Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case 21STCV16850 2022-08-31 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 21STCV16850, Date: 2022-08-31 Tentative Ruling

On May 4, 2021, plaintiff Stephen Yagman (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Eric Michael Garcetti (“Garcetti”), Bob Blumenfield (“Blumenfield”), Michael Bonin (“Bonin”), Joe Buscaino (“Buscaino”), Nury Martinez (“Martinez”), Mitch O’Farrell (“O’Farrell”), David E. Ryu (“Ryu”), Kevin Lee James (“James”), Aura Garcia (“Garcia”), Mike Davis (“Davis”), Jessica M. Caloza (“Caloza”), M. Teresa Villegas (“Villegas”), and Adel H. Hagekhalil (“Hagekhalil”) (collectively, “Defendants”) arising from a January 29, 2020 fall. Plaintiff’s operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges that he was walking on a sidewalk adjacent to the Grand Canal in Venice Beach, California, when he fell to the ground and into the canal. (FAC, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that the fall was caused by the broken and unrepaired condition of the sidewalk. (FAC, ¶ 18.) He asserts causes of action for (1) common law negligence, (2) statutory negligence pursuant to Government Code section 815.6 for violation of a mandatory duty, (3) statutory negligence for dangerous condition of public property pursuant to Government Code section 835, (4) public nuisance, and (5) violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).

The Court previously issued a ruling on Defendants’ demurrer and motion to strike portions of the Complaint. The ruling was amended to grant leave to Plaintiff to file a First Amended Complaint after a motion for reconsideration by Plaintiff based on Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b).

On May 18, 2022, Defendants filed this demurrer and motion to strike. Plaintiff opposes.

On July 22, 2022, the Court allowed the parties to file supplemental briefing.[1]

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face. (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.]” (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)

Before filing a demurrer or motion to strike, the demurring or moving party shall meet and confer with the party who has filed the pleading and shall file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, subd. (a); 435.5, subd. (a).)

The Court finds the meet and confer obligation satisfied based on the declaration of defense counsel Charlynn Rawlins. (See Rawlins Decl.)

Plaintiff alleges that: (1) Garcetti is the mayor of the City of Los Angeles, (2) Blumenfield and Ryu are City Council members, (3) Hagekhalil is the executive director and general manager of the Public Works Department’s Bureau of Street Services, and (4) the remainder of Defendants are members of the Board of the City Department of Public Works. (FAC, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff is suing each defendant in their individual and official capacity. (FAC, ¶ 4.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts that they owned, possessed, or controlled the sidewalk and that it is unclear which of them is implicated, in their individual or official capacities. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are legally responsible for maintaining the sidewalk and failed to do so. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants, had the right and responsibility to control, maintain, and keep safe the subject sidewalk. (FAC, ¶ 20; Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37 [Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.” (Emphasis added.)) Whether Defendants are in fact responsible for controlling, maintaining, and keeping the sidewalk safe is not a matter to be decided on demurrer. Therefore, a theory of liability based on common law liability exists against each defendant insofar as they are being sued in their individual capacities, but not as to their official capacities. (Govt. Code. § [“[A] public employee is not liable for injury caused by a condition of public property where such condition exists because of any act or omission of such employee within the scope of his employment.”]) Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED as to Defendants in their individual capacity, and SUSTAINED, without leave to amend as to Defendants in their official capacity.

Defendants next argue that there is no factual support for Plaintiffs’ statutory claims for negligence. Plaintiff asserts his causes of action under Government Code section 815.6 and 835.

As to the second cause of action under Government Code 815.6, Plaintiff fails to identify any mandatory duty that was “imposed by an enactment designed to protect against the risk” of the particular type of injury suffered by Plaintiff. (See Govt. Code. § 815.6) Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the second cause of action on this ground is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.

As for Plaintiff’s third cause of action pursuant to Government Code section 835, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege that “a negligent or wrongful act or omission of the public entity’s employee acting within the scope of his or her employment created the dangerous condition.” However, Plaintiff alleges exactly this in Paragraphs 46 and 47. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to maintain, inspect, and repair the sidewalk. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Accordingly, the demurrer to the third cause of action on the grounds that it fails to state a cause of action is OVERRULED.

