Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 22AHCV00085, Date: 2024-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22AHCV00085, Date: 2024-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Jaime Robison filed this action on February 17, 2022. The operative First Amended Complaint, filed on February 21, 2023, asserts three causes of action for: (1) relief for violation of POBRA, Government Code section 3309.5, (2) petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, and (3) violation of due process. The named defendants include the City of Pasadena, the Pasadena Police Department (which is not a separate entity but a department within the City), Steven Mermell, in his official capacity as City Manager (“Mermell”), and Michelle Perera, in her official capacity as Director of Library and Information Services (“Perera”).

On August 15, 2024, City, Police Department, Mermell, and Perera (collectively, “City”) filed this motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of each cause of action.

On November 1, 2024, the Court heard oral argument and continued the hearing to December 11, 2024.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.) A moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause of action, but it is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence. (Id. at p. 854; Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages . . . or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Id., subd. (f)(2).)

Plaintiff asserts 58 pages of boilerplate objections by objecting to each exhibit in City’s compendium of evidence, which consists largely of documents from the underlying administrative record. The Court notes that Plaintiff submits many of the same exhibits in support of her opposition and also relies on her counsel to authenticate them as being produced in discovery or as “part of the Administrative Record.” (Plaintiff’s Appendix, Glave Decl., ¶ 15) Accordingly, any objections on the grounds that City’s exhibits are insufficiently authenticated by defense counsel are OVERRULED. (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 856 [no merit to authentication, foundation, hearsay, or relevance grounds where opposing party relied on the identical evidence].) These evidentiary objections based on authentication are also not well-taken considering that Plaintiff does not actually dispute most of City’s proffered material facts which rely on the purportedly objectionable evidence.

Second, Plaintiff offers no explanation (either within her objections or in her opposition brief) as to how Penal Code section 832.5 through 832.8 and Evidence Code section 1043 and 1045 affect admissibility as opposed to “discovery and disclosure.” Therefore, all objections based on these statutes are overruled.

Third, the Court reminds Plaintiff that CRC 3.1354 requires written objections to “[s]tate the exhibit, title, page, and line number of the material objected to” and “[q]uote or set forth the objectionable statement or material.” Rule 3.1354 also requires objecting parties to adhere to one of two mandatory formats. Only 4 out of Plaintiff’s 64 objections comply with Rule 3.1354 and “set forth” the evidence that is objected to. This mean that to rule on 60 of Plaintiff’s objections, the Court must sift through each exhibit and anticipate which portions are actually at issue, which is especially arduous and time-consuming since Plaintiff’s stated grounds for objection lack analysis. The Court declines to perform this analysis on Plaintiff’s behalf. Therefore, Objections 5 through 64 are OVERRULED.

Since the Court is only required to rule on objections to evidence deemed material to the disposition of the motion, the Court rules on Plaintiff’s remaining objections as follows:

The Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (“POBRA”), located at Government Code section 3300 et seq., sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded to all peace officers by the agencies that employ them. (Bagett v. Gates (1982)32 Cal.3d 128, 135.) If a violation of POBRA is found, “the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer.” (Gov. Code, § 3309.5, subd. (c).)

Plaintiff alleges various violations of her rights under POBRA and requests “injunction/mandamus relief in the form of [sic] 1) suppression of Plaintiff’s statements and the fruits of said statements; 2) barring use of evidence not properly disclosed and the fruits of said evidence; 3) barring any disciplinary action against Plaintiff; 4) an order upholding the Arbitrator’s award; and/or 5) an order to [City] to modify their policies and practices to conform to the provisions of POBRA as determined by the court.” (FAC, Prayer, ¶ 3.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that her rights under sections 3303, 3304, 3304.5, 3305, 3306, 3306.5, and 3309 were violated as follows:

- Government Code section 3303(c), for allegedly failing to inform Plaintiff of the nature of the investigation;

- Government Code section 3303(h), for allegedly failing to inform Plaintiff of her constitutional rights;

- Government Code sections 3303(g), (l). for allegedly failing to inform Plaintiff of her right to have a representative present or to record the interview;

- Government Code section 3304/3304.5, for deficiencies in the notice of proposed discipline and notice of discipline, failing to provide an administrative appeal in a timely fashion or an unbiased impartial investigation, and violating her due process rights by requiring her to pay half of the cost of the arbitrator and transcripts;

- Government Code sections 3305-3306, for including a disciplinary reprimand in Plaintiff’s personnel file without her knowledge or ability to review/respond to it;

- Government Code section 3306.5, for not allowing Plaintiff to review her personnel files, including the original hard copies, because they were destroyed;

- Government Code section 3309, for searching Plaintiff’s e-mails outside of her presence without: (1) obtaining a search warrant or court order, (2) obtaining her consent, and (3) notifying her.

City argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that any of these violations occurred.

First, City argues that Plaintiff cannot prove a violation of Government Code section 3303(a). Plaintiff alleges that section 3303(a) was violated because the private investigators (referred to as “the Horsemen”) attempted to interrogate her and she was not compensated for her off-duty time. (See FAC, ¶¶ 160-161.) City argues Plaintiff was actually never interrogated and submits excerpts from hearing transcripts with testimony from the Chief of Police, Philip Sanchez (“Chief Sanchez”), who stated that: (1) he was unaware of any secret interview and (2) no interview of Plaintiff by the Horsemen took place. (City Exs. FF, HH.) City also argues that Plaintiff was not entitled to off-duty pay because she was placed on paid administrative leave and served with a leave order on September 10, 2014. (UMF Nos. 21-22.)

Therefore, City shows that Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of section 3303(a).

Second, Plaintiff alleges that City violated her rights pursuant to section 3303(b) because she was not informed of the identities of the officers in charge of the investigation or the interrogating officers. City argues that Plaintiff cannot prove a violation of section 3303(b) and cites to the transcript of an interview conducted on April 22, 2015, in which Lieutenant Kim Smith introduced herself as the officer who would be conducting the interview and also introduced the other officer present, Bill Grisafe. (UMF No. 33; Ex. W, p. AR2698.) This evidence is sufficient for City to show that Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of section 3303(b).

Third, Plaintiff alleges City violated section 3303(c), which provides: “The public safety officer under investigation shall be informed of the nature of the investigation prior to any interrogation.” City argues that Plaintiff was given adequate notice of the nature of the investigation and cites to Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 445, 449 (“Ellins”). In Ellins, an officer was given a notification which stated that “an administrative investigation is currently being conducted regarding an alleged abuse of [his] peace officers powers and duties.” (Ellins, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 450.) The officer retained an attorney and it was agreed that an interview would be conducted. The officer was informed “[j]ust minutes before the interview was to begin” that he was alleged to have inappropriately accessed a police database to obtain information about a former girlfriend and her relatives. (Ibid.) The officer and his counsel requested – and were given – an hour to discuss the charges in private, but 25 minutes after conferring, the officer refused to proceed with the interview. (Ibid.) After continuously refusing to be interviewed, the officer was terminated. The Ellins court concluded that POBRA required “reasonable advance notice” of an interrogation and that those requirements were satisfied. First, the Ellis court found that there was good cause to postpone disclosing the nature of the investigation to the officer to avoid any possibility of retaliation against the ex-girlfriend. Second, the Ellins court noted that the officer was given the amount of time that he requested to consult with his representative but did not use all of it. Third, the Ellins court stated that the officer faced a “sole allegation” that was “straight-forward legally and factually” and found that the time given to the officer was sufficient to allow for “meaningful consultation as to that allegation.”

City argues that here, Plaintiff alleges she was notified of allegations pending against her on April 14, 2015, and the first interview session occurred a week after, on April 22, 2015. (Motion, p. 19; FAC, ¶ 75.) City also cites to the transcript of the interview, in which Lt. Smith stated:

This has to do with the interaction between her [Plaintiff] and her physicians with regard to a January 2012 incident where she fell down the stairs that resulted in a surgery, and then there’s an incident, uh, that occurred in 2013, when she was in an on duty car accident, and you wanna talk about that traffic accident in relationship to events that occurred on July 15, 2014.

