Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 19STCV05335, Date: 2022-08-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV05335    Hearing Date: August 23, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

I.         INTRODUCTION

          On February 15, 2019, Plaintiff Kaitlin Woodson (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action against defendants LA Park La Brea C LLC (erroneously sued as “AIMCO Park LA Brea, Inc., AIMCO Properties, L.P., and AIMCO Park LA Brea Services, LLC”), and OP Properties Management, L.P. (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting the sole cause of action for negligence.

          On May 6, 2022, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot establish any of the elements of negligence. Plaintiff opposes.

II.      FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As alleged in the complaint, on February 17, 2017, Plaintiff slipped and fell while walking in the rain in the common area of her apartment complex at the Villas at Park La Brea located at 5553 West 6th Street, Los Angeles 90036, which was owned, operated, and managed by Defendants, and was injured.

III.      LEGAL STANDARD

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) 

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  A moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause of action.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.) 

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.  (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)  The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”  (Ibid.)¿ The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.) 

“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”  (Ibid.)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) 

IV.     EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

          Plaintiff objects to Defendants use of the Complaint and Answer as evidence to support their motion for summary judgment. The Court sustains Plaintiff’s objections in their entirety.  (College Hosp. Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 720; Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.)

          Defendants object to portions of the Declaration of Eris J. Barillas. The Court overrules these objections in their entirety. Defendants also object to a single portion of the declaration of Jeffrey Yeakel. The Court sustains this sole objection on hearsay grounds.

V.        DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) they were not negligent for Plaintiff’s fall because there was insufficient time for Defendants’ employee to finish his inspection of the relevant areas; and (2) they did not have prior knowledge of any allege dangerous condition or if one even exists.

The elements of negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages.

(Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.) “Since Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, the liability of landowners for injuries to people on their property has been governed by general negligence principles.” (Pineda v. Ennabe (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1407.)

“The owner of premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. A failure to fulfill this duty is negligence.” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611.) “A landlord must conduct reasonable periodic inspections of rental property whenever the landlord has the legal right of possession.” (CALJIC No. 1006 (March 2019 update).) “Whether a dangerous condition has existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it is a question of fact for the jury, and the cases do not impose exact time limitations. Each accident must be viewed in light of its own unique circumstances.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1207.)

First, in terms of the argument that Defendants’ lacked reasonable time to put up wet floor signs at the entrance of building #2 where Plaintiff fell, Defendants rely on the deposition testimony of Service Manage Ruben Del Real who stated that that he and another employee were still in the process of inspecting all three buildings and did not have time to put wet floor signs in the subject area. (Motion at pg. 8; UMF No. 20.) However, this evidence is not sufficient to carry Defendants’ burden because the incident occurred in the afternoon and, according to Mr. Del Real’s deposition testimony, his inspection procedure began around 8 o’clock in morning on the date of the incident. (UMF No. 17, 20; PUMF No. 17; Del Real Depo at pg. 34:1-4; Exhibit 18.) Thus, because of the large span of time between the start of the inspection and the incident, Defendants have not sufficiently shown that they lacked reasonable time to put up a wet floor sign.

Second, Defendants argue they lacked “noticed of any dangerous condition regarding the entrance to building 2.” (Motion at pg. 8.) They reason that there were no prior fall incidents in the area and no inspection of the area would have revealed any dangerous condition. (Id.; UMF No. 10; Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s request for production of documents, set one, No. 38.) However, this lack of knowledge is insufficient for Defendants to carry their burden on summary judgment. As stated in Swanberg v. O’Mectin (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 325:

“Although liability might easily be found where the landowner has actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, ‘[t]he landowner's lack of knowledge of the dangerous condition is not a defense. He has an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and therefore, must inspect them or take other proper means to ascertain their condition. And if, by the exercise of reasonable care, he would have discovered the dangerous condition, he is liable.‘ (4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, §592, p. 2860.) Accordingly, it would appear that actual knowledge is not an absolute requirement for finding liability here.”

(Id. at 330.) Moreover, because the subject area lacked any wet floor signs and the evidence suggests that there was reasonable time to inspect the area, it suggests that Defendants did not abide by their affirmative duty to keep the subject area in reasonably safe condition or properly inspected the area to ensure safety. Thus, Defendants’ motion fails on this theory as well.

          Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue.

VI.      CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 

Moving party to give notice. 

            Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.