Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 19STCV34024, Date: 2022-12-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV34024    Hearing Date: December 23, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

I.            INTRODUCTION

On September 25, 2019, plaintiff David Lawrence Foley (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Bank”), Diamond Parking Service (“Diamond”), and Jovante Childress (“Childress”) (collectively, “Defendants”).  Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint on April 30, 2020 asserting causes of action for negligence, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).  Plaintiff alleges that on November 8, 2017, he was assaulted and seriously injured by Childress while outside of Chase Bank in West Los Angeles.  (FAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that Diamond handles parking and other functions for Bank and that Childress was employed by Bank and Diamond.  (FAC, ¶¶ 10-11.)  Plaintiff further alleges that Bank and Diamond were negligent in employing Childress, despite his known propensity for violence.  (FAC, ¶ 19-25.) 

On April 7, 2022, Defendants filed this motion for summary judgment.  The motion is unopposed.

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  A moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause of action.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.)  To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Ibid.) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.  (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)  The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”  (Ibid.)  The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”  (Ibid.)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

III.        DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff has admitted in requests for admission that he sustained no damages. 

“[A] deemed admitted order establishes, by judicial fiat, that a nonresponding party has responded to the requests by admitting the truth of all matters contained therein.”  (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 979.)  Requests for admissions “differs fundamentally from the other five discovery tools (depositions, interrogatories, inspection demands, medical examinations, and expert witness exchanges) . . . [because] admission requests seek to eliminate the need for proof: ‘The purpose of the admissions procedure . . . is to limit the triable issues and spare the parties the burden and expense of litigating undisputed issues.’  Sometimes, the admissions obtained will even leave the party making them vulnerable to summary judgment.”  [Citations.]  Matters that are admitted or deemed admitted through RFA discovery devices are conclusively established in the litigation and are not subject to being contested through contrary evidence.  [Citation.]”  (St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 775.)

The Court takes judicial notice of the Court’s previous finding that Plaintiff failed to serve responses to Defendants’ Requests for Admission (Set One), as well as the minute order issued on March 1, 2022 granting Defendants’ motion to deem them admitted.  By this order, Plaintiff has admitted that Bank did not own, operate, control, or supervise any parking lot services, including the conduct of parking lot attendants and supervisors, and that Childress was not and has never been Bank’s employee or agent on the date of the incident.  (UMF Nos. 6-7, 9-11.)  Plaintiff has also admitted that Diamond and its affiliates were not, and have never been, Bank’s employees or agents.  (UMF Nos. 12-15.)  Plaintiff has also admitted that Bank had no prior knowledge of Childress’s conduct and that on the date of the incident, Childress calmly, politely, and respectfully asked Plaintiff to leave the premises if he did not have business to conduct there.  (UMF Nos. 18-20.)  Additionally, Plaintiff has admitted that he did not lose any income, that his civil rights were not violated, that Bank and Diamond were not liable for Childress’s conduct, and that none of the defendants were negligent on the day of the incident.  (UMF Nos. 22, 25-32.)  Instead, Plaintiff admits that he was entirely negligent and liable for the incident, and is not entitled to special or general damages.  (UMF Nos. 38-39.) 

Based on the deemed admissions, Defendants have shown that Plaintiff cannot establish any of his causes of action for negligence, assault, battery, or IIED. 

Plaintiff did not oppose this motion and failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

V.      CONCLUSION

          In light of the foregoing, the Motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Moving party to give notice. 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.