Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 20STCV13910, Date: 2022-10-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV13910    Hearing Date: October 19, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

I.            INTRODUCTION

On April 9, 2020, plaintiff Sandra Jacqueline Denton (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Samvel Hovhannisyan (“Hovhannisyan”), Marine Arakelyan (“Defendant”), Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”), Devhon Kawanell Mailo Polk, Patrick Beverly, Sunthan Shane Kunnavatana (“Kunnavatana”), Pia Chadha (“Chadha”), Patrick Michael Korte, and Michael Korte (collectively, “Defendants”).  Plaintiff alleges she was injured when Hovhannisyan was acting within the course and scope of his employment with Uber and negligently operated a vehicle owned by Defendant.  Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant negligently entrusted the vehicle to Hovhannisyan.  

On May 12, 2021, Defendant filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief, against all the Defendants, including 724 Lux Limo (“Lux Limo”), Khachatur Mikaelyan, Nairi Ghazaryan, and Matevos Papyan. 

Plaintiff then amended the Complaint to add Lux Limo as Doe 1. 

On September 10, 2021, Lux Limo filed a cross-complaint against Hovhannisyan and Uber for indemnification, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief.

On November 30, 2021, Kunnavatana and Chadha filed a cross-complaint against Hovhannisyan and Defendant for equitable indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief.

On January 28, 2022, Defendant filed this motion for summary adjudication arguing that her liability should be limited to $15,000 pursuant to California Vehicle Code section 17151.

On October 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. 

On October 13, 2022, Defendant filed her reply papers.

II.          FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 1, 2018, Plaintiff was a rear-seated passenger driven by Hovhannisyan when the multi-vehicle collision underlying this action occurred.  (Defendant’s Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 1.)  Defendant was not present when the accident occurred.  (UMF No. 2.)  Defendant was the registered owner of the vehicle Hovhannisyan was driving, a black Chevrolet Suburban. 

III.        LEGAL STANDARD

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages . . . or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.  A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)  A motion for summary adjudication shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).) 

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)  “[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) 

“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”  (Ibid.)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“If a party is otherwise entitled to summary judgment pursuant to this section, summary judgment shall not be denied on grounds of credibility or for want of cross-examination of witnesses furnishing affidavits or declarations in support of the summary judgment, except that summary judgment may be denied in the discretion of the court if the only proof of a material fact offered in support of the summary judgment is an affidavit or declaration made by an individual who was the sole witness to that fact; or if a material fact is an individual's state of mind, or lack thereof, and that fact is sought to be established solely by the individual's affirmation thereof.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (e).) 

IV.         EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The Court rules on Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections as follows:

Objections to Declaration of Marine Arakelyan, ¶¶ 3-8: OVERRULED.

Pursuant to CCP 437c(q), the Court reviewed Defendant’s evidentiary objections to evidence it considered material to its disposition of this motion and rules on those objections as follows:

Objection No. 1: Overruled.

Objection Nos. 2-5: Sustained, foundation.

Objection No. 6: Overruled. 

Objection No. 11: Overruled.

Objection No. 12: Sustained, foundation.

V.           DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that her liability to Plaintiff should be limited to $15,000 pursuant to Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151 as there is no triable issue of fact to demonstrate that Plaintiff can prevail under any theory of liability other than permissive use.  Vehicle Code section 17150 provides that any motor vehicle owner is vicariously liable if that owner gives express or implied permission to a person to use the vehicle and that person thereafter wrongfully causes injury to another.  However, the liability for this “permissive use” is expressly limited to $15,000 per person.  (See Cal. Veh. Code § 17151(a).)  Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prove her alleged theories of negligent entrustment and respondeat superior, which would obviate the statutory limit on the damages owed by Defendant.   

Defendant admits she was the registered owner of one of the vehicles involved in the accident, a black Chevrolet Suburban (the “Vehicle”).  She declares she agreed to purchase it for her friend, Matevos Papyan (“Papyan”), because he did not have strong credit to purchase a vehicle on his own.  (Appendix, Ex. 4, ¶ 3.)  Shortly before the accident, Papyan was unable to make payments and his colleague, Khachatur Mikaelyan (“Mikaelyan” or “Mike”) began making the payments to her.  (Id., ¶ 3.)  She also asserts, for purposes of this motion, that Hovhannisyan was a “permissive user” of the Vehicle.  (Motion, 6:15.) 

