Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 20STCV13910, Date: 2022-10-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV13910    Hearing Date: October 27, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

I.            INTRODUCTION

On April 9, 2020, plaintiff Sandra Jacqueline Denton (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Samvel Hovhannisyan (“Hovhannisyan”), Marine Arakelyan (“Arakelyan”), Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”), Devhon Kawanell Mailo Polk, Patrick Beverly, Sunthan Shane Kunnavatana (“Kunnavatana”), Pia Chadha (“Chadha”), Patrick Michael Korte, and Michael Korte (collectively, “Defendants”).  Plaintiff alleges she was injured when Hovhannisyan was acting within the course and scope of his employment with Uber and negligently operated a vehicle owned by Arakelyan. 

On May 12, 2021, Arakelyan filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief, against all the Defendants, including 724 Lux Limo (“Defendant”), Khachatur Mikaelyan (“Mikaelyan”), Nairi Ghazaryan (“Ghazaryan”) and Matevos Papyan (“Papyan”). 

Plaintiff then amended the Complaint to add Defendant as Doe 1. 

On September 10, 2021, Defendant filed a cross-complaint against Hovhannisyan and Uber for indemnification, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief.

On November 30, 2021, Kunnavatana and Chadha filed a cross-complaint against Hovhannisyan and Arakelyan for equitable indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief.

On January 28, 2022, Arakelyan filed a motion for summary adjudication arguing that her liability should be limited to $15,000 pursuant to California Vehicle Code section 17151.  The Court denied this motion on October 19, 2022.

On August 11, 2022, Defendant filed this motion for summary adjudication arguing that its liability should be limited to $15,000 pursuant to California Vehicle Code section 17151. 

On October 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. 

On October 21, 2022, Defendant filed its reply papers.

II.          FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 1, 2018, Plaintiff was a rear-seated passenger in a vehicle driven by Hovhannisyan when the multi-vehicle collision underlying this action occurred.  (Defendant’s Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 1.)  At the time of the accident, Hovhannisyan was in the course and scope of driving for Uber.  (UMF No. 2.)  Defendant is in the business of providing limousine transportation services and vehicles for short-term lease and rental.  (UMF No. 3.)  Defendant was the co-owner of the vehicle that Hovhannisyan was operating at the time of the accident (the “Vehicle”).  (UMF No. 4.)  Mikaelyan is Defendant’s owner and was contacted and informed that Hovhannisyan was interested in leasing the Vehicle.  Mikaelyan and Hovhannisyan discussed the weekly leasing price for the Vehicle.  (UMF No. 6.)  On June 30, 2018, Mikaelyan met Hovhannisyan at a gas station to deliver the Vehicle.  (UMF No. 7.)  Mikaelyan inspected Hovhannisyan’s driver’s license to confirm he had a valid California driver’s license. (UMF No. 8.)  Mikaelyan then turned over possession of the Vehicle to Hovhannisyan.  (UMF No. 11.) 

III.        LEGAL STANDARD

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages . . . or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.  A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)  A motion for summary adjudication shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).) 

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)  “[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) 

“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”  (Ibid.)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“If a party is otherwise entitled to summary judgment pursuant to this section, summary judgment shall not be denied on grounds of credibility or for want of cross-examination of witnesses furnishing affidavits or declarations in support of the summary judgment, except that summary judgment may be denied in the discretion of the court if the only proof of a material fact offered in support of the summary judgment is an affidavit or declaration made by an individual who was the sole witness to that fact; or if a material fact is an individual's state of mind, or lack thereof, and that fact is sought to be established solely by the individual's affirmation thereof.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (e).) 

IV.         EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The Court rules on Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections as follows:

Objections to Paragraphs 4-6, 8 of Mikaelyan’s Declaration: Overruled.

Pursuant to CCP 437c(q), the Court reviewed Defendant’s evidentiary objections to evidence it considered material to its disposition of this motion and rules on those objections as follows:

Objection No. 1: Sustained.

Objection No. 2: Overruled.

Objection No. 3: Overruled.

Objection No. 4: Sustained.

Objection No. 5: Overruled.

Objection No. 6: Overruled.

Objection No. 7: Sustained.

Objection No. 8: Sustained.

Objection No. 9: Overruled.

Objection No. 10: Sustained.

Objection No. 11: Overruled.

Objection No. 12: Overruled.  

Objection No. 13: Sustained.

Objection No. 14: Overruled.

Objection No. 15: Overruled.

Objection No. 16: Sustained.

Objection No. 17: Overruled.

Objection No. 18: Sustained.

Objection No. 19: Overruled.

Objection No. 20: Overruled. .

Objection No. 21: Overruled.

Objection No. 22: Overruled.

Objection No. 23: Sustained.

Objection No. 24: Overruled.

Objection No. 25: Overruled.

