Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 19STCV44966, Date: 2022-10-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV44966    Hearing Date: October 4, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

ASHLEY MANCI,

                   Plaintiff(s),

          vs.

 

THE TJX COMPANIES, INC., et al.,

 

                   Defendant(s).

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      CASE NO.: 19STCV44966

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: THE TJX COMPANIES, INC. AND MARSHALLS OF MA, INC.’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CROSS COMPLAINT AGAINST MCP ONE WESTSIDE LLC. 

 

Dept. 27

1:30 p.m.

October 4, 2022

 

I.            INTRODUCTION

On December 12, 2019, Plaintiff Ashley Manci filed this action for premises liability and negligence against The TJX Companies, Inc. (“TJX”), Marshalls of MA, Inc. (“Marshalls”), and MCP One Westside LLC (“MCP”). Plaintiff alleges she was injured on February 13, 2019, when she walked into an exterior glass window panel of a commercial building owned by MCP and leased by Marshalls. 

TJX and Marshalls (collectively, “Defendants”) filed an answer on January 21, 2020.  On April 3, 2020, MCP filed an answer.  MCP also filed a cross-complaint against Marshalls alleging breach of contract, express indemnity, implied indemnity, equitable indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief.  MCP alleges it is entitled to a defense based on an indemnity clause in the lease agreement between MCP and Marshalls. 

On August 17, 2022, Defendants filed this motion seeking leave to file a cross-complaint against MCP.  The proposed cross-complaint claims that MCP assumed full responsibility with regard to the structural portion of the property pursuant to its lease agreement and that MCP is required to indemnify and defendant Defendants.  As in MCP’s cross-complaint, Defendants assert causes of action for breach of contract, express indemnity, implied indemnity, equitable indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief. 

Only MCP opposes Defendants’ motion. 

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

A party shall file a cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him or her before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint or cross-complaint.  (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 428.50 (a).)  Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a date for trial.  (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 428.50 (b).)  A party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except one filed within the time specified in subdivision (a) or (b).  Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.  (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 428.50 (c).)  Where the proposed cross-complaint arises out of the same transaction as plaintiff’s claim, the court must grant leave to file the cross-complaint so long as defendant is acting in good faith.  (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 426.50.)

III.        DISCUSSION

Defendants request leave to file the cross-complaint on the grounds that it arises from the same transaction or occurrence alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint and that filing the cross-complaint is in the interests of justice, will not prejudice any other parties, and will promote the efficient resolution of all claims between all potential parties.  Defendants state that there is no question of “bad faith” because their lease with MCP includes an indemnity clause and a tender was submitted and rejected.

As stated above, only MCP opposes the motion.  MCP argues the proposed cross-complaint is untimely and there is no showing that Defendants are acting in good faith.  MCP emphasizes the fact that Defendants have been in possession of the lease agreement since the inception of this action and had ample time to assert cross-claims, especially since MCP filed a cross-complaint against Marshalls for indemnity and breach of the same lease agreement.  MCP claims that Defendants proposed cross-complaint (and any subsequent action) is time-barred.  MCP also claims that it will need to undertake additional discovery on the eve of trial, which is scheduled for January 10, 2023. 

In their reply brief, Defendants argue that the statutes governing leave to file a cross-complaint do not function as a statute of limitations and there is no showing of bad faith or prejudice sufficient to deny leave.  The Court agrees with both assertions.  First, the statute of limitations for any cross-claims by Defendants were tolled, making this cross-complaint timely.  (See ZF Micro Devices, Inc. v. TAT Capital Partners, Ltd. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 69, 90-93.)   Second, MCP’s claims of bad faith and prejudice are unsubstantiated.  There is no showing of a “sinister motive” or wrongdoing with a “dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.”  (See Silver Organizations , Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 100.)  MCP does not articulate any prejudice that will occur other than the fact that it would have to defend itself.  MCP also does not identify how any additional discovery would be so burdensome.  Even if trial is scheduled for late January, it can always be briefly continued if MCP believes it need additional time to defend itself against Defendants’ cross-claims.   

IV.         CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED and Defendants are ordered to file the proposed cross-complaint within 5 days of the date of this Order.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.