Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 21STCV38090, Date: 2022-12-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV38090    Hearing Date: December 6, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

JOSE FRANCISCO PONCE,

                   Plaintiff(s),

          vs.

 

ALEXIS ROBERTO BALDERAS FLORES, et al.,

 

                   Defendant(s).

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      CASE NO.: 21STCV38090

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: CROSS-DEFENDANT KAREN KALEH’S MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT

 

Dept. 27

1:30 p.m.

December 6, 2022

 

On October 15, 2021, plaintiff Jose Francisco Ponce (“Ponce”) filed this action against defendants Alexis Roberto Balderas Flores (“Flores”) and Pacific Blue Industries, Inc. dba Servpro of Van Nuys South (“Servpro”) arising from a multi-vehicle collision that occurred on June 4, 2021.  On January 19, 2022, Flores and Servpro filed a cross-complaint for indemnity, apportionment, and declaratory relief against Andrew Insun Jun (“Jun”), Miran Park (“Park”), Karen Kaleh (“Kaleh”), Cindy Khachatryan (“Khachatryan”), and Izabela Hoktanyan (“Hoktanyan”).  On April 14, 2022, Kaleh filed a cross-complaint against Jun, Park, Khachatryan, and Hoktanyan.  On April 15, 2022, Jun and Park filed a cross-complaint against Flores, Servpro, Kaleh, Khachatryan, and Hoktanyan. 

On May 10, 2022, Kaleh, along with Ramadan Barasi (“Barasi”), filed a separate action against Khachatryan, Hoktanyan, Flores, and Servpro.  The two actions were consolidated per stipulation on July 12, 2022. 

On August 5, 2022, Ponce amended his complaint to add Hoktanyan and Khachatryan as Doe defendants.  Ponce is not asserting a claim against Kaleh.  However, on November 3, 2022, Kaleh filed this motion for determination of good faith settlement after settling with Ponce in exchange for $50,000.  The motion is unopposed.

The Court must approve any settlement entered into by less than all joint tortfeasors or co-obligors.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6.)  This requirement furthers two sometimes-competing policies: (1) the equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault, and (2) the encouragement of settlements.  (Erreca’s v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1487.)  If the settlement is made in good faith, the Court “shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor . . . for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).)  “A plaintiff and a cross-defendant may enter into a good faith settlement, even if the plaintiff’s claims against the cross-defendant are time-barred.  [Citation.]  However, in such a situation, the proffered good faith settlement must be subjected to particular scrutiny to ensure the settlement amount is reasonable and that there is no collusion aimed at injuring the interests of the non-settling cross-complainant.”  (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1354.) 

“A determination as to the good faith of a settlement, within the meaning of section 877.6, necessarily requires the trial court to examine and weigh a number of relevant factors, one of the most important of which is the settling party’s proportionate liability.  In making such examination, the court must look at the state of the evidence as it exists at the time the motion for a good faith determination is heard.  [Citation.]  If . . . there is no substantial evidence to support a critical assumption as to the nature and extent of a settling defendant’s liability, then a determination of good faith based upon such assumption is an abuse of discretion.”  (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 871; L.C. Rudd & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 742, 750 [“It is the burden of the settling parties to explain to the court and to all other parties the evidentiary basis for any allocations and valuations made sufficient to demonstrate that a reasonable allocation was made”].)  “When no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground for good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient” for the Court to grant a motion for determination of good faith settlement.  (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1257, 1261.) 

Kaleh argues that she is entitled to a determination that her policy limit settlement of $50,000 was made in good faith and contends that the injuries to Ponce occurred as a result of Flores’s negligence because Ponce testified that he felt only one impact from Flores’s vehicle.  Kaleh compares her policy limit of $50,000 to Ponce’s settlement demand letter, which identified $742,244.72 in special damages including medical bills and loss of earnings.  Kaleh executed a declaration of no assets or excess liability insurance and was not acting in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the incident. 

Based on the foregoing, Kaleh’s unopposed motion is GRANTED.  

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.