Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 20STCV38239, Date: 2022-09-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV38239    Hearing Date: September 22, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

On October 5, 2020, plaintiff Sarmen Essagholian (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendant Letter Four, Inc. (“Letter Four”), Lauren Adams (“Adams”), Jeremy Baker (“Baker”), Alfred Jr. Anderson (“Anderson”), Shieda Monique Brown Anderson, and Willie D. Campbel arising from a February 19, 2019, motor vehicle collision. Plaintiff alleges Anderson caused the collision when he was driving the vehicle as an agent, servant, or employee of the other defendants. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for negligence and negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of employee against Letter Four, Adams, and Baker (collectively, “the Letter Four Defendants”). 

On June 17, 2022, the Letter Four Defendants filed this motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 for $65,128.20.  The Letter Four Defendants served requests for admission asking Plaintiff to admit that Anderson was not their agent, servant, or employee, or that they had no involvement with the accident.  Plaintiff denied these requests for admission.

Section 2033.420 provides that if, in response to a request for admission, a responding party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter, and if the requesting party is forced to and subsequently does prove the genuineness of that document or the truth of the matter, the requesting party may move the court for an order requiring the responding party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making the proof, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.  An award is mandatory unless the Court finds any of the following: (1) an objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under CCP § 2033.290; (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance; (3) the party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter; and (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.420, subd. (b).)

The determination of whether there were no good reasons for denying the requested admission, whether the requested admission was of substantial importance, or the amount of expenses to be awarded, if any, is within the sound discretion of the trial court.  (Bloxham v. Saldinger (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 729, 753.)  If it is clear from the evidence introduced by either party that the party who denied for lack of information or belief had access to the information at the time the requests for admission were propounded, sanctions are justified because the party who denied the admission has a duty to investigate.  (Smith v. Circle P Ranch Co. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 267, 275.)  A request for admission has “substantial importance” when the matter requested is central to the disposition of the case.  (Brooks v. American Broadcasting Co. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 500, 509.)  In evaluating whether there was “good reason” to deny a request to admit “a court may properly consider whether at the time the denial was made the party making the denial held a reasonably entertained good faith belief that the party would prevail on the issue at trial.  (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1276.) 

Requests for Admission (“RFA”) Nos. 1-3 demanded Plaintiff admit that Anderson was never the “agent, servant, and/or employee” of Letter Four, Adams, or Baker.  (Declaration of Sean A. Fredin (“Fredin Decl.”) ¶¶ 23-25, Exh. 5.)  Plaintiff responded after boilerplate objections, “Plaintiff states: denied based on information and belief. Plaintiff is still conducting discovery into this issue and may later discover information relevant to this request. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend and/or supplement this response.”  (Ibid.)

RFA Nos. 7-9 demanded Plaintiff admit that Letter Four, Adams, and Baker were not involved whatsoever in the incident alleged in the complaint filed in this action. (Fredin Decl. ¶¶ 26-27, Exh. 5.)  After asserting boilerplate objections, Plaintiff responded, “Plaintiff states: Plaintiff can neither admit nor deny this request as Plaintiff lacks sufficient information. A reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the request has been made, and that information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable Plaintiff to admit or deny this request at this time. Plaintiff is still conducting discovery into this issue and may later discover information relevant to this request. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend and/or supplement this response.” (Ibid.)

The Letter Four Defendants argue that through their motion for summary judgment, they proved that they never employed Anderson and that Plaintiff failed to raise a dispute of fact that any agency relationship between Anderson and the Letter Four Defendants existed.  Letter Four Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s denials were unreasonable because Anderson’s counsel offered to provide a declaration from his client confirming that he was never hired by the Letter Four Defendants and did not know who they were.  The Letter Four Defendants also provided its payroll, list of all subcontractors hired in 2019 and the subcontractor bids.  Anderson was not listed in these documents.  Furthermore, Adams, Baker, and Anderson testified in their depositions that Anderson was not hired by the Letter Four Defendants.

In his opposition brief, Plaintiff argues that this motion should be denied because: (1) the RFAs were objected to as vague and ambiguous and seeking legal conclusions and should be stricken because no motion to compel further was filed, (2) Plaintiff had a good faith belief that he would prevail on the employment matter at trial, (3) the Letter Four Defendants did not distinguish the time defense counsel spent proving the issue of employment from their two motions for sanctions, which Plaintiff argues were purely punitive. 

