Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 21GDCV00201, Date: 2023-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21GDCV00201    Hearing Date: January 30, 2023    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT

I.         BACKGROUND

On February 10, 2021, plaintiff Donald J. Matson (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against defendant Chao Li (“Defendant”) and his various aliases. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on February 16, 2022, asserts causes of action for: (1) theft [Civil Code § 3344 & Penal Code § 496]; (2) theft [Penal Code §§ 484 & 496]; (3) trade libel; (4) infringement of trade name; (5) fraud; (6) indemnification; (7) conversion; (8) civil conspiracy; (9) accounting; (10) unfair business practices; (11) declaratory relief; and (12) injunctive relief. Plaintiff alleges Defendant used Plaintiff’s law firm name and trade insignia to practice unlicensed law and otherwise defraud potential clients. Plaintiff’s FAC prays for $750,000 in compensatory damages and “at least” $2,250,000 in punitive damages.

On May 16, 2022, default was entered as to Defendant on the FAC. On August 25, 2022, the Court denied default judgment without prejudice. On January 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed this request for default judgment.

II.        LEGAL STANDARD

          Code of Civil Procedure sections 585 and 586 allows a court of law to enter default judgment upon a party’s complaint without trial when a defendant has not timely filed an appropriate response.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 585, 586.) 

          A party seeking a default judgment “must use mandatory Request for Entry of Default (Application to Enter Default) (form CIV-100), unless the action is subject to the Fair Debt Buying Practices Act, Civil Code section 1788.50 et seq., in which case the party must use mandatory Request for Entry of Default (Fair Debt Buying Practices Act) (form CIV-105).”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, subd. (a).)  “The following must be included in the documents filed with the clerk: (1) Except in unlawful detainer cases, a brief summary of the case identifying the parties and the nature of plaintiff's claim; (2)  Declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3)  Interest computations as necessary; (4)  A memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5)  A declaration of nonmilitary status for each defendant against whom judgment is sought; (6)  A proposed form of judgment; (7)  A dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment against specified parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8)  Exhibits as necessary; and (9)  A request for attorney fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties.”  (Id. Rule 3.1800, subd. (a)(1)-(9).)

III.      DISCUSSION

           Here, Plaintiff has made all the necessary filings. On January 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default on the mandatory Civ-100 form. That same day, Plaintiff offered a summary of the case, a proposed judgment on form JUD-100, and a declaration with exhibits in support. Plaintiff also includes a memorandum of costs and a declaration of nonmilitary status with Civ-100. Finally, Plaintiff requested dismissal of the Doe defendants on June 21, 2022. Plaintiff has met the filing requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.

          However, the Court cannot grant Plaintiff’s request because there is a significant discrepancy between the amount listed on form JUD-100 (proposed judgment) that Plaintiff filed on January 20, 2023, and Plaintiff’s declaration and summary of the case that are dated that same day. On form JUD-100, Plaintiff lists the proposed judgment at $6,001,223.67—including $6,000,000 in damages and $1,223.67 in costs. But Plaintiff’s declaration states he is seeking $750,000 in general damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. (Matson Decl., ¶ 28.) Likewise, Plaintiff’s statement of the case concludes by requesting the Court enter default judgment for $750,000 in general damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. This reason for this discrepancy is unclear, as Plaintiff’s request for entry of default (form CIV-100) lists an amount of $6,001,223.67 with $0 credits acknowledged, yet a balance of $750,000 for the demand of complaint and $250,000 in special (punitive) damages. In addition, Plaintiff’s FAC prays for punitive damages of “at least” $2,250,000. (FAC, 17:15.) Plaintiff must resolve this discrepancy for the Court to enter default judgment.

Finally, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.115 requires a statement of damages be served on Defendant for punitive damages to be sought at default judgment. On April 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed proof of personal service of a statement of damages on Defendant. However, Plaintiff did not file the statement of damages he served on Defendant with the Court. Technically, Section 425.115 does not require Plaintiff to file the statement with the Court—it only requires Plaintiff to serve the statement on Defendant. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 425.115(f) [“The plaintiff shall serve the statement upon the defendant pursuant to this section before a default may be taken, if the motion for default judgment includes a request for punitive damages.”].) That said, considering the discrepancy between Plaintiff’s proposed judgment, declaration and exhibits, and first amended complaint, it would be helpful if Plaintiff filed the statement of damages he served on Defendant with the Court.

IV.      CONCLUSION

            Plaintiffs Donald J. Matson’s request for default judgment is DENIED without prejudice.

            Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at alhdept3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.