(Ex. W, p. AR2699.) City also argues that Plaintiff had sufficient notice because Lt. Smith testified later at an arbitration proceeding that “there was a discussion prior to the interview about what the allegations [against Plaintiff] were.” (Ex. VV.) Lt. Smith said, “Prior to the interview starting on the recording, Mr. Shinee [Plaintiff’s counsel at the interview] had several questions for me. I answered all of those questions. I remember our conversation. I don’t remember what specific questions or any details about the conversation.” (Ex. WW.)

The Court separately notes that City cites to its Exhibit D, which is not the April 14, 2015, notice, but a different Notice of Proposed Discipline dated September 22, 2015. Nevertheless, a memorandum dated April 14, 2015, is attached to Exhibit L, p. AR1060, and it states:

This notice is to advise you that you are a subject of an Internal Affairs Investigation. It is alleged that you misrepresented or gave misleading statements pertaining to a worker’s compensation claim.

It is further alleged that you participated in conduct which any employee knows or reasonably should know is unbecoming a member of the department or which is contrary to good order, efficiency or morale, or which tends to reflect unfavorably upon the department or its members.

Further, it is alleged that you initiated civil action for recovery of damages or injuries incurred in the course and scope of employment without first notifying the Chief of Police of such action.

Should these allegations be true, they would be a violation of the Pasadena Police Department policies listed below and you may be subject to discipline for your conduct.

The memorandum goes on to identify Policy 340.3.2 (b), 340.3.5 (p) and 340.3.5.(aa). It also advises Plaintiff that she has the right to have a representative of her choice present during the interview. The interview was conducted a week later on April 22, 20215.

As for the second interview, held on July 1, 2015, Lt. Smith testified (and the interview transcript shows) that she informed Plaintiff there would be “an additional charge, a violation of a misdemeanor and/or felony statute.” (Exs. Y, FFF.) A memorandum dated May 20, 2015, noted this additional allegation and identified the corresponding policy as Policy 340.3.5.(z). (Ex. BB.)

In total, City produces sufficient evidence to show that “reasonable advance notice” of the nature of the investigation was provided to Plaintiff prior to the April 15, 2022, interview, and that Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of section 3303(c).

Fourth, City persuasively argues that Plaintiff cannot show a violation of 3303(g), (h), and (i).

- Section 3303(g) allows the officer to have access to a tape recording of the interrogation “if any further proceedings are contemplated or prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time.” The officer is also entitled to “a transcribed copy of any notes made by a stenographer or to any reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons, except those which are deemed by the investigating agency to be confidential.” The officer also has “the right to bring his or her own recording device and record any and all aspects of the interrogation.” Lt. Smith testified that she sent a copy of the audio recording and transcript of the first interview session to Plaintiff before the start of the second session. (Ex. DDD.)

- Section 3303 (h) provides, “If prior to or during the interrogation of a public safety officer it is deemed that he or she may be charged with a criminal offense, he or she shall be immediately informed of his or her constitutional rights.” Plaintiff’s counsel, Corey Glave, stated at a later hearing that there was no dispute that after the recorders went on that Plaintiff was read her Constitutional rights and Lybarger order. (EX. BBB). City also attaches a signed admonition form dated April 22, 2015. (Ex. L, AR1061.)

- Section 3303(i) states, “Upon the filing of a formal written statement of charges, or whenever an interrogation focuses on matters that are likely to result in punitive action against any public safety officer, that officer, at his or her request, shall have the right to be represented by a representative of his or her choice who may be present at all times during the interrogation.” Here, Lt. Smith testified that Plaintiff was represented by Mr. Shinee during both interviews held on April 22, 2015, and July 1, 2015. (Ex. TT.)

Fifth, Plaintiff alleges that City violated section 3304 because it was required to issue its Notice of Proposed Discipline no later than December 2014. (FAC, ¶ 173.)

Except as provided in this subdivision and subdivision (g), no punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken for any act, omission, or other allegation of misconduct if the investigation of the allegation is not completed within one year of the public agency's discovery by a person authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation of an act, omission, or other misconduct. . . . In the event that the public agency determines that discipline may be taken, it shall complete its investigation and notify the public safety officer of its proposed discipline by a Letter of Intent or Notice of Adverse Action articulating the discipline that year, except as provided in paragraph (2).

