Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22AHCV00330, Date: 2023-07-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22AHCV00330 Hearing Date: July 21, 2023 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 3, 2022, Primerica Life
Insurance Company (“Primerica”) filed a complaint-in-interpleader naming Perla
Ragos Joyce (“Perla”) and Latoya Joyce (“Latoya”) as defendants-in-interpleader
(Perla and Latoya are referred to by their first names only to avoid confusion). Primerica alleges that in or about July 2012,
it issued a term life insurance policy, Policy Number 0489317355, (“Policy”) to
Jimmie Ishan Joyce (“Jimmie”). The Policy
provided for a payment of a death benefit in the amount of $50,000 to Jimmie’s
designated beneficiary or beneficiaries.
Jimmie’s application for the Policy designated his daughter, Latoya, as
the Policy’s sole beneficiary. On or
about January 31, 2013, Jimmie submitted a document called a Multipurpose
Change Form (“Form”) which revoked his previous beneficiary designations and
designated Perla as the sole beneficiary.
Perla submitted a claim for the death benefit and Latoya contested the
validity of the Form, claiming, among other things, that the Form was submitted
when Jimmie was “heavily medicated and mentally diminished and without
capacity.” Due to these competing
claims, Primerica filed this interpleader action to determine to whom the death
benefit from the Policy should be paid.
The interpleader proceeding is
traditionally viewed as two lawsuits in one. The first dispute is between the
stakeholder and the claimants to determine the right to interplead the funds;
the second dispute to be resolved is who is to receive the interpleaded funds.
(San Francisco Savings Union v. Long (1898) 123 Cal. 107, 109; State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 612; Lincoln
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 16, 19.) Thus,
an interpleader action follows a two-step process. First, the court determines
if the plaintiff may bring the suit and force the claimants to interplead. (City
of Morgan Hill v. Brown (1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 1114.) If the court finds
the plaintiff has a right to do so, the court enters an interlocutory decree
requiring the remaining parties to litigate their claims among themselves. (Dial
800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal. App. 4th 32.) The order thereby preserves
the fund, discharges the stakeholder from further liability, and keeps the fund
in the court’s custody until the rights of the potential claimants of the
monies can be adjudicated. (Id.)
On July 20, 2022, Perla filed an answer
to the complaint which asserted her right to the Funds and claims against
Primerica. Primerica deposited $51,684.93
(the “Funds”) with the Court on August 15, 2022. On October 31, 2022, Primerica filed an
acknowledgement of receipt executed by Latoya on October 26, 2022, showing that
Latoya received a copy of the summons, complaint, and Perla’s answer. Neither Perla nor Latoya have disputed
Primerica’s right to interplead the Funds and Primerica’s role as a mere
stakeholder. Therefore, the Court first discharges
Primerica from the action before proceeding to adjudicate Perla and Latoya’s
claims to the Funds.
On April 28, 2023, Perla filed a motion
for summary judgment on all claims and causes of action alleged by Latoya for the
Funds. In the alternative, Perla seeks summary
adjudication.
On May 19, 2023, Perla filed a motion
for terminating and issue sanctions against Latoya requesting that the Court
enter a default judgment against Latoya after Latoya failed to serve discovery
responses as previously ordered.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“The purpose of the law of summary
judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’
pleadings in order to determine whether . . . trial is in fact necessary to resolve
their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl.
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “The court must grant the motion
if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact.” (Ibid. [internal quotation marks omitted].)
III. DISCUSSION
Perla argues that there is no dispute
of material fact as to who the beneficiary of Jimmie’s Policy should be. She introduces two “Multipurpose Change
Forms” that Jimmie executed on January 31, 2013, and July 22, 2015, and an
internal note between Primerica’s employees documenting a conversation with
Jimmie. (McFee Decl., Exs. 6-8.) She argues that these forms and documentation
confirm that Jimmie intended to – and did -- designate her as his beneficiary. (McFee Decl., Exs. 6-7.) Perla declares she was not involved with the
preparation or signing of either form designating her as a beneficiary. (Perla Decl., ¶ 8.)
Perla also argues that there is no evidence
behind Latoya’s claim that Jimmie was mentally incapacitated. On February 17, 2021, Primerica asked Latoya to
submit any court documents or medical records showing undue influence or mental
incapacity. (UMF No. 9, McFee Decl., Ex.
3.) Latoya provided documents on March
8, 2021, but Primerica determined that none of these documents relate to or
support her claim that Jimmie lacked capacity or that Perla exercised undue
influence when Jimmie executed the beneficiary change forms. (McFee Decl., Exs. 12-13.) The Court has reviewed the documents Latoya
submitted and agrees with Primerica’s conclusion. Latoya provided copies of her driver’s
license and social security card, Jimmie’s death benefit, an affidavit of collection
of Jimmie’s personal property, her birth certificate, her mother’s death
certificate, and billing records for Jimmie’s medical services received after
2015. (UMF No. 10.) These documents do not bear on the validity
of the beneficiary designations and the medical records relate to services
provided after the Jimmie executed the second beneficiary change form in
2015.
Perla also declares that she never
noticed any mental incapacity during her marriage to Jimmie or at any point
during their friendship. (Perla Decl.,
¶¶ 4-5.) Perla also states that while
Jimmie resided at Live Oak Rehab Center, his medical records do not reflect any
sign of incapacity and he was given permission to leave the facility at any
time. (Perla Decl., Exs. 1-2.)
Perla has established that she is the
proper recipient of the Funds. Latoya
did not appear to make a competing claim, nor did she oppose Perla’s motion to
raise a triable issue of material fact. Therefore,
the Funds, along with any accrued interest, should be distributed to Perla.
IV. CONCLUSION
Primerica is discharged from further
liability and dismissed from the action.
Perla’s motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED. Because the Court grants
Perla’s motion for summary judgment, her motion for terminating sanctions is moot
and taken off calendar.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Clerk of
the Court pay to Perla Ragos Joyce, in care of her counsel Ryan K. Yagura, 1104
Lorain Road, San Marino CA 91108, her claim in the amount of $51,684.93.
Dated
this
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William A.
Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court |
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org.
Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to
appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the
hearing and argue the matter. Unless you
receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume
that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the
parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.