Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 20STCV09518, Date: 2022-08-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV09518    Hearing Date: August 5, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

1. INTRODUCTION

On March 6, 2020, plaintiffs Alfonso Nuno (“Nuno”) and Sarah Heinbigner (“Heinbigner”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendants Kyndall Dior Boyd (“Boyd”), Maynor Raul Sanchez-Solis (“Sanchez-Solis”), The Hertz Corporation (“Hertz”), and Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”).  Plaintiffs allege they were pedestrians who were injured on July 19, 2019, when Boyd and Sanchez-Solis’s vehicles collided at the intersection of East 9th Street and South Los Angeles Street.  Plaintiffs further allege Boyd was driving while intoxicated. 

On May 12, 2022, Boyd filed these two motions requesting the Court make a determination of good faith settlement with respect to her settlements with each of the Plaintiffs.  Under this settlement, Heinbigner will receive $6,450 and Nuno will receive $15,000.   

On July 1, 2022, Sanchez-Solis filed two briefs in opposition.  As both motions and briefs address the same facts underlying any analysis of proportionate liability, the Court addresses both motions in this ruling.   

1. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must approve any settlement entered into by less than all joint tortfeasors or co-obligors.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6.)  This requirement furthers two sometimes-competing policies: (1) the equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault, and (2) the encouragement of settlements.  (Erreca’s v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1487.)  If the settlement is made in good faith, the Court “shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor . . . for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).) 

“A determination as to the good faith of a settlement, within the meaning of section 877.6, necessarily requires the trial court to examine and weigh a number of relevant factors, one of the most important of which is the settling party’s proportionate liability.  In making such examination, the court must look at the state of the evidence as it exists at the time the motion for a good faith determination is heard.  [Citation.]  If . . . there is no substantial evidence to support a critical assumption as to the nature and extent of a settling defendant’s liability, then a determination of good faith based upon such assumption is an abuse of discretion.”  (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 871; L.C. Rudd & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 742, 750 [“It is the burden of the settling parties to explain to the court and to all other parties the evidentiary basis for any allocations and valuations made sufficient to demonstrate that a reasonable allocation was made”].) 

The non-settling tortfeasors or obligors bear the burden of demonstrating the absence of good faith in the settlement.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).)  To demonstrate a lack of good faith, the non-settling party must show that the settlement is so far “out of the ballpark” as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of Section 877.6.  (Nutrition Now, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 209, 213.)  The Court will typically consider: (1) the plaintiff’s (roughly) approximated total recovery; (2) the settlor’s share of liability; (3) the size of the settlement at issue; (4) the distribution of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (5) the usual discount value when plaintiffs settle before trial; the settlor’s financial condition and insurance policy limits; and (6) whether there is evidence of “collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.”  (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.)  These factors will be evaluated accordingly to what information is available at the time of settlement.  (Ibid.)

1. DISCUSSION

Boyd has agreed to settle with Nuno in exchange for $15,000, which represents the limits of Boyd’s automobile liability insurance policy, which is $15,000/$30,000 for bodily injury.  (Motion, Boyd Decl., ¶ 3.)  Nuno’s injuries included a right elbow dislocation and fracture with a torn ligament.  His medical specials are $28,408 and a future operation is estimated to cost $19,750, for a total of $48,158.  Nuno is also seeking $650,000 for pain, suffering, and inconvenience.  Boyd states that her settlement with Heinbigner in exchange for $6,450 represents the remaining limits of her automobile liability insurance policy.  Heinbigner’s medical expenses are $4,875.72, and she seeks $50,000 for pain, suffering, and inconvenience.  Boyd admits liability for turning west onto 9th street, which is a one-way street going east.  (Motion, 3:15-23.)  Boyd testified that she was following the audible prompts from the maps application on her cell phone and was prompted to turn onto the street in the wrong direction.  (Ibid.)  Nevertheless, Boyd argues that had Sanchez-Solis acted differently, the collision could have been avoided.  First, Boyd claims that if Sanchez-Solis had been traveling at 25 miles per hour, he would’ve been able to brake and avoid the collision.  (Motion, p. 3.)  Second, Boyd claims that if Sanchez-Solis had braked and kept his foot on the brakes, he would’ve stopped before hitting Plaintiff’s in the crosswalk.  (Motion, pp. 3-4.)  Third, Boyd claims that when Sanchez-Solis closed his eyes before the collision, he took his hands off of the steering wheel and his vehicle made a wide turn after impact into the Plaintiffs.  (Motion, p. 4.)  Boyd argues that if Sanchez-Solis kept his hands on the wheel, his vehicle would have continued to go straight and he would’ve avoided hitting Plaintiffs altogether.  (Ibid.)  Boyd further declares that she has no assets with a value over $2,000 and does not have $2,000 in her bank accounts.  (Boyd Decl., ¶ 2.) 