Subsection (d)(2), in turn, provides for an exception to the one-year period for investigations involving allegations of workers’ compensation fraud. (Gov. Code, § 3304, subd. (d)(2)(H).) It also tolls the period while any allegation of misconduct is also the subject of a criminal investigation or criminal prosecution. (Id., subd. (d)(2)(A).)

City argues that the Notice of Proposed Discipline was timely issued on September 30, 2015, because the one-year limitation was tolled while the criminal investigation of Plaintiff was pending and the one-year period did not apply since Plaintiff was being investigated for worker’s compensation fraud. (Motion, p. 21; Gov. Code, § 3304, subd. (d)(2)(A), (d)(2)(H).) However, the Notice of Proposed Discipline also includes an allegation (specifically, Allegation #3) that Plaintiff initiated a civil action for the recovery of damages or injuries incurred in the course and scope of employment without first notifying the Chief of Police of such action. (Ex. F, AR 0010.) Plaintiff alleges in her FAC that the Chief of Police was aware of this lawsuit in November/December 2013 because City filed an ex parte application to intervene in that suit. (FAC, ¶ 125.) City does not address when it first discovered Plaintiff’s lawsuit or whether the Notice of Proposed Discipline was timely with respect to that particular allegation; therefore, City fails to meet its burden to show that Plaintiff cannot prove a violation of section 3304.

The Court also notes that Plaintiff alleged the Notice of Proposed Discipline violated section 3304.5 because it did not provide sufficient detail to identify dates, times, places, and specific acts as required by the Police Department’s Manual of Personnel Rules, Practices and Procedures (“Manual”). (FAC, ¶ 166.) City only argues that Plaintiff “received all the information she needed and was entitled to on or around September 30, 2015.” (Motion, pp. 20-21.) City emphasizes that the Notice of Proposed Discipline was served on Plaintiff along with a 38-page long cover letter (“Executive Summary”) from the IA investigation. (Id; see Ex. M.) It is this Executive Summary that includes a “detailed chronology” including the numerous dates, times, locations, and actions at issue. The Notice of Proposed Discipline itself, attached as Ex. D, clearly does not include any of this information. Accordingly, City has not shown that Plaintiff cannot prove a violation of section 3304.5.

Since City has not shown that Plaintiff’s entire cause of action fails, the Court need not address the remaining alleged POBRA violations (including the allegedly improper delegation of authority to Perera or the appearance of bias) because a motion for summary adjudication “shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for
damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) To the extent that City wished for the Court to summarily adjudicate its obligations under each section (or subsection) of POBRA as separate issues, City did not identify them in its notice of motion or separate statement. (See Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1854-1855 [party may present motion for summary adjudication challenging separate and distinct wrongful act as separate issues].)

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED and the motion for summary adjudication of Issue #1 is DENIED.

Plaintiff’s second cause of action seeks a writ of mandate overturning Perera’s decision, reinstating her employment, and enforcing the arbitrator’s award which found various violations of POBRA. (FAC, ¶¶ 198-199.) Plaintiff’s third cause of action is for due process violations.

City moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action through Issues #2 and #5, which argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit. City cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 which allows a court to conduct a writ review of any “final administrative order or decision.” City argues that the City Manager’s designee, Perera, did not issue a final order or decision because it “expressly leaves the issue of her employment status for future consideration.” (Motion, p. 24.) City emphasizes that the decision stated: “For the reasons set forth below, . . . the matter shall be and hereby is remanded to the parties for a determination of the merits of the allegations upon which Officer Robison was terminated.”

At the hearing, City addressed the second page of Perera’s decision, which states:

“Judicial review of this decision may be obtained by way of a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 and must be filed in Superior Court within 90 days pursuant to section 1094.6 of that Code.”

(Ex. Z, p. AR0689.) Although the decision specifically required Plaintiff to file a petition for writ of mandate within 90 days, defense counsel stated that this was simply “stock language that was included in the final order of remand that probably shouldn’t have been, but that’s essentially, doesn’t really kind of move the needle one way or the other, because at the end of the day, what the specific order was for the parties to go back to the arbitrator fully litigating the case of the merits so they can make a full decision, which would ultimately be subject to the 90-day requirement of the 1094.5.” (Hearing Transcript, 10:47- 11:17.)

