Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 20STCV37353, Date: 2022-10-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV37353 Hearing Date: October 18, 2022 Dept: 27
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL
DISTRICT
Plaintiff(s), vs. CEDARS-SINAI MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendant(s), |
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS CEDARS-SINAI MEDICAL CENTER AND CEDARS-SINAI HEALTH
SYSTEM’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO
STRIKE Dept.
27 1:30
p.m. October
18, 2022 |
I. INTRODUCTION
On
September 30, 2020, plaintiff Robert Perez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action
against defendants Cedars-Sinai Medical Center and Cedars-Sinai Health System
(collectively, “Defendants”). On July
27, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”)
asserting causes of action for: (1) elder abuse – custodial neglect, (2)
reckless willful misconduct, (3) professional negligence, (4) negligent hiring,
supervision, and retention, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On
September 6, 2022, Defendants filed this demurrer and motion to strike. Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s causes of
action for elder abuse and reckless willful misconduct. Defendants also move to strike Plaintiff’s
requests for punitive damages and allegations related to punitive damages, as
well as Plaintiff’s request for trebled damages.
II. LEGAL
STANDARDS
A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency
of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on
its face. (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all
material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law. We accept the factual
allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be
judicially noticed. [Citation.]” (Mitchell v. California Department of
Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v.
Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged
in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) A demurrer may be brought if insufficient
facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)
Any party, within the time allowed to
respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole
or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., §
435, subd. (b)(1).) The court may, upon
a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper,
strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford
v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not
essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be
stricken out or disregarded”].) The
court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one
that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither
pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a
demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the
complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10,
subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to
strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
Leave to amend must be allowed where
there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d
335, 348.) The burden is on the
complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)
III. DISCUSSION
Meet and Confer
Before filing a demurrer or motion to
strike, the demurring or moving party shall meet and confer with the party who
has filed the pleading and shall file a declaration detailing their meet and
confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., §§
430.41, subd. (a); 435.5, subd. (a).)
Defense counsel Natasha Covarrubias
declares that on September 1, 2022, she spoke with Plaintiff’s counsel
regarding Plaintiff’s amendments to the SAC and presented Defendants’ position
regarding its deficiencies. (Covarrubias
Decl., ¶ 2.) The meet and confer
requirement is satisfied.
Demurrer
A.
First
Cause of Action for Elder Abuse
To plead elder abuse, the plaintiff
must allege “facts establishing that the defendant: (1) had responsibility for
meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent adult, such as nutrition,
hydration, hygiene or medical care [citations]; (2) knew of conditions that
made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for his or her own basic
needs [citations]; and (3) denied or withheld goods or services necessary to
meet the elder or dependent adult’s basic needs, either with knowledge that
injury was substantially certain to befall the elder or dependent adult (if the
plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of
the high probability of such injury (if the plaintiff alleges recklessness)
[citations].” (Carter v. Prime
Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 406-07.) “The plaintiff must also allege . . . that the
neglect caused the elder or dependent adult to suffer physical harm, pain or
mental suffering.” (Id. at p.
407.) Additionally, to recover against a
corporate defendant for elder abuse, a plaintiff must allege that an officer,
director, or managing agent of the corporation personally engaged in wrongful
conduct, or else had advance knowledge of the conduct, authorized it, or
ratified it. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657, subd.
(c).) “[T]he facts constituting the
neglect and establishing the causal link between the neglect and the injury
‘must be pleaded with particularity,’ in accordance with the pleading rules
governing statutory claims.” (Carter,
supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 406-407 [quoting Covenant Care, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790].)
Plaintiff alleges he underwent a
thoracoscopic surgery on or about June 12, 2019, and was thereafter transferred
to the intensive care unit with complaints of sharp post-operative pain. (SAC, ¶ 11.)
He acquired Serratia Maracescens and methicillin-sensitive
Staphylococcus Aureus (“MSSA”) and his discharge was delayed. (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges that due to an outburst at
the beginning of his stay, he was thereafter “recognized by hospital staff,
including but not limited to the corporate officers, directors, managing agents
of Defendants, and each of them,” as a “problem patient.” (Compl., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that he was physically
restrained and consistently and frequently denied treatment and attention by
employees, who left him to lay in his own feces and urine for prolonged periods
of time and allowed the development of pressure ulcers. (Ibid.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants’
motive was to reduce the cost of providing care to him, especially after being
branded by Defendants as a “problem patient.”
(Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges
on information and belief that he lost approximately 30 pounds as a result of
the neglect he allegedly experienced.
(SAC, ¶ 14.)
The Court found that Plaintiff’s
allegations in previous iterations of the Complaint presented a case involving
a negligent undertaking of medical services, rather than abuse or neglect. Here, Plaintiff adds that Defendants labeled
him as a “problem patient”, physically restrained him, and failed to prevent
Plaintiff from laying in his own feces and urine for prolonged periods of
time. (SAC, ¶ 21.) However, as noted by the Court in connection
with Plaintiff’s previous First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff still fails to
allege corporate ratification of any alleged abuse with the required
specificity. No officer, director,
agent, or management personnel is identified.
Instead, the SAC only includes generalized allegations of agency and
ratification, not of the conduct, but of the harms posed to residents by understaffing
and the “insufficiency of financial budgets to lawfully operate said
facilities.” (SAC, ¶ 27.)
The demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Cause
of Action for Elder Abuse is SUSTAINED.
B.
Second
Cause of Action for Reckless Willful Misconduct
Willful misconduct involves an
unreasonable act in disregard of a risk that is so great that it is highly
probable that harm will follow, and that is either known to the actor or so
obvious that the actor objectively must have been aware of it. (New v. Consolidated Rock Products Co.
(1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 681, 689.) Willful
misconduct is different from and more than negligence, more even than gross
negligence. (Weber v. Pinyan
(1937) 9 Cal.2d 226, 231.) It is a
positive intent actually to harm another or to do an act with a positive,
active, and absolute disregard of its consequences. (Id. at p. 233.) In contrast, gross negligence involves a
failure to act under circumstances that indicate a passive and indifferent
attitude toward the welfare of others. (Id.
at pp. 232-233; Traxler v. Thompson (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 278, 287.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendants
“recklessly neglected” him by failing to prevent the contraction of
infections. (SAC, ¶ 34.) Plaintiff specifically allege that Defendants
failed to provide adequate care, resulting in a pressure ulcer and severe
emotional distress. (SAC, ¶¶ 35-36.) These allegations are insufficient to allege
a positive intent to harm or act with absolute disregard for consequences as
required for a claim of willful misconduct.
Defendants’ demurrer to the Second
cause of action is SUSTAINED.
Motion to Strike
As the Court sustains Defendants’
demurrer to the first and second causes of action, the only issues that remain
in Defendant’s motion to strike is an allegation for punitive damages in
connection with Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress and a request for trebled damages.
First, with respect to punitive
damages, an employer shall not be liable for punitive damages based upon acts
or an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of
the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the
wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ.
Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) With respect
to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, fraud,
or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the
corporation. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff does not allege that an
officer, director, or managing agent was involved with the alleged misconduct
or engaged in, authorized, or ratified the misconduct, or otherwise had advance
knowledge of an employee’s unfitness and employed him with a conscious disregard
of the rights or safety of others.
Second, Plaintiff’s prayer for treble
damages under Civil Code section 3345 is also inappropriate. Civil Code section 3345 applies to actions
brought by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of senior citizens or disabled
persons to redress unfair or deceptive acts or practices or unfair methods of
competition. (Civ. Code, § 3345(a).) “[T]rebled
recovery may be awarded under Civil Code section 3345, subdivision (b) only if
the statute under which recovery is sought permits a remedy that is in the
nature of a penalty.” (Clark v. Superior
Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 605, 614.)
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion,
Civil Code section 3345 does not apply to this action. (Opp., 9:24-27.) The statutory remedies under the Elder Abuse
Act are intended to incentivize attorneys to take on cases of elder abuse and
neglect and not to punish or deter those who have engaged in elder abuse or
neglect. (Covenant Care, supra,
32 Cal.4th at p. 787 [quoting Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600(j)].)
IV. CONCLUSION
As this is Plaintiff’s third
unsuccessful attempt to plead an elder abuse and willful misconduct claim, Defendants’
demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
Defendants’ motion to strike is
GRANTED.
Moving party to give notice.
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org.
Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to
appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the
hearing and argue the matter. Unless you
receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume
that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the
parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.