Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 20STCV05094, Date: 2023-01-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV05094 Hearing Date: January 12, 2023 Dept: 27
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL
DISTRICT
|
Plaintiff, vs. CAROL
DUBOIS-CHESS, et al., Defendants. |
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: (1) Defendant Carol Dubois-Chess’ Motion for Leave To Conduct
Independent Medical Examination of Plaintiff (Neurosurgical), and Request for
Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $939.15 Against George Oketcho and
Counsel of Record, Jointly and Severally; (2) Defendant Carol Dubois-Chess’ Motion to Continue Trial and
All Trial-Related Dates Dept.
27 1:30
p.m. January
12, 2023 |
I.
INTRODUCTION
This action arises from an automobile
collision, which occurred on approximately March 24, 2018, on Rosemead
Boulevard in Los Angeles, California. On
said date, George Oketcho (“Plaintiff”) was stopped in his vehicle, when a
separate vehicle driven by Carol Dubois-Chess (“Defendant Dubois-Chess”)
collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle from behind at a high rate of speed. Plaintiff alleges he suffered significant
personal injury as a result of the collision.
On
February 7, 2020, Plaintiff commenced the instant action by filing a Complaint
against Defendant Dubois-Chess, Hertz Vehicles, LLC, and Does 1 through 50
(collectively, “Defendants”).
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1)
Negligence; and (2) Negligence Per Se.
On January 6, 2021, Defendant
Dubois-Chess filed an Answer.
Subsequently, on January 27, 2021, Defendant Hertz Vehicles, LLC filed
an Answer.
On February 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed a
Request for Dismissal, dismissing Defendant Hertz Vehicles, LLC from this
action, without prejudice.
On December 14, 2022, Defendant
Dubois-Chess filed the following two motions, which are presently before the
Court for consideration: (1) Motion for Leave To Conduct Independent Medical
Examination of Plaintiff (Neurosurgical), and Request for Monetary Sanctions in
the Amount of $939.15 Against George Oketcho and Counsel of Record, Jointly and
Severally; and (2) Motion to Continue Trial and All Trial-Related Dates. Plaintiff has not submitted an Opposition to
either of the aforementioned Motions filed by Defendant Dubois-Chess.
II.
LEGAL
STANDARD
A.
Motion For Leave to Conduct Independent Medical Examination
“In any case in which a plaintiff is
seeking recovery for personal injuries, a defendant may demand one physical
examination of the plaintiff, if both of the following conditions are
satisfied: (1) The examination does not include any diagnostic test or procedure
that is painful, protracted, or intrusive. (2) The examination is conducted at
a location within 75 miles of the residence of the examinee.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.220, subd. (a).) “A defendant may make a demand under this
article without leave of court after that defendant has been served or has
appeared in the action, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.220, subd. (b).) “A physical examination demanded under
subdivision (a) shall be scheduled for a date that is at least 30 days after
service of the demand.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 2032.220, subd. (d).)
“The plaintiff to whom a demand for a
physical examination under this article is directed shall respond to the demand
[within 20 days after service] by a written statement that the examinee will
comply with the demand as stated, will comply with the demand as specifically
modified by the plaintiff, or will refuse, for reasons specified in the
response, to submit to the demanded physical examination.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.230, subd. (a),
(b).)
“The defendant may move for an order
compelling response and compliance with a demand for a physical
examination.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2032.240, subd. (b).) “The court shall
impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section
2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or
opposes a motion to compel response and compliance with a demand for a physical
examination, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with
substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of
the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2032.240, subd. (c).)
B.
Motion to Continue Trial and All Trial-Related Dates
Trial dates are firm to ensure prompt
disposition of civil cases. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (a).)
Continuances are thus generally disfavored. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd.
(b).) Nevertheless, the trial court has
discretion to continue trial dates. (Hernandez
v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246.) Each request for continuance must be
considered on its own merits and is granted upon an affirmative showing of good
cause. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332,
subd. (c); Hernandez, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at 1246.) Circumstances that may indicate good cause
include: (1) the unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness due to
death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (2) the unavailability of a
party due to death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (3) the
unavailability of trial counsel due to death, illness, or other excusable
circumstances; (4) the substitution of trial counsel where there is an
affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of
justice; (5) the addition of a new party if (A) the new party has not had a
reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial, or (B) the
other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and
prepare for trial in regard to the new party’s involvement in the case; (6) a
party’s excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other
material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) a significant, unanticipated
change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for
trial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332,
subd. (c).)
The court
must also consider such relevant factors as: (1) the proximity of the trial
date; (2) whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or
delay of trial caused by any party; (3) the length of the continuance
requested; (4) the availability of alternative means to address the problem
that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; (5) the
prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance;
(6) if the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for
that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid
delay; (7) the court’s calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on
other pending trials; (8) whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial;
(9) whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; (10) whether the
interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the
matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and (11) any other fact
or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or
application. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332,
subd. (d).)
