Judge: Wesley L. Hsu, Case: 21STCV35442, Date: 2023-03-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV35442 Hearing Date: March 30, 2023 Dept: L
1. Defendant Inland
Valley Partners, LLC dba Inland Valley Care and Rehabilitation Center’s Demurrer
to Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED. The court will hear from counsel
for Plaintiffs as to whether leave to amend is requested, and as to which
cause(s) of action, and will require an offer of proof if so.
2. Defendant Inland
Valley Partners, LLC dba Inland Valley Care and Rehabilitation Center’s Motion
to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint is DENIED as MOOT.
Background
Plaintiffs Tammy Denney and Dyanna
Denney, as heirs and successors-in-interest to Janice Larcom, decedent (“Plaintiffs”)
allege as follows: On April 15, 2020, Janice Larcom (“Larcom”) was discharged
from Kaiser’s Fontana Medical Center to Inland Valley Care and Rehabilitation
Center. Larcom died on September 26, 2020 as a result of deficiencies in care.
On February
16, 2022, this case was transferred
from Department 29 of the Personal Injury Court to this instant department.
Legal Standard
A demurrer may be made on the grounds that
the pleading, inter alia, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action and/or is uncertain (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f).)
When considering
demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer
proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via
proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v.
Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the
pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it
lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are
judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d
902, 905 [citations omitted].) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only
allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis
for the claim against him. (Semole v.
Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) “[A] demurrer does not,
however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in
the pleading, or the construction placed on an instrument pleaded therein, or
facts impossible in law, or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may
take judicial knowledge.” (S. Shore Land
Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [citations omitted].)
Discussion
Defendant Inland
Valley Partners, LLC dba Inland Valley Care and Rehabilitation Center (“Inland
Valley”) demurs, per Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10, subdivisions (e)
and (f), to the second cause of action in Plaintiffs’ TAC, on the basis that it
fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain.
The elements of a
cause of action for elder abuse and neglect are determined by the Elder Abuse
and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (“EADACPA”). (Welf. & Inst. Code §
15600 et seq.)
At the outset, the EADACPA excludes liability
for acts of professional negligence; it does not apply to simple or gross
negligence by health care providers. (Delaney
v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th
23, 32; Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th
771, 785.) Several factors “must be present for conduct to constitute neglect within
the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act and thereby trigger the enhanced remedies
available under the Act. The plaintiff must allege (and ultimately prove by
clear and convincing evidence) facts establishing that the defendant: (1) had
responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent adult,
such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or medical care; (2) knew of conditions
that made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for his or her own
basic needs; and (3) denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet the
elder or dependent adult's basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was
substantially certain to befall the elder or dependent adult (if the plaintiff
alleges oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of the high
probability of such injury (if the plaintiff alleges recklessness). The
plaintiff must also allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing
evidence) that the neglect caused the elder or dependent adult to suffer physical harm, pain
or mental suffering. Finally, the facts constituting the neglect and
establishing the causal link between the neglect and the injury must be pleaded
with particularity, in accordance with the pleading rules governing statutory
claims.” (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198
Cal.App.4th 396, 406-407 [quotation marks and citations omitted].)
Neglect under the EADACPA “refers not to the
substandard performance of medical services but, rather, to the failure of
those responsible for attending to the basic needs and comforts of elderly or
dependent adults, regardless of their professional standing, to carry out their
custodial obligations. Thus, the statutory definition of ‘neglect’ speaks not
of the undertaking of medical services, but of the failure to provide
medical care.” (Sababin v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th
81, 89 [quotation marks and citation omitted].)
Moreover, “[i]n order to obtain the
[EADACPA’s] heightened remedies, a plaintiff must allege conduct essentially
equivalent to conduct that would support recovery of punitive damages. (Compare
Welf & Inst. Code, § 15657 [requiring ‘clear and convincing evidence that a
defendant is liable for’ elder abuse and ‘has been guilty of recklessness,
oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of the abuse’] with Civ. Code, §
3294, subd. (a) [requiring ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice].)” (Covenant Care,
supra, 32 Cal.4th at 789.) When an elder abuse claim is brought
against a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must further show that an officer,
director or managing agent authorized or ratified the abuse or neglect. (Welf
& Inst. Code, § 15657, subd. (c); Civ. Code, § 3294.)
The court determines that Plaintiffs have failed to plead a
cause of action for elder abuse.
Plaintiffs have alleged that decedent was hospitalized at
Kaiser; no specified time or reason for said hospitalization is given, although
it was said to be a “lengthy stay.” (TAC, ¶¶ 10 and 23.) On April 15, 2020,
decedent was discharged from Kaiser’s Fontana Medical Center to Inland Valley.
