Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 20STCV04202, Date: 2022-08-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV04202 Hearing Date: August 11, 2022 Dept: 27
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL
DISTRICT
|
Plaintiff(s), vs. THE
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendant(s). |
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT VANOWEN GARDENS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Dept.
27 1:30
p.m. August
11, 2022 |
I.
INTRODUCTION
On January 31, 2020, plaintiff Coral Markle
(“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Vanowen Gardens, LLC
(“Defendant”), the City of Los Angeles, the County of Los Angeles, and Candida
Property, LLC. Plaintiff alleges that on
June 17, 2019, she was injured on the public sidewalk on the property located
between 14639 and 14635 Vanowen Street in Van Nuys, California. On May 25, 2022, Defendant filed this motion
for summary judgment on the grounds that it did not own, possess, or control
the subject property. The motion is
unopposed.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the incident, Defendant owned the
property located at 14639 Vanowen Street, Van Nuys, CA 91405 (the “Vanowen
Property”). (Defendant’s Undisputed
Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 1.) Defendant
did not have a property interest in the sidewalk adjacent to the Vanowen
Property. (UMF No. 2.) Defendant did not own, possess, lease,
operate, manage, design, manufacture, maintain, repair, construct or control
the sidewalk adjacent to the Vanowen Property.
(UMF No. 3.) Defendant did not
have a property interest in the adjacent property, located at the corner of
Vanowen and Tobias. (UMF No. 4.) On June 17, 2019, Plaintiff was on her
motorized wheelchair traveling on the sidewalk of Vanowen Street. (UMF No. 5.)
Plaintiff’s motorized wheelchair hit a hole in the sidewalk causing her
to fall out of her motorized wheelchair.
(UMF No. 6.) Plaintiff identified
the location of the elevated portion of the sidewalk to be in front of the
neighboring property, not in front of Defendant’s property. (UMF No. 7.)
The area Plaintiff identified as where she fell is on public sidewalk
and is 3.5 feet east of Defendant’s eastern property line. (UMF No. 14.)
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
In reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues
framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the
opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated
the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley
v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)
“[T]he initial burden is always on the
moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of
material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510,
1519.) A defendant moving for summary
judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a
cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements
of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete
defense to the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A
moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause
of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.)
To meet this burden of showing a cause
of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the
plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff
cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) It is
insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of
evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003)
108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The defendant
“must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain
evidence to support his or her claim.” (Ibid.)
The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations,
admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which
judicial notice may be taken. (Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)
“Once the defendant . . . has met that
burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue
of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense
thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not
merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable
issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts
showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of
action.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff
cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
IV.
DISCUSSION
Those who own, possess, or control property
generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in
order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki
v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) “A defendant cannot be held liable for the defective
or dangerous condition of property which it did not own, possess, or
control. Where the absence of ownership,
possession, or control has been unequivocally established, summary judgment is
proper. [Citation.]” (Isaacs
v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 134.) Courts have held that in the absence of a staute a
landowner is under no duty to maintain in a safe condition a public street
abutting upon the landowner’s property unless the landowner created the
danger. (See, e.g., Sexton v. Brooks (1952) 39 Cal.2d 153, 157.) “The reason for this rule is that a landowner
generally has no right to control another’s property, including streets owned
and maintained by the government.” (Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1084.)
However, after applying the Rowland
factors, courts have imposed a duty on adjacent landowners where the landowners
magnified the danger of abutting property, obstructed the danger of abutting
property, or had control over a condition on their property which would
justified imposing a duty.
Defendant
contends it did not possess, own, or maintain the sidewalk where Plaintiff fell
and that the sidewalk was not even in front of its property. Dany Hersko, one of Defendant’s managing
members, declares that Defendant owned the property located at 14639 Vanowen
Street in Van Nuys, but does not, and never did, own possess, lease, operate,
manage, design, manufacture, maintain, repair, construct or control the
sidewalk in front of the property. (Barresi
Decl., Ex. G (“Hersko Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-4.) Hersko
also declares that Defendant does not have, and never did have, an ownership
interest in the adjacent property located on the corner of Vanowen Street and
Tobias Avenue, in front of which Plaintiff fell. (Hersko Decl., ¶ 5.) Lastly, Hersko declares it does not, and
never did, own, possess, lease, operate, manage, design, manufacture, maintain,
repair, construct, or control the sidewalk in front of the adjacent property
located on the corner of Vanowen Street and Tobias Avenue, in front of which
Plaintiff fell. (Hersko Decl., ¶
6.) Defendant also submits the
declaration of a land surveyor, Chris Nelson, who states that, based on his
review and preparation of maps as well as a land survey that he conducted, the
location of the incident is 3.5 feet east of the east property line of 14639
Vanowen Street. (Barresi Decl., Ex. F, ¶¶
3-7.)
Based
on Defendant’s submitted evidence, the Court finds that Defendant has met its
moving burden to make a prima facie showing that Plaintiff cannot establish it
had a duty to maintain the sidewalk where she fell. As Plaintiff did not oppose the motion,
Plaintiff fails to meet her burden to show that a triable issue of material
fact. Accordingly, summary judgment is
appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of
the foregoing, the Motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Moving party to give notice.
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org.
Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to
appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the
hearing and argue the matter. Unless you
receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume
that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the
parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.