On motion of any party, the court may
grant leave to complete discovery proceedings, or to have a motion concerning
discovery heard, closer to the initial trial date, or to reopen discovery after
a new trial date has been set. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and
confer declaration demonstrating a good faith effort at informal resolution.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.050, subd. (a).)
The court shall take into consideration
any matter relevant to the leave requested, including, but not limited to: (1)
the necessity and the reasons for the discovery, (2) the diligence or lack of
diligence of the party seeking the discovery or the hearing of a discovery
motion, and the reasons that the discovery was not completed or that the
discovery motion was not heard earlier, (3) any likelihood that permitting the
discovery or hearing the discovery motion will prevent the case from going to
trial on the date set, or otherwise interfere with the trial calendar, or
result in prejudice to any other party, and (4) the length of time that has
elapsed between any date previously set, and the date presently set, for the
trial of the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.050, subd. (b).)
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Motion For Leave to Conduct Independent Medical Examination
Defendant Dubois-Chess (hereinafter,
“Defendant”) moves for an Order compelling Plaintiff to submit to an
independent physical examination, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.240,
subdivision (b), on the ground Plaintiff has refused to undergo a physical
examination despite initiating the present action where Plaintiff prays for
damages against Defendant for personal injuries. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2032.220, subd. (a),
2032.240, subd. (b); LaScola Decl., ¶ 7 [Plaintiff’s counsel states, “we will
not be producing Plaintiff for any IME’s.”].)
The Court observes Plaintiff has not submitted an Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion.
Following review of Defendant’s
arguments and submitted evidence, the Court concludes Defendant is entitled to
an Order compelling Plaintiff to submit to an independent physical examination,
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.240, subdivision (b). (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.240, subd. (b).)
Initially, the Court observes, by
virtue of Plaintiff’s operative Complaint, Plaintiff presently seeks recovery
for personal injuries suffered as a result of the subject automobile collision,
which Plaintiff contends was caused by Defendant’s negligence. (Compl., ¶¶ 15-17 [alleging, as a result of
Defendant’s negligent acts, “Plaintiff suffered severe injuries and attendant damages”
including, “medical expenses . . . in an amount to be established at the time
of trial according to proof.”].) Specifically,
as stated within Plaintiff’s responses to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories,
Plaintiff maintains he suffered “neck injuries, low back injuries, chest
injuries, bilateral wrist injuries, and injuries to both knees” as a result of
the subject automobile collision.
(LaScola Decl., Ex. A at pp. 11-12.)
Additionally, Plaintiff maintains he continues to suffer from the
aforementioned injuries and requires future treatment by way of “[l]eft wrist
arthroscopy surgery” (“[t]he costs associated with this treatment are
approximately $65,000”) as well as “[r]ight ankle diagnostic arthroscopy,
synovectomy, chondroplasty surgery” (“[t]he approximate costs associated with
this treatment are $65,000”). (LaScola
Decl., Ex. A at pp. 12-13, 19, Ex. B at p. 8.)
The Court concludes, as Plaintiff unambiguously prays for damages
against Defendant for personal injuries, Defendant is clearly entitled to a
physical examination of Plaintiff, so long as the demand for examination
complies with the requirements outlined within Code of Civil Procedure section
2032.220. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.220.)
Upon review, the Court concludes the
physical examination noticed by Plaintiff properly complies with the
requirements outlined within Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.220. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.220.) As noted in the “Legal Standard” Section of
this Order, Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.220, enumerated various
requirements with respect to a defendant’s demand for physical examination of a
plaintiff. (Ibid.) These requirements include the following: (a)
the examination must not include any diagnostic test or procedure that is
painful, protracted, or intrusive; (b) the examination is conducted at a
location within 75 miles of the residence of the examinee; and (c) the
examination must be scheduled for a date that is at least 30 days after service
of the demand. (Ibid.) The Court observes, Defendant’s Demand For
Independent Medical Examination, which was served upon Plaintiff on October 4,
2022, complies with the whole of the aforementioned requirements. (LaScola Decl., Ex. D.) Specifically, Defendant’s Demand indicates
that the physical examination would take place on November 21, 2022 (48 days
from the date of service). Additionally,
Defendant’s Demand provides the examination will be conducted by Luke Macyszyn,
M.D. (“Dr. Macyszyn”), within Dr. Macyszyn offices, located approximately 25
miles from Plaintiff’s residence. (LaScola Decl., Ex. D at pp. 1-2 [identifying,
the office of Luke Macyszyn, M.D. is located in Marina Del Rey, California];
see Compl., ¶ 2 [alleging, Plaintiff resides in Tarzana, California].) Furthermore, Defendant’s Demand specifies
that the examination to be conducted by Dr. Macyszyn would be a physical
examination of Plaintiff, and “will not include any diagnostic test that is
painful, protracted or intrusive.”