“A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance of damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” (Civ. Code, § 3480; see Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1548.) “A private person may maintain an action for a public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself, but not otherwise.” (Civ. Code, § 3493; see Birke, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at 1548.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for public nuisance because nuisance actions against public entities may only proceed based upon Civil Code section 3479, which defines a nuisance as anything “injurious to health, including but not limited to . . . an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or in any public park, square, street, or highway.” Defendant also argues that Plaintiff failed to allege that he suffered a special injury over and above that suffered by the public. Defendant also cites to Longfellow v. County of San Luis Obispo (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 379, 383, to suggest that a sidewalk in disrepair is not a public nuisance.

Plaintiff alleges that the sidewalk is the only route available by land “to reach his intended destination” but does not identify what that destination is. (FAC, ¶ 17.) Plaintiff also does not allege how the condition of the sidewalk was “an obstruction” to its use. Accordingly, the demurrer to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.

Defendants argue that CEQA does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims because a municipal entity cannot be required to engage in environmental review of a plan that does not exist. (Demurrer, p. 11, citing to Muzzy Ranch Co. Solano County Airport Land Use Comm’n (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 379-380.) CEQA also does not provide monetary damages for personal injury as a remedy, but allows a petitioner to obtain a writ of mandate from a court ordering the government to undertake the required environmental review, and an order setting aside a project approved without first conducting necessary environmental review. (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 566-568.) Plaintiff has not made any changes to this cause of action in the FAC and has not opposed this issue. The Court does not see how Plaintiff may amend the pleading to state this claim under the circumstances. Accordingly, the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint against them in their official capacities is untimely because his claim under the Tort Claims Act was denied on March 17, 2020. (FAC, ¶ 13.) The FAC alleges that on March 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed the action in Federal Court and the action remained pending until it was dismissed on April 30, 2021. (Ibid.) On May 1, 2021, an appeal was taken from that dismissal to the Ninth Circuit and is pending disposition. (Ibid.) The Complaint was filed on May 4, 2021. (Ibid.) Pursuant to Government Code sections 945.6, 950.2, and 950.6, this action needed to be filed within six months after the notice of rejection was delivered or deposited in the mail. As this action was not filed until May 4, 2021, Plaintiff’s action against Defendants as public employees is untimely. Plaintiff appears to argue equitable tolling in opposition, but it is unclear and there is no actual argument other than a recitation of legal authority. Therefore, the demurrer to Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action on this ground are SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.

Defendants move to strike all allegations of mandatory duty and invocation of Government Code § 815.6. However, as the Court has sustained the demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action, the motion to strike these allegations is MOOT.

Defendants also move to strike Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages, costs of suit including attorneys’ fees, and injunctive relief. As the only claim remaining in the Complaint is a negligence claim, punitive damages are inappropriate. (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958 [“Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award” for punitive damages.]) Defendants’ motion to strike the request for punitive damages is GRANTED.

Next, Defendants’ request to strike Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is also GRANTED because Plaintiff provides no statutory basis for recovering fees. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5 [attorneys’ fees only allowed when authorized by contract, statute, or law].) Lastly, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief should be stricken because Plaintiff has not shown how there is a threat of continuing misconduct. (Madrid v. Perot Sys. Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 440, 463; Code Civ. Proc., § 525.) Accordingly, the motion to strike as to the prayer for an injunction is GRANTED. The Court also notes that as to attorney’s fees and injunctive relief, Plaintiff’s opposition fails to argue these issues.

Defendants’ demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED as to Defendants in their individual capacity, and SUSTAINED, without leave to amend as to Defendants in their official capacity.

Defendants’ demurrer to the second, third, and fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED with, 20 days leave to amend.

Defendant’s demurrer to the fifth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Defendant’s Motion to strike is GRANTED in its entirety, except as to the first request regarding mandatory duty which is MOOT.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

[1] The Court notes that Plaintiff instead of filing a supplemental brief simply attached an excerpt from Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 340, 350, without any explanation of its application to this matter. Plaintiff’s supplemental “brief” fails to comply with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(b) because it fails to provide a discussion of the case cited and its application to this matter, and the Court is not under a duty to determine how the excerpt from Pitts applies to this case. (See Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Associates, Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927, 934 [“[T]he trial court ha[s] no obligation to undertake its own search of the record backwards and forwards to try to figure out how the law applies to the facts’ of the case.]) In addition, a review of Pitts reveals that it is inapplicable to this matter because it relates to the application of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and the violation of constitutional rights by public officials. Plaintiff has not asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 nor does he contend that his constitutional rights have been violated, and his reliance on Pitts in inapplicable.

