Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 21STCV08721, Date: 2022-09-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV08721    Hearing Date: September 16, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

I.            INTRODUCTION

On March 4, 2021, Maria Guadalupe Trujillo (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants William G. Farish (“Farish”), George W. Pearson (“Pearson”), County of Los Angeles (“Defendant”), City of Long Beach (“City”), and Southern California Edison (“SCE”) (collectively, “Defendants”).  Plaintiff claims that on May 24, 2020, her husband, Andres Trujillo (“Decedent”), rode a horse on property located at 6751 Atlantic Avenue, Long Beach, where horses are stabled and ridden.  (Compl., Attachment 1.)  Decedent’s horse lost its footing due to the dangerous condition of the paved area. (Ibid.) Although the horse tried to gather itself, Andres was thrown and hit his head on the paved area; his horse lost his balance, fell on Andres, and killed him.  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff alleges the paved area was a construction defect, unreasonably dangerous when traversed by a horse, and the unusual rise of the paved area was a trap for the unwary.  Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants failed to: (1) post a warning or (2) install railing or a mat to ameliorate these alleged conditions.  Plaintiff also claims the failure to fence off the paved area or give notice of a dangerous condition was unreasonable. 

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant owned, maintained, or controlled the property at issue, which belonged to the Los Angeles County Sanitation District (“LACSD”) and (2) Defendant is afforded immunity under Government Code section 831.7. 

On August 5, 2022, the Court continued the hearing on Defendant’s motion so that the parties could provide supplemental briefing on the relationship between Defendant and LACSD. 

II.          FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on May 24, 2020, Decedent was killed when a horse he was riding lost its footing on a “paved area”, threw Decedent, and fell on him. (Defendant’s Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 1.)  As alleged in the Complaint, the incident occurred on property located on 6751 Atlantic Avenue in Long Beach, California (the “Property”).  (UMF No. 2.)

III.        LEGAL STANDARD

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  A moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause of action.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.  (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)  The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”  (Ibid.)  The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”  (Ibid.)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

IV.         EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff’s objections to the Declaration of Carol Chaparro, contained in Plaintiff’s “request to strike”, are OVERRULED.  Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice are OVERRULED.

V.           DISCUSSION

A.   Ownership of the Property

To prevail on a cause of action for dangerous condition of public property under Government Code § 835, a plaintiff must establish that the property in question was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: “(1) a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his or her employment created the dangerous condition; or (2) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”  A “public entity may not be held liable under section 835 for a dangerous condition of property that it does not own or control.”  (Goddard v. Department of Fish and Wildlife (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 350, 359.)

Defendant relies on the declaration of Carol Chaparro (“Chaparro”) as evidence that it does not own the Property.  Chaparro is employed by Defendant as an investigator in the Claims & Litigation Section of the Survey/Mapping & Property Management Division.  (Chaparro Decl., ¶ 2.)  She declares that in her position, she is aware of, and has the capacity of making herself aware of, those curbs, sidewalks, and streets, for which Defendant has responsibility for inspection, maintenance, ownership, and control, as well as the roadways, sidewalks, parkways, and trees which Defendant is responsible for inspecting and maintaining.  (Chaparro Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.)  Chaparro states that the Property, including the asphalt area and the gate in front of the sanitation equipment, is owned by the Los Angeles County Sanitation District (“Sanitation District”) and is not within Defendant’s jurisdiction.  (Chaparro Decl., ¶ 8.)  Chaparro further declares that Sanitation District is a separate and distinct entity.  (Chaparro Decl., ¶ 9.)  She also states that Defendant had no agreement with Sanitation District, nor did Defendant receive any request from Sanitation District, to perform any inspection, operation, repair, or maintenance of the roadway at the Property, or any section or maintenance of the curb, sidewalk, street at or near the Property for the five fiscal years before Decedent’s accident.  (Chaparro Decl., ¶¶ 11-13.) 

In her opposition, Plaintiff argues there is a triable issue as to whether Defendant is responsible for the Property because the chair of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors sits on the Board of Directors of the Sanitation District.  However, in Defendant’s supplemental briefing filed on August 19, 2022, Defendant cites to various statutory provisions from the Health and Safety Code, including section 4700 et seq., known and cited as the “county sanitation district act”, to show that it is a special district  (H&S, § 4700, et seq.)  For example, Defendant points to section 4738, which provides that a county sanitation district may sue and be sued by its own name.  Defendant also cites to Government Code section 56036, which defines a “district” or “special district” as including a county service area but excluding a county. 

In contrast, Plaintiff’s supplemental brief cites to no legal authority showing that there is a relationship between Defendant and LACSD.  Plaintiff  only refers to case law which concerns “substantial compliance” with the Government Tort Claims Act and cites to general law defining the various duties and formation of local government agencies.  Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to meet her burden of showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.

B.   Recovery of Defense Costs

Defendant requests the Court determine whether the proceeding was brought in good faith and with reasonable cause so that it might recover its defense costs, in addition to costs normally awarded to the prevailing party.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1038.)  However, Defendant’s assertion that there was no factual or legal basis for maintaining this lawsuit is conclusory.  There is no evidence that Plaintiff failed to act in good faith.  Accordingly, Defendant’s request for defense costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1038 is DENIED.

VI.     CONCLUSION

          In light of the foregoing, the Motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Moving party to give notice. 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.