Judge: Walter P. Schwarm, Case: 30-2022-01255274, Date: 2023-08-15 Tentative Ruling
Plaintiffs’ (Jung Park and Young Park) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents, Set One (Motion), filed on 11-29-22 under ROA No. 68, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The court DECLINES to rule on Plaintiffs’ Evidentiary Objections (filed on 4-24-23 under ROA No. 87) as immaterial to the court’s decision.
Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 provides, “(a) On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: [¶] (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. [¶] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. [¶] (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general. [¶] (b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with each of the following: [¶] (1) the motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand. [¶] (2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. . . [¶] (c) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand.”
The Motion seeks to compel Defendant’s (General Motors LLC) further responses to Request for Production (RFP) Nos. 1, 3, 4, 15, 18, 21, 23, 28, 30, 33, 35, 38, 48, 51, 76, 78, 81, 83, 84, 85, and 89. (Motion; 1:2-9.)
The First Amended Complaint (FAC), filed on 10-19-22 under ROA No. 38, pleads, “July 23, 2021, GM issued Product Safety Recall No. N202311731-02 (High Voltage Battery May Melt or Burn) on Subject Vehicle. [¶] On December 20, 2021, GM issued Product Safety Recall No. 212343883 (High Voltage Battery May Melt of Burn. ‘General Motors has decided that a defect which relates to motor vehicle safety exists in certain 2017-2019 model year Chevrolet Bolt EV vehicles. The high voltage batteries in these vehicles may pose a risk of fire when charged to full, or very close to full, capacity.’) GM reduced the maximum charge on Subject Vehicle to 80% of capacity, thereby inconveniencing Plaintiffs with more frequent need to charge and curtailing longer road trips. [¶] On May 20, 2022, Plaintiffs presented Subject Vehicle to Defendant’s authorized repair facility with various concerns, including battery and electrical issues. The authorized repair facility performed warranty repairs. To date, GM has not fixed Subject Vehicle’s Battery Defect. The Repair Order states ‘No Remedy.’ Subject Vehicle was at Martin Chevrolet from May 20, 2022 until August 9 , 2022 – a total of 81 days. Plaintiffs incurred over $4,000 in out of pocket expenses for rental fees and gas for the rental vehicle – money they would not have spent had their electric vehicle not had a Battery Defect. [¶] Thereafter, Plaintiffs have continued to experience symptoms of Subject Vehicle’s Battery defects. Plaintiffs continue to experience the inconvenience of not being able to park at public parking facilities that prohibit the parking of Chevy Bolts due to fire risk. Subject Vehicle’s battery drains at an exceptionally high rate while driving on the freeway (the driving range will drop by 100 miles once the Vehicle reaches highway speeds).” (FAC, ¶¶ 43-46; Emphasis in FAC.)
Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 152 (Donlen), states, “ ‘A plaintiff pursuing an action under the Act has the burden to prove that (1) the vehicle had a nonconformity covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the use, value or safety of the vehicle (the nonconformity element); (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer of the vehicle for repair (the presentation element); and (3) the manufacturer or his representative did not repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts (the failure to repair element). (Civ.Code, § 1793.2; Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 886–887 [263 Cal.Rptr. 64].)’ [Citation.]”
Code of Civil Procedure section 1794 provides in part, “
“(a) Any buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under this chapter or under an implied or express warranty or service contract may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief. . . .[¶] (c) If the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful, the judgment may include, in addition to the amounts recovered under subdivision (a), a civil penalty which shall not exceed two times the amount of actual damages. This subdivision shall not apply in any class action under Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Section 1781, or with respect to a claim based solely on a breach of an implied warranty. . . .”
Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 344, 347 (Santana), provides, “Here, there was evidence to support a finding that Chrysler's ‘repair’ of the faulty fuel pump relay was intentionally inadequate during the warranty period. Specifically, the bridge operation solved one problem—stalling or failing to start—only to introduce a new defect: the inability of the fuel pump to shut off in the event of an accident. Contemporaneous internal e-mails demonstrated that Chrysler was aware of the problem. And Santana's expert testified there was no evidence that Chrysler's recall procedure ever accounted for the new risk, and that, in fact, Santana's vehicle was left with the new defect after the bridge operation. Although Chrysler did not include the actual warranty in our record, presumably it requires a repair that restores full functionality, not a “MacGyver” half measure that simply swaps defects. From this evidence, the jury could infer that Chrysler intentionally chose not fully to honor the express warranty, which is sufficient to support a civil penalty under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (c).” (Footnote 5 omitted.)
RFP Nos. 76 and 78:
Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief (PSB), filed on 7-26-23 under ROA No. 118, acknowledges that Defendant’s supplemental responses to RFP Nos. 76 and 78 are sufficient. (PSB; 2:8-10.) Therefore, the court DENIES the Motion as MOOT as to RFP Nos. 76 and 78. The PSB contends that Defendant’s responses to RFP Nos. 1, 3, 4, 15, 18, 21, 23, 28, 30, 33, 35, 38, 48, 51, 81, 83, 84, 85, and 89 are insufficient.
RFP Nos. 1 and 4:
RFP Nos. 1 and 4 request documents pertaining to Plaintiffs’ vehicle. The documents requested by RFP Nos. 1 and 4 are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding Plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Defendant’s responses to RFP Nos. 1 and 4 state, “. . . GM will comply in part and produce the following documents in its possession . . . .” (Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement (PSS) filed on 11-29-22 under ROA No. 55; 5:14-26 and 24:1-12.) The court GRANTS the Motion as to RFP Nos. 1 and 4, and ORDERS Defendant to comply with RFP Nos. 1 and 4, or provide a response that complies with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 as to its inability to comply.
RFP Nos. 3 and 15:
RFP Nos. 3 and 15 also request documents related to Plaintiffs’ vehicle. The documents requested by RFP Nos. 3 and 4 are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding Plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) As to RFP No. 3, Defendant responded in part, “. . . GM states that is not currently aware of any parts from the SUBJECT VEHICLE that were sent to it by any authorized repair facilities for analysis. Therefore, no documents will be produced.” (PSS; 14:26-15:2.) As to RFP No. 15, Defendant responded in part, “. . . GM is not currently aware of any such responsive documents and reserves the right to supplement this response as discovery continues.” (PSS; 33:7-9.) Defendant’s responses do not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230. Therefore, the court GRANTS the Motion as to RFP Nos. 3 and 15, and ORDERS Defendant to provide responses to RFP Nos. 3 and 15 that comply with the Code of Civil Procedure.
RFP No. 18:
RFP No. 18 requests documents related to the defect that is at issue in the FAC. RFP No. 18 limits its request to vehicles of the same year, make, and model of Plaintiffs’ vehicle based on the term “CHEVROLET VEHICLES.” (The court notes that the definitions for the Requests for Production defines the term “CHEVY VEHICLES” as vehicles of the same make, model, and year of Plaintiffs’ vehicle. The definitions do not define “CHEVROLET VEHICLES.” The court assumes that failure to define “CHEVROLET VEHICLES” was an oversight by Plaintiffs, and that Plaintiffs intended to use “CHEVROLET VEHICLES” and “CHEVY VEHICLES” interchangeably.) The documents requested by RFP No. 18 are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as to the defect alleged in the Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) The court, however, limits the discovery to documents pertaining to “. . . internal analysis or investigation . . .” as to vehicles of the same year, make, and model sold in California by Defendant. Further, the court limits the term “BATTERY DEFECTS” to the defects identified in the FAC in paragraphs 43, 44, and 46 regarding the defect identified in “Product Safety Recall No. N202311731-02,” “Product Safety Recall No. 212343883,” and “. . . battery drains at an exceptionally high rate . . . .” Therefore, the court GRANTS the Motion as to RFP No. 18 as limited.
RFP No. 21:
The court DENIES the Motion as to RFP No. 21 because it does not pertain to the defect at issue in the FAC, and it is vague and overbroad in terms of “. . . problem-solving efforts . . . .”