On
May 4, 2021, Stephen Yagman, in propria persona, (“Plaintiff”) initiated
the present action by filing a Complaint against Eric Michael Garcetti, Bob
Blumenfield, Michael Bonin, Joe Buscaino, Nury Martinez, Mitch O’Farrell, David
E. Ryu, Kevin Lee James, Aura Garcia, Mike Davis, Jessica M. Caloza, M. Teresa
Villegas, Adel H. Hagekhalil, and Does 1 through 20 (collectively,
“Defendants”). Plaintiff’s Complaint
alleges the following causes of action: (1) Common Law Negligence; (2)
Statutory Negligence I; (3) Statutory Negligence II; (4) Public Nuisance; and
(5) Violation of California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”). Plaintiff’s Complaint arises from Plaintiff’s
trip and fall on a public sidewalk located upon Venice Grand Canals, in Venice
Beach, California. (Compl., ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that the fall was caused by
the broken and unrepaired condition of the sidewalk. (Id. ¶ 18.)

On
December 27, 2021, Defendants filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike against
Plaintiff’s Complaint.

On
February 8, 2022, Defendants’ Demurrer and Motion to Strike came before the
Court for hearing. The Court overruled
Defendants’ Demurrer to Plaintiff’s first cause of action. The Court sustained Defendants’ Demurrer to
Plaintiff’s remaining second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action,
without leave to amend. The Court granted
Defendant’s Motion to Strike as to Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages and
an injunction.

On
February 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration, with respect
to the Court’s Order sustaining Defendants’ Demurrer to Plaintiff’s second
through fifth causes of action, without leave to amend.

On
April 20, 2022, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration was granted by this
Court. Plaintiff was provided with
twenty (20) days leave to file a First Amended Complaint.

On
April 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint against
Defendants. Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) Common Law Negligence;
(2) Statutory Negligence I; (3) Statutory Negligence II; (4) Public Nuisance; and
(5) Violation of California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).

On
May 18, 2022, Defendants filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike against
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
Defendants’ Demurrer and Motion to Strike is scheduled to come before
this Court for hearing on August 23, 2022 at 1:30pm in Department 27 of Spring
Street Courthouse.

On
July 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel All Defendants to Provide
Substantive Responses to Form Interrogatories (hereinafter, “Motion”).

“Any party may
obtain discovery . . . by propounding to any other party to the action written
interrogatories to be answered under oath.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.010, subd. (a).)

“The party to whom interrogatories
have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each
interrogatory by any of the following: (1) An answer containing the information
sought to be discovered[;] (2) An exercise of the party's option to produce
writings[;] (3) An objection to the particular interrogatory.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.210, subd. (a).)

“Each answer in a response to
interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information
reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd.
(a).) “If an interrogatory cannot be
answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd.
(b).) “If the responding party does not
have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that
party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to
obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations,
except where the information is equally available to the propounding
party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220,
subd. (c).)

“On receipt of a response to
interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a
further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following
apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete[;]
(2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is
unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate[;]
(3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

A propounding party’s motion for an
order compelling a further response must be made “within 45 days of the service
of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or
before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the
responding party have agreed in writing . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c).)

A propounding party’s motion for an
order compelling a further response must be accompanied by a meet and confer
declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., §
2030.300, subd. (b)(1).) A meet and
confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable
and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the
motion.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2016.040.)

A propounding party’s motion for an
order compelling a further response must also be accompanied by a separate
statement, outlining the text of each request, the response, and a statement of
factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses. (Cal. Rules of
Court, Rule 3.1345, subd. (a)(3).)

“The court shall impose a monetary
sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party,
person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a
further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to
the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances
make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).)