V.           DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that its liability to Plaintiff should be limited to $15,000 pursuant to Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151 as there is no triable issue of fact to demonstrate that Plaintiff can prevail under any theory of liability other than permissive use.  Vehicle Code section 17150 provides that any motor vehicle owner is vicariously liable if that owner gives express or implied permission to a person to use the vehicle and that person thereafter wrongfully causes injury to another.  However, the liability for this “permissive use” is expressly limited to $15,000 per person.  (See Cal. Veh. Code § 17151(a).)  Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prove her alleged theories of negligent entrustment and respondeat superior, which would obviate the statutory limit on the damages owed by Defendant.   

Defendant’s owner and manager, Mikaelyan, declares that Defendant was registered as a co-owner of the Vehicle.  (Mikaelyan Decl., ¶¶ 1, 3.)  Mikaelyan states that Defendant is in the business of providing limousine transportation services and vehicles for short-term lease and rental.  (Id., ¶ 2.)  Sometime in late June 2018, Mikaelyan received information that Hovhannisyan was interested in leasing the Vehicle and they discussed the leasing price.  (Id., ¶ 4.)  Defendant did not have a physical business storefront, so Mikaelyan met Hovhannisyan at a gas station to deliver the Vehicle.  (Id., ¶ 5.)  Mikaelyan declares he “checked to confirm that [Hovhannisyan] had a valid driver’s license and there was no indication he did not have car insurance.”  (Ibid.)  Mikaelyan further declares he had no reason to believe that Hovhannisyan would not operate the vehicle in a safe, responsible, competent manner, and that nothing about Hovhannisyan’s appearance, conduct, or demeanor suggested that Hovhannisyan was under the influence of drugs or alcohol or otherwise unfit to drive, so Mikaelyan turned over possession of the Vehicle to him.  (Id., ¶ 6.)  Mikaelyan was not operating the Vehicle at the time of the accident, nor was he involved or in the vehicle at the time of the accident.  (Id., ¶ 7.)  At no point was Hovhannisyan ever Defendant’s employee, nor was he performing any work in any capacity on behalf of Defendant at the time of the accident.  (Id., ¶ 8.) 

Defendant’s owner and manager, Mikaelyan, inquired whether Hovhannisyan possessed a valid driver’s license and attests that nothing about Hovhannisyan’s appearance, conduct, or demeanor suggested that Hochannisyan was under the influence of drugs or alcohol or otherwise unfit to drive.  (Mikaelyan Decl., ¶ 6.)  Also, Mikaelyan declares that Hovhannisyan was not performing work on Defendant’s behalf at the time of the accident and was never employed by Defendant.  (Mikaelyan Decl., ¶ 8.)  Therefore, Defendant has met its moving burden to show that Plaintiff cannot prove her theory of negligent entrustment. 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not comply with section 437c of the Code of Civil Procedure.  Plaintiff additionally argues that triable issues of fact exist as to whether Hovhannisyan was employed by Defendant.  Plaintiff also argues there are triable issues regarding the credibility of Mikaelyan and Hovhannisyan.  As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is procedurally improper is not well-taken.  A motion for summary adjudication may be based on an issue of duty, such as whether Defendant’s duty to Plaintiff was limited to that of a registered owner.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) 

Next, Plaintiff argues that some kind of relationship between Hovhannisyan and Defendant exists because Hovhannisyan was listed as Defendant’s director and remains as Defendant’s director to this day.  However, Defendant’s Statement of Information and other filings with the California Secretary of State were filed on or around November 6, 2019.  (Index, Ex. 4.)  The underlying accident occurred more than a year and a half earlier, on July 1, 2018, and Plaintiff produces no evidence that would create the inference that Defendant was Hovhannisyan’s employer or principal at the time of the accident, or contradict Mikaelyan’s declaration that Hovhannisyan was only interested in leasing the vehicle.  Mikaelyan’s transfer of another entity, West Limo 7, to Hovhannisyan, around May 2019 also does not create a triable issue of material fact. 

Plaintiff also argues that triable issues exist as to any actual or constructive knowledge Defendant, through Mikaelyan, may have had of Hovhannisyan’s alleged incompetence.  Plaintiff argues that Mikaelyan could not reasonably assume that Hovhannisyan was a safe, competent, or qualified driver based on a seven-to-thirty minute conversation, nor was Mikaelyan’s inspection of Hovhannisyan’s driver’s license indicative that Hovhannisyan was a safe driver.  However, Plaintiff produces no evidence of facts that would have imparted actual or constructive notice to Mikaelyan of Hovhannisyan’s alleged incompetence. 

Last, Plaintiff claims additional discovery needs to be completed.  “If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h).) 

Plaintiff’s counsel declares that Defendant’s responses to special interrogatories and requests for production were inadequate and that he has not been able to depose Uber or Defendant’s person most knowledgeable.  Plaintiff’s counsel also states that a police report regarding the theft of documents has not been produced.  But Plaintiff’s counsel does not explain what essential facts he expects to present as a result of this discovery which would create a triable issue. 

VI.     CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of her liability pursuant to Vehicle Code section 17151 is GRANTED. 

Moving party to give notice. 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.