Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 21STCV14877, Date: 2022-12-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV14877    Hearing Date: December 7, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

KALA JAMES,

                   Plaintiff(s),

          vs.

 

GREG DOE, et al.,

 

                   Defendant(s),

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      CASE NO.: 21STCV14877

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT GREG BELL’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

 

Dept. 27

1:30 p.m.

December 7, 2022

 

I.       INTRODUCTION

          On April 20, 2021, plaintiff Kala James (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Lyft Inc. (“Lyft”) and Greg Bell (“Defendant”) (named as “Greg Doe”).  Plaintiff alleges that on April 27, 2019, she was a passenger in the vehicle driven by Defendant when an argument ensued.  (Compl., pp. 6-7.)  Defendant stopped the vehicle and ordered her to exit the vehicle.  (Ibid.)  As Plaintiff was halfway out of the vehicle, Defendant drove away leaving Plaintiff “hanging half out of the car and with [Plaintiff’s] child in thevehicle [sic] as well.”  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff also alleges she was placed in great apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with her person and suffered great bodily injury from being thrown around the inside of the vehicle while Defendant drove at a high and erratic speed.  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff also alleges she was confined within the interior of Defendant’s car without a means of escape when Defendant locked his car doors.  (Compl., IT-1, p. 7.) 

          On October 21, 2022, Defendant filed this demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint which argues that her causes of action for intentional tort fail to allege sufficient facts. 

          On November 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief.

          On November 29, 2022, Defendant filed a reply brief. 

II.      LEGAL STANDARDS

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face. (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.)  “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.  [Citation.]”  (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].)  Allegations are to be liberally construed.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) 

A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)  A demurrer for uncertainty brought under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(f) is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her.  (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment.  (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully.  (Ibid.)

III.     DISCUSSION

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party shall meet and confer with the party who has filed the pleading and shall file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).)  

          Defendant’s counsel, Jonathan R. Gerber, declares that on October 4 and October 18, 2022, he sent email correspondence requesting to meet and confer.  Mr. Gerber concludes that the parties have met conferred but does not indicate whether the parties discussed the merits of the demurrer over the telephone or in person.  Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that the meet and confer requirement has been satisfied.  Nevertheless, the Court proceeds to analyze the demurrer on its merits. 

          Defendant claims that the Complaint merely states a claim for general negligence, not intentional tort, because Plaintiff’s allegations of intent are conclusory.  

The elements of a cause of action for assault are: (1) the defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch the plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believed he was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to the plaintiff that the defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the defendant's conduct; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm.  (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 890.)

The elements of a cause of action for battery are: (1) the defendant touched the plaintiff, or caused the plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) the plaintiff was harmed or offended by the defendant's conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have been offended by the touching.  (Ibid.)

The elements for false imprisonment are (1) nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief.  (Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496; see CACI 1400.)

First, Defendant claims that it is unclear which tort Plaintiff claims that he committed.  Based on a review of the Complaint, as well as the opposition brief, it appears that Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges assault and battery and the fourth cause of action alleges false imprisonment. 

Next, in analyzing the sufficiency of the allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Defendant acted with an intent to cause apprehension of harm and an intent to confine.  A review of the Complaint shows that Plaintiff alleges Defendant: (1) drove away while Plaintiff was halfway outside the vehicle, and (2) confined her within the interior of his car by locking the car.  Although the chronological order of these acts is uncertain, this ambiguity may be clarified through discovery.  (See Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

However, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to show that Defendant committed a battery because neither the Third nor Fourth Causes of Action allege an unlawful contact.  Nevertheless, a demurrer may be sustained “only¿if the complaint fails to state a cause of action under any possible legal theory.”  (Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd.¿(2009) 45 Cal.4th 992, 998.)  Accordingly, because the Third and Fourth Causes of Action sufficiently state a claim for assault and false imprisonment, the demurrer to the Third and Fourth Causes of Action is OVERRULED.

IV.     CONCLUSION

Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED. 

Moving party to give notice.

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.