Preliminary, the Court notes, while
Plaintiff’s Motion is calendared as a “Motion to Compel Discovery (not ‘Further
Discovery’)”, such is incorrect.
Plaintiff presently moves for an Order compelling Defendants’ further
responses to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories (Set One). Plaintiff advances the instant Motion on the
ground Defendants’ responses, which were served upon Plaintiff on approximately
May 27, 2022, comprise solely of objections, and a further response is
warranted as such objections are meritless.
(Mot., at p. 2; Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) Therefore, the Court preliminarily notes Plaintiff’s
Motion must be scrutinized in accordance with the statutory provisions (Code
Civ. Proc., § 2030.300) and Court rules (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345)
which govern motions to compel a further response to interrogatories.

A. Procedural
Defects Presently Prevent Court From Considering Plaintiff’s
Motion

The Court finds the numerous
procedural deficiencies associated with Plaintiff’s present Motion prevent this
Court from considering the merits of Plaintiff’s arguments and contentions.

First, and most pertinently, Plaintiff
has failed to participate in an Informal Discovery Conference (“IDC”) prior to
hearing upon Plaintiff’s Motion, in accordance with the Court’s “Standing Order
Re: Personal Injury Procedures, Central District” (hereinafter, “Standing
Order”). The Court preliminarily notes
Plaintiff has been served with the Court’s Standing Order, per the Certificate
of Mailing which has been filed upon the Court’s docket. (Certificate of Mailing, filed on May 24,
2021 [indicating the Court has mailed the Standing Order to Plaintiff at 333
Washington Boulevard, Venice Beach, CA 90292].)
The Court’s Standing Order expressly states, “Parties must
participate in an IDC before a Motion to Compel Further Responses
to Discovery will be heard . . . .”
(Standing Order, filed on May 24, 2022.)
The Court’s docket reflects Plaintiff has failed to schedule, or
otherwise participate in an IDC prior to the hearing upon Plaintiff’s present
Motion.

Second, Plaintiff has failed to file a
Separate Statement, as required by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345, subd.
(a)(2).) California Rules of Court, Rule
3.1345, subdivision (a)(2) expressly states, “Any motion involving the content
of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanies
by a separate statement. The motions that require a separate statement include
a motion: ¶(2) To compel further responses to interrogatories[.]” (Ibid.) Plaintiff has failed to file a Separate
Statement in conjunction with the present Motion, in violation of California
Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345. (Ibid.)

Prior to filing any motion to compel a
further response to discovery, Plaintiff, in propria persona, should
reference the above statutory sections and Court rules, and ensure the
discovery motion corresponds with the requirements outlined therein. While, normally, the Court would provide
Plaintiff with an opportunity to cure the procedural deficiencies identified in
the preceding paragraphs, the Court is without jurisdiction to consider
Plaintiff’s present Motion, as further discussed below.

Plaintiff’s present Motion is untimely,
and the Court is without jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s Motion.

Code of Civil Procedure section
2030.300, subdivision (c) provides, “Unless notice of this motion is given within
45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental
verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the
propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the
propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the
interrogatories.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2030.300, subd. (c) [emphasis added].) A
verified response is not required when a party served only objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.250, subd.
(a).) “[T]he time within which to make a
motion to compel [answers to interrogatories] is mandatory and
jurisdictional.” (Sexton v. Superior
Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1409-1410.) “Delaying the motion beyond the 45-day time
limit waives the right to compel a further response to the
interrogatories.” (Weil & Brown,
California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June
2022 Update) Discovery, § 8:1146, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd.
(c), Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Superior Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 681,
685.)

Presently, Plaintiff’s Motion
demonstrates that Plaintiff was served with Defendants’ responses to
Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories (Set One) on May 27, 2022 by mail. It follows, pursuant to the relevant
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff was required to file the
present Motion compelling Defendants’ further responses to the subject Form
Interrogatories (Set One), no later than July 16, 2022. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c)
[providing, a party must notice a motion to compel further responses to
interrogatories “within 45 days of the service of the verified response”],
1013, subd. (a) [“any period of notice and any right or duty to do any act or
make any response within any period or on a date certain after service of a
document, which time period is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be
extended five calendar days, upon service by mail”].) Plaintiff failed to file the present Motion
by July 16, 2022, and instead, filed the present Motion on July 29, 2022. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is untimely,
and the Court is without jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff’s Motion.

Plaintiff’s
Motion to Compel All Defendants to Provide Substantive Responses to Form
Interrogatories is DENIED, with prejudice

Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit
on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s
website at www.lacourt.org. Please be
advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the
hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue
the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If
the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on
this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court
may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the
motion off calendar.