First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prove that she negligently entrusted the vehicle to Hovhannisyan because Defendant understood that both Papyan and Mikaelyan had valid licenses and she had no reason to believe they would not use the Vehicle in a safe, responsible, and competent manner.  (Appendix, Ex. 4, ¶¶ 4-5.)  She further declares that she did not have any knowledge that anyone other than Papyan and Mikaelyan would operate the Vehicle.  (Id., ¶ 5.) 

However, if, as Defendant requests, the Court assumes that Hovhannisyan was a permissive user, Defendant fails to show that no triable issues exist regarding Defendant’s alleged negligent entrustment.  The Court notes that Defendant claims Hovhannisyan was a competent driver in an attempt to prove that no actual or constructive notice of incompetence was possible.  Defendant also cites to Dodge Center v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 322 for the proposition that she has no “duty of inquiry” absent any knowledge of unfitness.  However, the Court of Appeal in McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, departed from Dodge Center by holding that a reasonable jury could find that a vehicle owner breached its duty to determine whether the driver had a valid driver’s license and use that finding to conclude that the owner had constructive knowledge that the driver was incompetent or unfit.  The McKenna court cited to Vehicle Code section 14604, which sets forth an affirmative duty of inquiry and states:

No owner of a motor vehicle may knowingly allow another person to drive the vehicle upon a highway unless the owner determines that the person possesses a valid driver's license that authorizes the person to operate the vehicle. For the purposes of this section, an owner is required only to make a reasonable effort or inquiry to determine whether the prospective driver possesses a valid driver's license before allowing him or her to operate the owner's vehicle. An owner is not required to inquire of the department whether the prospective driver possesses a valid driver's license.

(Veh. Code, § 14604, subd. (a).) 

Here, there is no evidence that Defendant made any effort or inquiry to determine whether Hovhannisyan possessed a valid driver’s license or was otherwise a competent driver.  Therefore, Defendant has not met her moving burden to show that Plaintiff cannot prove her theory of negligent entrustment. 

The Court notes that Defendant also argues that Plaintiff admitted in discovery that she has no facts to support any theory other than “registered owner liability.”  (Appendix, Ex. 5, Response to SROG Nos. 9, 10.)  However, even if the Court concluded that Defendant met her moving burden based on Plaintiff’s discovery responses, Plaintiff has shown that triable issues of material fact exist regarding Defendant’s relationship with Hovhannisyan, Papyan, and Mikaelyan and her connection with Lux Limo. 

Plaintiff submits a copy of the Vehicle’s registration which shows that the Vehicle is jointly registered to Defendant and Lux Limo.  (Plaintiff’s Exhibit List, Ex. 1.)  Defendant testified in her deposition that she was not aware of a company called 724 Lux Limo and had never heard that company’s name before.  (Ex. 20, 31:19-22.)  Defendant also denied knowing or ever meeting Mikaelyan.  (Ex. 20, 27:22-29:14.)  But she later testified that she spoke with Mikaelyan over the phone and he told her he would take over the car and pay off the remaining balance of the car.  (Ex. 20, 29:20-30:11.)  Mikaelyan also testified that he told Defendant that the Vehicle would be registered under Lux Limo.  (Ex. 10, 65:16-18.)  This conflicting testimony, when liberally construed in Plaintiff’s favor, casts doubt on Defendant’s credibility and calls into question whether Defendant truly had no reason to believe that individuals other than Papyan and Mikaelyan would be driving the car or whether Defendant had any association with Lux Limo.  Plaintiff has shown that triable issues of material fact exist regarding Defendant’s purported role as merely a registered owner of the Vehicle. 

VI.     CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of her liability pursuant to Vehicle Code section 17151 is DENIED. 

Moving party to give notice. 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.