie to attack a complaint for insufficiency of allegations to justify relief; that is a ground for general demurrer. [Citation.]”

Code of Civil Procedure section 437, subdivision (a), provides, “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.”

The Motion seeks to strike Item Nos. 1-10. (Motion; 1:24-2:13) contained in Plaintiffs’ (Armando Avila Villarreal, Ange Avila Duran, and Liliana Ojeda) Complaint (filed on 12-6-21 under ROA No. 2.)

Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63, states, “ ‘In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.’ [Citation.] [¶] In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. [Citation.] These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) ‘ “Malice” ’ is defined in the statute as conduct ‘intended by the defendant to cause injury to plaintiff, or despicable conduct that is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.’ [Citations.] ‘ “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.’ [Citation.] ‘ “Fraud” ’ is ‘an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.’ [Citation.]”

Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896 (Taylor) states, “We concur with the Searle observation that a conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. [Citation.]” Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88-89 (Dawes) explains, “The decision in Taylor v. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal.3d 890, 157 Cal.Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854, did not change the law in this regard. It simply held, contrary to the decision in Gombos v. Ashe, supra, 158 Cal.App.2d 517, 322 P.2d 933, that driving a vehicle while intoxicated may in appropriate circumstances evidence a conscious disregard of probable injury to others and be sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Thus, petitioners are correct that under the law as it existed prior to the Taylor decision, the allegations set forth in the fifth count of their first amended complaint relating to Mardian's conduct were sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. Petitioners alleged a good deal more than Mardian's decision to drive and his driving in an intoxicated condition. They alleged that ‘with knowledge that probable serious injury would result to persons in the area,’ Mardian ran a stop sign, and was zigzagging in and out of traffic at a speed in excess of 65 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone at the entrance to a popular recreation area on a Sunday afternoon when many pedestrians and bicyclists were in the immediate vicinity. They also alleged that immediately after the accident Mardian and his passenger falsely reported to the police that the passenger was driving rather than Mardian. If these allegations were proved at trial, the factfinder could reasonably find that Mardian acted with ‘malice’-with a conscious disregard of safety and the probable injury of others as a result of his conduct.”

Item Nos. 1-7:

Item Nos. 1-7 pertain to punitive damages allegations contained in the Complaint. The Motion states, “All these cases are inapplicable to the case before this Court since Ms. RAFFAELE was not intoxicated at the time of the December 19, 2019 accident. Moreover, she was not given a citation for the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint for making an unsafe turning movement. There was no mention of an unsafe speed by the investigating officer. Plaintiffs’ complaint merely alleges factual support for general motor vehicle negligence and nothing more.” (Motion; 9:5-8 (Uppercase in Motion.).) The Motion does not direct the court to allegations where the Complaint pleads that Defendant was not intoxicated, did not receive a citation, or that the investigating officer did not mention unsafe speed. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 437, subdivision (a), the court cannot consider facts outside of the Complaint.

Here, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant with a conscious disregard for the safety of others. (Complaint, ¶¶ 8 and 11.) Therefore, the court DENIES the Motion as to Item Nos. 1-7.

Item Nos. 8-10:

The court DENIES the Motion as to Item Nos. 8-10 because the allegations in Item Nos. 8-10 are relevant to Plaintiffs’ Negligent Entrustment Cause of Action. (See CACI No. 724.)

Based on the above, the court DENIES Defendant’s (Tiffany Rose Arnold Raffaele) Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Punitive Damages filed on 4-8-22 under ROA No. 13. The court ORDERS Defendant to file an answer to the Complaint within 14 days of the notice of the court’s decision.

Plaintiff is to give notice.