Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 20STCV22819, Date: 2022-12-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV22819    Hearing Date: December 29, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

I.            INTRODUCTION

          On June 16, 2020, plaintiff Lilly Ayrin Khatirnia (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”) and Christopher Torzano (“Torzano”).  This action arises from an automobile accident that occurred on or about July 16, 2019. 

          On August 23, 2022, Lyft filed this motion for a protective order regarding Plaintiff’s demand to depose its person most qualified (“PMQ”) and Plaintiff’s requests for production of documents.  Lyft requests that this Court enter a protective order prohibiting the PMQ deposition or production of confidentially designated documents in response to the deposition notice.  Lyft also requests that this Court adopt the proposed protective order as an order of the Court to prevent the dissemination of information contained in documents that might be produced in discovery. 

          On December 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief.

          On December 21, 2022, Lyft filed a reply brief. 

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

“Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.420, subd. (a).) The trial court has the power to enter a protective order to protect a party from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden and expense. (Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1287; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).) The court’s ruling, like any discovery ruling, will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion. (Liberty Mutual, supra, at pp. 1286-87.) The party seeking a protective order bears the burden to show good cause for the requested order. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) The concept of “good cause” requires a showing of specific facts demonstrating “undue burden,” etc., and justifying the relief sought. (See Goodman v. Citizens Life & Cas. Ins. Co. (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 807, 819.)  If “good cause” is shown, the court can exercise its discretionary power to limit discovery.  (See In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 298-99.)

When an inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of documents, tangible things, places, or electronically stored information has been demanded, the party to whom the demand has been directed, and any other party or affected person, may promptly move for a protective order.¿¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.060, subd. (a.)  The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other person from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.  (Id., subd. (b).) 

III.        DISCUSSION

A.   PMQ Deposition

First, Lyft argues that the deposition of its PMQ should not go forward because the date of the deposition was chosen unilaterally.  The issue of timing is not relevant to the disposition of this motion because the deposition was scheduled for August 24, 2022.  This leaves Lyft’s substantive objections to the PMQ deposition.

First, Lyft argues that a protective order is needed on the grounds that the information sought can be obtained by less burdensome and intrusive means.  The deposition notice lists 3 categories of testimony and 52 requests for production.  Lyft argues that deposition testimony regarding its background check process is unnecessary because the qualifications necessary for a driver to use a Transportation Network Company (“TNC”) are dictated by the California Public Utilities Commission and available to the public.  Lyft also argues that all information related to how drivers in California obtain approval to use its Lyft platform is available on its website, and that additional documents will be produced once a protective order has been issued.     However, a PMQ may provide additional testimony and explanation and any documents and information, by themselves, are not sufficient to address Plaintiff’s theories of vicarious liability and negligent entrustment. 

Next, Lyft argues that Plaintiff’s claims against it are “unnecessary” and “not ripe.”  This argument is unpersuasive.  Lyft argues that no claims against Lyft are “ripe” because Torzano is already covered by a $1 million automobile liability insurance policy, and Plaintiff can collect her entire damages based on her claims against Torzano, without needing to conduct any discovery about Lyft.  Lyft provides no evidence of Plaintiff’s damages and there is no evidence that Plaintiff is not pursuing claims of negligent conduct by Lyft that is separate from any vicarious liability for Torzano’s actions.   

Third, Lyft’s characterization of documents as “confidential, proprietary, trade secret and commercially sensitive information” is unsubstantiated.  There is no declaration from an individual with sufficient personal knowledge of the material that is considered confidential and the reasons why a protective order is needed.  In the absence of such a declaration there is no basis even for a general protective order preventing the dissemination of Lyft’s documents to the public and limiting the use of the information to only this litigation.  But Lyft fails to produce any evidence that any of the documents demanded should be entitled to confidentiality. 

Last, Lyft argues that the categories of testimony and documents are so overbroad that the entire deposition should not go forward.  Lyft argues that Categories 2 and 3 are overbroad because they seek testimony regarding “Lyft’s supervision of its drivers at the time of the incident” and “Lyft’s background check of its drivers at the time of the Incident.”  Lyft also argues that it properly objected to Demand for Production Nos. 1, 5, 9, 10, and 11 by arguing that they are “overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because it seeks information and material, not limited in time or scope, which is wholly unrelated to the subject accident or Plaintiff’s alleged damages.” 

-      Demand for Production No. 1 seeks all documents reflecting Torzano’s “financial relationship” with Lyft at the time of the incident.  Lyft agreed to produce materials related to Torzano’s pay for the week of the incident upon the entry of a protective order because those documents are trade secret, confidential, private, and/or proprietary.   

-      Demand for Production No. 5 seeks “all documents that reflect, refer, reference and/or demonstrate” all the instances that “Lyft wrote [Torzano] up at any point prior to the incident and after the incident.”  Lyft agreed to produce materials related to communications between its representative and Torzano regarding the subject incident upon entry of a protective order. 

-      Demand for Production Nos. 9 through 11 request documents relating to Torzano’s pay rate, Lyft’s method of payment to Torzano, Torzano’s compensation.  Lyft has only agreed to produce documents relating to Torzano’s pay for the week of the incident upon the entry of a protective order. 

As stated above, Lyft fails to show how the documents sought are confidential or trade secrets.  In addition, Lyft provides no argument about why it should be limited to producing financial information from only the week of the incident and communications only regarding the incident itself.  This information is not overbroad and is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding Torzano’s relationship with Lyft and any prior knowledge Lyft may have had of any qualities that Torzano exhibited which made him an unfit driver. 

IV.         CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Lyft’s request for a protective order prohibiting the PMQ deposition is DENIED.  The request for a protective order allowing the parties to designate documents as confidential and prevent the dissemination of Lyft’s documents to the public is DENIED without prejudice.  Both parties’ request for sanctions are also DENIED. 

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.