(Id.) Decedent was 69 years old, morbidly obese, ventilator-dependent
and required full assistance with her activities of daily living. (Id.) Decedent
was admitted to Inland Valley for treatment, care, and therapy required to wean
her off the ventilator. (Id.) Decedent had “existing” wounds in the
sacral area and around her abdomen. (Id., ¶¶ 12 and 36.) Inland Valley
staff left decedent to lie for hours in her own feces, did not bathe or shower
her and did not turn and re-position her as required. (Id.) No
information is alleged as to when these alleged failures occurred or the
frequency with which they occurred. Decedent’s pressure sores became worse,
with one becoming unstageable. (Id., ¶ 12.) It is not specified when
decedent’s pressure sores are alleged to have worsened. Decedent’s pressure
sores became infected at some unspecified time, which led to sepsis and
resulted in decedent’s September 26, 2020 death. (Id.)
Plaintiffs have further generically alleged that “on
numerous occasions during her admission and residency at Defendant INLAND
VALLEY’s facility, Ms. Larcom suffered from abuse, neglect and other
preventable complications and injuries. Moreover, on numerous occasions during
her admission, Defendant INLAND VALLEY, and its managing agents, officers,
directors and others that direct corporate affairs, failed to provide Ms.
Larcom medically necessary care, medication, nutrition, hydration, physical
therapy, occupational therapy and other rehabilitative services. In addition,
on numerous occasions during her admission and residency at Defendant INLAND
VALLEY’s facility, Defendant INLAND VALLEY, and its managing agents, officers,
directors and others that direct corporate affairs, failed to monitor Ms.
Larcom for changes in her condition, failed to properly document and report
changes in her condition, and otherwise failed to supervise and prevent harm to
Ms. Larcom.” (TAC, ¶ 33.)
Plaintiffs urge that they have now adequately pled this
cause of action via new allegations contained in Paragraph 38. At Paragraph 38,
Plaintiffs allege that on or about June 30, 2022 (at the latest) through and up
to the time of her death, decedent “was supposed to be” provided care by three
specifically identified nurses (i.e., Sonya Santos, RN, Mila Malabanan, RN, and
Anita Infante, RN) “and others,” that these individuals and “other
nurses/employees,” were aware from the records that decedent required turning
and prepositioning, as well as cleaning/bathing services, that despite this
knowledge, these individuals at unspecified “aforementioned times (and other
times by other nurses)” skipped the repositioning and cleansing care required
“because they were busy with taking care of too many patients/residents (due to
overstaffing[1]
underfunding. . .) and because they felt that decedent would likely
succumb, from her other medical conditions soon anyway.” The former allegation
is conclusory and not factually supported. Again, as noted by the court
previously, this latter allegation is not factually supported and based on
conjecture of multiple individuals’ state of mind.
Although Plaintiffs set forth dates and times[2] Santos,
Malabanan and Infante allegedly “intentionally chose not to provide this care,”
they still fail to allege any ratification or authorization by the named
defendants in the lawsuit. As pointed out by the court in its rejection of the previous
complaint, this is fatally defective.
With respect to the issue of understaffing, Plaintiffs again
allege that an unspecified investigation was conducted at an unspecified time
by the Department of Public Health and that, during this time, “the
above-referenced nurses (and others)” advised investigators that “residents’
physicians orders [for certain physician ordered care, such as exercises or
application of special devices to prevent skin breakdown] were not done” when
only one RNA worked in the subacute unit. (Id.)
Plaintiffs have not alleged dates, if any, when only one RNA
worked in the subacute unit or that decedent was in the subacute unit or that
only an RNA could perform repositioning and cleansing care.
Plaintiffs allege that additionally, “investigators found no
evidence that physician-ordered care was provided to decedent on 9/5, 9/6, 9/7,
9/8, 9/11, 9/12, 9/13, 9/15, 9/18, 9/20, 9/24, 9/26 and 9/29 of 2020,” yet they
fail to identify what specific “physician-ordered care” was in place as to
decedent. Further, September 29, 2020 was three days after decedent’s
death, which suggests that this allegation pertains to an investigation of all
residents in general and not to decedent in particular. It is unclear if this
allegation involves to the same or a different investigation by the Department
of Public Health.
Plaintiffs conclude that “nurses could have requested help
or worked longer hours to provide life saving care, but deliberately chose not
to—resulting in decedent’s death,” but fail to factually support said
statement. (Id., ¶ 38.)
Plaintiffs have failed to plead with specificity facts
demonstrating that Inland Valley failed to provide care to Plaintiffs’ decedent
“either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall the
elder or dependent adult . . . or with conscious disregard of the high
probability of such injury. . .” (Carter, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th
at 407.) Plaintiffs have otherwise made generic allegations of “underfunding”
and “ignor[ing] laws,” “disregard” for decedent’s “care plan(s),” “disregard[ ]
[of] orders,” and “disregard[ ] [of] its own policies and procedures,” without
providing any specific facts regarding same. Further, Plaintiffs have failed to
plead any causal link with specificity. Plaintiffs have failed to plead with
specificity facts demonstrating the alleged corporate authorization or
ratification of any wrongful conduct.
Accordingly, Inland Valley’s demurrer to the second cause of
action of the TAC is sustained.
Inland Valley‘s motion to strike is denied as moot, based
upon the ruling made on the demurrer.
[1]
Plaintiffs’ reference to “overstaffing” appears to be a clerical error.
[2]
One of the dates listed, September 29, 2020, is three days after decedent’s
date of death.