In opposition, Sanchez-Solis argues that this settlement is unfair because Boyd was the sole cause of the accident and Plaintiff’s injuries.  Sanchez-Solis points out that according to the traffic collision report, Boyd caused the collision when she drove her vehicle the wrong way on 9th street and collided with his vehicle in the intersection.  (Opp., Craver Decl., Ex. F.)  The vehicles then rolled through the intersection and hit Plaintiffs.  (Ibid.) 

Also, Sanchez-Solis argues that Plaintiff’s three theories are meritless.  First, Sanchez-Solis points out that the police officers investigating the collision did not find an issue with Sanchez-Solis’s speed of travel, which was approximately 30 miles per hour.  Also, Sanchez-Solis states that by the time he saw Boyd’s vehicle, he had already entered the intersection and had no time to do anything but brace for impact.  Therefore, a small deviation in Sanchez Solis’s rate of travel would not have prevented the accident.  Second, it is unreasonable to expect Sanchez-Solis to press his brake pedal in the moment after his vehicle was blindsided by Boyd’s vehicle.  The impact was on the driver’s side and this theory of liability fails to consider the driver’s ability to press a brake pedal during and immediately after the physically intense experience of a side impact collision.  Sanchez-Solis argues it would be unreasonable to expect him to have had the presence of mind and physical ability to press his foot on the brake pedal after being jostled in the immediate aftermath of the collision.  Third, Sanchez-Solis claims that Boyd assumes, without evidence, that he ever took his hands off the steering wheel.  Sanchez-Solis admits closing his eyes before the impact, but the vehicles approached one another from a 90-degree angle and his vehicle was impacted on its rear driver’s side, making it unlikely that the vehicle would have continued on a straight path after the impact. 

Sanchez-Solis further claims that the settlement amounts are grossly disproportionate to Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries because $6,450 is a mere 11.5% of Heinbigner’s total claimed damages of $56,666.54, and $15,000 is only 2.2% of Nuno’s claimed damages.  This argument considers Plaintiffs’ claims for general damages, which Sanchez-Solis would not be jointly liable for.  Sanchez-Solis would only be jointly liable with Boyd for Plaintiffs’ economic damages.  Sanchez-Solis would only be obligated to pay the amount of non-economic damages which corresponds to his percentage of fault.  Therefore, this calculation is imprecise in determining whether Boyd’s settlement with Plaintiffs is “in the ballpark.” 

Additionally, “[i]n order to encourage settlement, it is quite proper for a settling defendant to pay less than his proportionate share of the anticipated damages.  What is required is simply that the settlement not be grossly disproportionate to the settlor’s fair share.”  (Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858, 874-875.)  When evaluating Plaintiffs’ economic damages, Boyd’s settlement with Heinbigner for $6,450 in light of Heinbigner’s medical damages only consisting of $5,875.72 is more than adequate.  Similarly, Boyd’s settlement with Nuno for $15,000 is 68.1% of Nuno’s past medical expenses.  Even when factoring in the potential cost of future medical treatment, the settlement amount of $15,000 is approximately 31% of $48,158.  In light of Boyd’s declaration and deposition testimony that she earns $18.00 an hour as a claims representative handling unemployment insurance claims, owns no real property, and has no assets worth collectively more than $2,000, the Court finds that Sanchez-Solis has not shown that Boyd’s settlement with Plaintiffs was not in good faith. 

1. CONCLUSION

Boyd’s motions for determination of good faith settlement as to plaintiffs Sarah Heinbigner and Alfonso Nuno are GRANTED.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.