First, Plaintiff’s responses to Defendants’ RFAs were “complete” such that the Letter Four Defendants were not required to file a motion to compel further.  (American Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 268-269.)  Furthermore, the Court does not find that the RFAs were vague and ambiguous.  Additionally, a request for admission may seek a legal conclusion.  (See Burke v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 286.) 

Second, Plaintiff argues he had a good faith belief that the Letter Four Defendants employed Anderson.  This argument is identical to that asserted in opposition to the Letter Four Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Plaintiff says he saw an Ohm meter, electrical wires, plugs, and boxes used for the construction of homes inside Anderson’s vehicle at the time of the incident.  Plaintiff claims he also saw Anderson with two other workers inside Letter Four’s gated worksite five or six houses away from where the accident occurred.  Plaintiff states he reasonably believed that Anderson was in the course and scope of employment with Letter Four at the time of the accident or was an actual or ostensible agent of Letter Four.  However, this testimony was insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact and it is similarly insufficient to support a reasonable belief that Anderson was the Letter Four Defendants’ employee, especially in light of the sworn testimony provided in multiple forms by Baker, Adams, and Anderson. 

Third, Plaintiff challenges the amount of attorneys’ fees sought by the Letter Four Defendants by characterizing the motions for sanctions as “punitive” and not directed towards proving the matter of Anderson’s employment status.  The party may seek reimbursement only for expenses incurred in proving matters denied by the opposing party and does not extend to trial preparation in other areas or preparation prior to the denials.  (Garcia v. Hyster Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 724, 736- 737; Yoon v. CAM IX Trust (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 388, 395.)  The Letter Four Defendants have calculated attorneys fees from the date of Plaintiff’s denials, June 22, 2021, to the date of the hearing on the summary judgment motion, April 14, 2022, on the grounds that all work during this period went to prove that Anderson was not the agent, servant or employee of the Letter Four Defendants and that they had no involvement whatsoever with the accident. 

The Letter Four Defendants clarify that costs and fees for only one sanctions motion – the one brought on September 20, 2021, before the summary judgment motion – is being requested.  Also, they argue that the costs for the motion should be recoverable because the motion sought to secure a dismissal via terminating sanctions by proving that there was no basis for Plaintiff’s claim that Anderson and the Letter Four Defendants were connected.  That motion was heard by the Court on November 4, 2021, and denied, finding that “more discovery, such as the deposition of Letter Four’s Person Most Knowledgeable, needs to be conducted and sanctions at this moment would be premature.” (Minute Order dated November 4, 2021, page 5 of 5.)

The Court finds that the attorney’s fees reimbursement period claimed by Defendants, from June 22, 2021, through April 14, 2022, is too extensive.  If the key issue is when did the Plaintiff cease to have reasonable ground to believe that that it would prevail on the agent, servant, or employee relationship with Defendants, then that did not occur until after the depositions occurring on February 15 and 16, 2022. 

While it is true that Anderson, Adams, and Baker signed declarations under penalty of perjury in support of the motion for sanctions filed on September 20, 2021, the motion was ill-conceived, and the Letter Four Defendants did not prevail.  The Plaintiff’s belief in an agency relationship between the Letter Four Defendants and Anderson was reasonable until Plaintiff had the opportunity to depose Adams and Baker on February 15 and February 16, 2022.  But, after Plaintiff’s counsel had the opportunity to examine Baker and Adams under oath, Plaintiff’s belief that there was any connection between Anderson and the Letter Four Defendants became untenable. 

Accordingly, the motion for cost-of-proof sanctions is GRANTED in part and the Letter Four Defendants are entitled to recover their attorneys’ fees incurred after February 16, 2022, in connection with their summary judgment motion, including reviewing Plaintiff’s opposition, drafting the reply brief, and preparing for and attending the hearing. 

The Letter Four Defendants are to give notice and submit a proposed order including a revised calculation of their attorneys’ fees.  Plaintiff may file an objection to the proposed order if he takes issue with the fee calculation. 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.