RFP No. 23:
The court DENIES the Motion as to RFP No. 23 because it does not pertain to “CHEVY VEHICLES” as defined in the definitions. RFP No. 23 is overbroad because it applies to all Chevrolet vehicles.
RFP No. 28:
The court DENIES the Motion as to RFP No. 28 because it does not pertain to the defect at issue in the FAC, and the term “. . . trends . . .” is vague and overbroad.
RFP No. 30:
The court DENIES the Motion as to RFP No. 30 because it requests substantially the same information as RFP No. 18, and the court GRANTED the Motion as to RFP No. 18.
RFP No. 33:
The court GRANTS the Motion as to RFP No. 33. The documents requested by RFP No. 33 are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding the defect pertaining Plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) The GRANTS the Motion as to RFP No. 33 with the same limitations as stated for RFP No. 18.
RFP No. 35:
The documents requested by RFP No. 35 are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding the defect pertaining Plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Defendant has agreed to comply with RFP No. 35 in part. Defendant’s response states “. . . GM will comply in part and produce a list of technical service bulletins . . . and informational service bulletins . . . issued for the same year, make, and model . . . After it has produced a list of TSBs and ISBs, GM will – at PLAINTIFFS’ request – search for and produce, if located, copies of a reasonable number of TSBs and ISBs, if any . . . .” (PSS; 92:19-21.) Defendant’s response is evasive because it requires Plaintiffs to make a further request as to documents requested by RFP No. 35. The GRANTS the Motion as to RFP No. 35 with the same limitations as stated for RFP No. 18.
RFP No. 38:
The court DENIES the Motion as to RFP No. 30 because it is vague as to “. . . decision to modify the battery system . . .” because this phrasing is not connected to the defect alleged in the FAC.
RFP No. 48:
The court DENIES the Motion as to RFP No. 48 because the term “countermeasures” is vague because it is not connected to the defect alleged in the FAC.
RFP No. 51:
The court DENIES the Motion as to RFP No. 51 because it is overbroad in light of the issues raised in the FAC, and in light of the fact that the court has GRANTED the Motion as to RFP Nos. 18, 33, and 35 which are sufficient to obtain discovery regarding Defendant’s awareness of the defect at issue. Further, RFP No. 51 is vague because it requires subjective decision as to the terms “reviews” and “summaries.”
RFP No. 81:
The court DENIES the Motion as to RFP No. 81 because it is overbroad in terms of time. Further, the court has already GRANTED the Motion as to RFP Nos. 18, 33, and 35 which are sufficient to discover relevant information regarding Defendant’s awareness of the defects alleged in the FAC to show that Defendant’s failure to comply was willful.
RFP No. 83:
The court GRANTS the Motion as to RFP No. 83. The documents requested by RFP No. 83 are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding the defect pertaining Plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) The GRANTS the Motion as to RFP No. 83 with the same limitations as stated for RFP No. 18.
RFP No. 84:
The court DENIES the Motion as to RFP No. 84 because it is overbroad in terms of time. Further, the court has already GRANTED the Motion as to RFP Nos. 18, 33, and 35 which are sufficient to discover relevant information regarding Defendant’s awareness of the defects alleged in the FAC to show that Defendant’s failure to comply was willful.
RFP No. 85:
The court DENIES RFP No. 85 because it is vague in terms of the term “complaints,” and it is not connected to the defects alleged in the FAC.
RFP No. 89:
The court DENIES RFP No. 89 because the term “performance standards” is unconnected to the defects alleged in the FAC.
Based on the above, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ (Jung Park and Young Park) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents, Set One, filed on 11-29-22 under ROA No. 68, as to RFP Nos. 1, 3, 4, 15, 18, 33, 35, and 83. The court ORDERS Defendant to provides supplemental responses to RFP Nos. 1, 3, 4, 15, 18, 33, 35, and 83 within 30 days of the date of service of the notice of the court’s ruling. The court DENIES the Motion as to the remaining RFPs. The court DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for a monetary sanction because both sides achieved some success in this Motion, and Defendant was substantially justified in opposing it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)
Plaintiffs are to give notice.