The Court first considers that section 3309.5 provides that “[t]he superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter [POBRA].” (Gov. Code § 3309.5, subd. (c).) Section 3309.5 was “specifically designed to allow an officer to pursue a remedy immediately in the courts for violation of [the rights set forth in POBRA] during the investigation and not be required to wait for judicial review after administrative consideration of those violations.” (Mounger v. Gates (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1248, 1256.) In Mounger, a sergeant in the Los Angeles Police Department, who was the subject of an investigation for misconduct, was disciplined and he filed an administrative appeal. While the administrative appeal was pending, the sergeant filed a court action alleging violations of POBRA seeking declaratory relief and an injunction. The Mounger court held that the plaintiff could pursue, simultaneously, his administrative appeal from the discipline imposed, as well as judicial relief pursuant to section 3309.5. (Mounger, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1256-1257.) The Mounger court further explained that Government Code section 3309.5 granted the court initial jurisdiction to evaluate whether POBRA rights have been violated and to grant extraordinary relief; therefore, it eliminates the requirement that peace officers must exhaust their administrative remedies for alleged violations of POBRA before seeking judicial relief. (Mounger, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 1256.)

Subsequently, in Gales v. Superior Court (1996), 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, the Second Appellate District explored whether an officer could file a section 3309.5 action after a final administrative decision had been issued. (Id. at p. 1603.) Importantly, the Gales court distinguished a 3309.5 action from a mandamus action stating, “[T]he review contemplated under section 3309.5 is limited to whether the employer violated an officer’s rights under the Act” while “a mandamus action … contemplates a review of . . . the validity of the final administrative decision made by the employer.” (Id. at p. 1602-1603. After discussing Mounger, the Gales court concluded that to challenge a final administrative decision, an officer was required to file a mandamus petition and was also permitted to file a concurrent 3309.5 action; the court also acknowledged that these actions “will, of course, overlap, and consolidation will undoubtedly be required” because “issues decided in one action will be binding in the other.” (Ibid.)

Turning to the facts before the Court, it appears that Plaintiff’s “petition for writ of mandate” requests the Court evaluate whether Perera abused her discretion in rejecting the arbitrator’s findings of POBRA violations and the arbitrator’s suggested remedy for those violations: dismissal and reinstatement. (Def.’s Ex. Z, p. 238 of Compendium of Exhibits.) Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking judicial review of those alleged violations and a determination of an appropriate remedy for those violations, this would form the basis of a section 3309.5 action, not a writ petition.

The Court also agrees with City that Perera’s order to remand after rejecting the arbitrator’s advisory opinion does not constitute a “final administrative decision.” “A decision attains the requisite administrative finality when the agency has exhausted its jurisdiction and possesses no further power to reconsider or rehear the claim.” (AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. State Dept. of Health Care Services (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1337–1338 [citations omitted].) Since Perera’s decision remanded the matter back to the parties, it was not “final.” Accordingly, Plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies by obtaining a final decision on the merits.

In opposition, Plaintiff argued in her brief and at the hearing that the arbitrator’s decision was not appropriately acted on within 30 days and should be considered the final decision. This argument lacks merit because although the Memorandum of Understanding does not mention delegation of the Municipal Employee Relations Officer’s duties, the Manual of Personnel & Administrative Rules provides that the MOU shall take precedence of the Manual of Personnel & Administrative Rules “if there is any conflict” between them. (Def’s Ex. P, p. 124 of PDF.) The MOU is silent on the issue of delegation and only provides that the municipal employee relations officer must advise the employee within 30 days’ of receipt of the advisory opinion whether further action regarding the issues referred to in the advisory opinion will be taken. (Def.’s Ex. CC, p. 284 of PDF.) Therefore, the Manual’s rules, which allow the Municipal Employee Relations Officer to delegate powers or duties to any management employee, apply. (Def.’s Ex. P, p. 125 of PDF.)

Therefore, the motion for summary adjudication of Issue Nos. 2 and 5 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is GRANTED. Since the Court GRANTS summary adjudication of the Second and Third Causes of Action on this basis, the Court declines to address Issue Nos. 3 and 4.

In light of the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED as to the Second and Third Causes of Action.

Accordingly, the Court sets a trial setting conference on the remaining POBRA claims for __________ in Department 3 of the Alhambra Courthouse.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.