Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 21STCV20561, Date: 2022-10-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV20561    Hearing Date: October 28, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

I.            INTRODUCTION

On June 3, 2021, plaintiff Amanna Morales (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”), Raiser, LLC, Raiser-CA, LLC, and Angel Hernandez Benavides (“Benavides”) arising from a February 1, 2019 motor vehicle collision.  On August 2, 2021, Defendant filed an answer. 

On October 5, 2022, Uber filed this motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss or stay the action pending completion of arbitration.  Uber argues that Plaintiff is bound by a written agreement to arbitrate the subject matter of the Complaint against it. 

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. §1281.2, subds. (a), (b).)  “If an application has been made to a court . . . for an order to arbitrate a controversy . . . the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until the application for an order to arbitrate is determined and, if arbitration of such controversy is ordered, until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)

“The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

III.        DISCUSSION

Defendant submits a declaration from Ryan Buoscio (“Buoscio”), who is employed as Uber’s Senior Program Manager, Safety & Core Services + CLO Tech Operations.  (Buoscio Decl., ¶ 2.) 

Buoscio authenticates Uber’s business records which reflect that on December 31, 2021, Plaintiff was presented with an in-app blocking pop-up type screen with the header “We’ve updated our terms.”  (Buoscio Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. A.)  It also stated in large type, “We encourage you to read our Updated Terms in full.”  (Buoscio Decl., Ex. A.)  Under that message were the phrases “Terms of Use” and “Privacy Notice” in bright blue underlined text, indicating a hyperlink.  (Ibid.)  When the “Terms and Conditions” hyperlink was accessed, the terms and conditions in effect at the time would be displayed. (Buoscio Decl., ¶ 8.)  The in-app blocking pop-up screen expressly stated that: “By checking the box, I have reviewed and agreed to the Terms of Use and acknowledge the Privacy Notice.”  It also states that: “I am at least 18 years of age.”  (Buoscio Decl., Ex. B.)  Based on a copy of Plaintiff’s rider account sign-up date and consent record, an individual named “Arianna Morales” clicked the checkbox and tapped “Confirm” on December 31, 2021.  (Buoscio Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. B.)  Although the name on the consent record is different from Plaintiff’s, Buoscio states that the telephone number that was used to create the account and click the checkbox consent is associated with Plaintiff.  (Buoscio Decl., ¶ 9.)  Buoscio authenticates a true and correct copy of the terms that were in effect at this time (the “December 2021 Terms”) and attaches it as Exhibit C.  (Buscio Decl., Ex. C.)  The December 2021 Terms contain an arbitration agreement encompassing all disputes, claims, and controversies which “occurred or accrued before or after the date you agreed to the Terms.”  (Buoscio Decl., Ex. C, section 2.)  The agreement also applies to any third-party when the underlying claims arise out of or relate to the account holder’s use of Uber’s services.  (Ibid.) 

In her opposition, Plaintiff argues that she should not have to arbitrate a claim which occurred almost 3 years before she agreed to the December 2021 Terms because she did not know that the popup would limit her current claim for negligence against Defendant.  Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement was not conspicuous and there was nothing on the pop-up screen that said she would waive her constitutional right to a jury trial on all claims, even those that were previously filed.  Plaintiff further argues that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable. 

Where the arbitration agreement has a delegation clause, any challenge to its enforceability must be specific to the delegation clause.  (Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 231.)  There are two prerequisites for a delegation clause to be effective. First, the language of the clause must be clear and unmistakable. The delegation clause in this case satisfies that requirement. The second prerequisite is that the delegation must not be revocable under state contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.

The arbitration agreement contains a section named “Delegation Clause.”  This section states, in relevant part, that “[o]nly an arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute arising out of or relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this Arbitration Agreement, including without limitation any claim that all or any part of this Arbitration Agreement is void or voidable. An arbitrator shall also have exclusive authority to resolve all threshold arbitrability issues, including issues relating to whether the [December 2021 Terms] are applicable, unconscionable, or illusory and any defense to arbitration, including without limitation waiver, delay, laches, or estoppel.”  (Buoscio Dec., Ex. C, section 2(a)(4).)  This language is unmistakably clear. 

Plaintiff also fails to meet her burden to show that the delegation clause is unconscionable.  “The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving unconscionability.”  (Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 247.) “[U]nconscionability has both a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ element, the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.”  (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114, citations omitted.) These elements are evaluated on a “sliding scale”: “the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.”  (Ibid.)  The unconscionability defense requires a showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.  (Ibid.) 

Notably, Plaintiff makes no argument specific to the delegation clause at all and only generally argues that the arbitration agreement as a whole is unconscionable.  This is insufficient.  (See Rent-A-Ctr. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 72-76.)  Instead, Plaintiff claims she did not understand the terms of the arbitration agreement.  However, a “cardinal rule of contract law is that a party’s failure to read a contract, or to carefully read a contract, before signing it is no defense to the contract’s enforcement.”  (Desert Outdoor Advertising v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 866, 872.) “[O]ne who assents to a contract is bound by its provisions and cannot complain of unfamiliarity with the language of the instrument.”  (Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 710.)

IV.         CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court grants Uber’s motion to compel arbitration and stays the proceedings before this Court pending completion of the arbitration between Plaintiff and Uber.  The Court sets a hearing on the status of the arbitration for April 28, 2023 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 27 of the Spring Street Courthouse.

On the Court's own motion, the Final Status Conference scheduled for November 17, 2022, Jury Trial scheduled for December 1, 2022, and Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal scheduled for May 30, 2024 are advanced to this date and vacated .

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.