(LaScola Decl., Ex. D at p. 2.) Accordingly,
the Court concludes the Demand served upon Plaintiff was proper and complies
with the requirements outlined within Code of Civil Procedure section
2032.220. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.220.)
Based upon the Court’s findings
outlined above, the Court concludes Defendant is entitled to an Order
compelling Plaintiff to submit to a physical examination, as identified within
the Demand served upon Plaintiff on October 4, 2022. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.240, subd.
(b).) The Court, furthermore, concludes
monetary sanctions may be properly issued against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s
counsel of record, jointly and severally, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 2032.240, subdivision (c). (Code
Civ. Proc., § 2032.240, subd. (c).) As Plaintiff has failed to submit an
opposition to the present Motion explaining the reasons for which Plaintiff has
refused to submit to a physical examination, the Court cannot find Plaintiff
acted with substantial justification in refusing the same. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the Court concludes monetary
sanctions may be appropriate issued against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel,
jointly and severally, in the sum of $451.65 (hourly rate of $195 multiplied by
2 hours in preparing and appearing for Motion, plus $61.65 filing fee). (LaScola Decl., ¶ 8.)
B.
Motion to Continue Trial and All Trial-Related Dates
Defendant Dubois-Chess (hereinafter,
“Defendant”) moves for an Order continuing the trial date of February 2, 2023,
by approximately four months to June 1, 2023, for the purposes of completing
two independent medical examinations of Plaintiff prior to trial, pursuant to
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1332, subdivision (c)(6). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd.
(c)(6).) The Court observes Plaintiff
has not submitted an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion.
Following review of Defendant’s
arguments and submitted evidence, the Court concludes Defendant has
demonstrated good cause warranting a trial continuance, pursuant to California
Rules of Court, Rule 3.1332, subdivision (c)(6). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd.
(c)(6) [“Circumstances that may indicate good cause include: ¶(6) A party's
excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material
evidence despite diligent efforts.”].)
The Court observes there have been two previous trial continuances in
this action, with the most recently trial continuance having been granted by
this Court on October 3, 2022, as a result of Defendant’s a Motion to Continue
Trial filed on September 8, 2023 (hereinafter, “Prior Motion”). (LaScola Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. A-B.) The Court observes Defendant’s Prior Motion
sought a continuance of the trial date for reasons nearly identical to Defendant’s
present Motion—namely, Defendant’s need to complete multiple independent
medical examinations of Plaintiff prior to trial. (Id., Ex. A.) The Court previously found Defendant’s need
to conduct the aforementioned independent medical examinations equated to good
cause to permit a trial continuance in this action. (Id., Ex. B.) Following the Court’s granting of a trial
continuance on October 3, 2022, Defendant immediately served a Demand For
Independent Medical Examination upon Plaintiff on October 4, 2022. (Id., ¶ 5 [“The day after hearing on
the Motion to continue the trial and all trial-related dates . . . my firm
served notice of the two IME’s.”].) Defendant
presently moves for a third trial continuance as Plaintiff has refused to
undergo “any IME’s”, despite having been served with Defendant’s Demand For
Independent Medical Examination. (Ibid.) Defendant has filed two discovery motions
(one of which the Court addressed above), for the purposes of compelling
Plaintiff’s submission to the requested independent medical examinations. Defendant contends, despite the
aforementioned diligent efforts, Defendant has been unable to obtain the
subject discovery as a result of Plaintiff’s refusal to submit to the relevant
independent medical examinations. The
Court agrees the foregoing constitutes good cause to warrant a third
continuance in this action, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1332,
subdivision (c)(6). (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (c)(6).)
IV.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Carol Dubois-Chess’ Motion
for Leave To Conduct Independent Medical Examination of Plaintiff
(Neurosurgical), and Request for Monetary Sanctions Against George Oketcho and
Counsel of Record, Jointly and Severally is GRANTED. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to submit to a
physical examination before Luke Macyszyn, M.D. on February 6, 2023 at 9:00
a.m. Additionally, Plaintiff and
Plaintiff’s counsel of record are ordered to pay monetary sanctions, jointly
and severally, in the amount of $451.65, within 30 days of this Court’s Order.
Defendant Carol Dubois-Chess’ Motion to
Continue Trial and All Trial-Related Dates is GRANTED. As the June 1, 2023 trial date requested by
Defendant is not available and the next available trial date is further into
the future than warranted by this motion, the trial date is continued to May 10,
2023 at 8:30 a.m. and the Final Status Conference is continued to April 26,
2023 at 10:00 a.m. All trial-related
dates and deadlines are additionally continued in accordance with the new trial
date.
Moving party to give notice.
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org.
Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to
appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the
hearing and argue the matter. Unless you
receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume
that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the
parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.