Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22AHCV00376, Date: 2023-01-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV00376    Hearing Date: January 19, 2023    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT

I.         BACKGROUND

On July 17, 2022, plaintiff Yong Wu (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against defendants Mega Bank, Julian Fong, and Shirley Fu-Chang (“Defendants”), asserting causes of action for: (1) retaliation/harassment; (2) discrimination on the basis of age; (3) discrimination on the basis of disability; (4) hostile work environment; (5) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and/or retention; (6) defamation—libel and slander; and (7) unfair business practices.

On September 2, 2022, the Court granted Defendants’ special motion to strike paragraphs 43, 59(b), 65(e), 75(e), 84(b), and the sixth cause of action for defamation—libel and slander from Plaintiff’s complaint.

On November 1, 2022, Defendants filed this motion for $115,103.20 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c)(1). On January 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On January 11, 2023, Defendants filed a reply along with evidentiary objections

II.        EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Defendants raise nine objections to the declaration of Claire Espina. The Court rules as follows:

          Objections 1-7 are sustained.

          Objections 8-9 are overruled.

III.      LEGAL STANDARD

“[A] prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(c)(1); see Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131 [“Thus, under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c), any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees.”].)

“Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 permits the use of the so-called lodestar adjustment method under our long-standing precedents…” (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1131.) “Under the lodestar method, the trial court ‘tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.’” [Citation.] (Frym v. 601 Main Street LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 613, 621.) “The lodestar figure ‘may be increased or decreased depending on a variety of factors, including the contingent nature of the fee award.’ [Citation.] Indeed, the trial court has discretion to determine the amount of reasonable fees to award based on ‘a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. [Citation.] The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.’ [Citation.] (Ibid.)

IV.      DISCUSSION

           Defendants argue they are entitled to $115,103.20 in attorney’s fees as the prevailing party to their special motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s original complaint. Plaintiff acknowledges that in general parties who prevail on a special motion to strike are entitled to their attorney’s fees. However, Plaintiff argues in this case that Defendants’ requested fees are patently excessive and therefore the Court should outright deny or substantially reduce Defendants’ request.

The Court finds that Defendants are entitled to attorney's fees but that their request is excessive. Using the lodestar method, the Court starts by determining the appropriate hourly rate. “The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom, and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436-437 [internal citations omitted].)

Defendants seek fees for three attorneys: Keith Fink, Sarah Hernandez, and Olaf Muller. Defendants seek $997 per hour for Fink and Hernandez, and $829 per hour for Muller. In support, Defendants offer declarations from each attorney describing their qualifications and experience. (Fink Decl., ¶¶ 10-11; Hernandez Decl., ¶¶ 12-13; Muller Decl., ¶¶ 15-16.) But notably, Muller is the SLAPP-expert to whom principal attorney Fink and Defendants turned to prepare the motion. The Court thus finds Muller’s hourly rate – instead of Fink’s and Hernandez’s rates – is the more appropriate reasonable hourly rate to apply to this matter. Muller’s rate is $829 per hour, which the Court applies in its lodestar calculation.

The Court’s next step under the lodestar method is to determine whether the hours billed by Defendants’ counsel are reasonable. “[A]s the parties seeking fees and costs, defendants ‘bear[ ] the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.’ [Citation.]” (569 East County Boulevard LLC, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at 432.) Trial courts may reduce the award where the fee request appears unreasonably inflated, such as where the attorneys’ efforts are duplicative. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635, fn. 21.) Finally, parties entitled to SLAPP fees likewise are entitled to fees and costs relating to the fees motion itself. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1141.)

Fink states he spent 58 hours on Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and 3.5 hours (2.5 hours expended thus far and 1.0 hours anticipated) on this motion for attorneys’ fees. (Fink Decl., ¶¶ 14-15.) Hernandez states she spent 22.6 hours on Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and 1 hour on this motion for attorneys’ fees. (Hernandez Decl., ¶¶ 19-20.) Muller states he spent 28 hours on Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and 8.5 hours on this motion for attorneys’ fees. (Muller Decl., ¶¶ 20-21.) In total, Defendants seek reimbursement for 108.6 hours related to their anti-SLAPP motion and 13 hours related to this motion for attorneys’ fees.

Turning first to the hours billed for the motion to strike, the Court finds 108.6 hours is excessive.  Although Defendants offer a detailed narrative of their attorneys’ preparation of the anti-SLAPP motion, counsel do not explain how much time was spent on each task. In addition, Defendants do not explain why this anti-SLAPP motion was so time consuming given its similarity to anti-SLAPP motions counsel have filed in related matters. Put simply, Defendants cannot justify their attorneys spending 108.6 hours on this anti-SLAPP motion specifically. Because the motion to strike was not unusually complicated legally or factually, the Court finds that one work-week calculated at eight billable hours per day for five days – not two-and-a-half weeks of attorney time working 8 hours per day (108.6 ÷ 8 = 13.575 days) – was a reasonable amount of time to prepare the motion to strike. Thus, the Court awards Defendants $33,160 (40 hours x $829/hour) as a reasonable fee award for the motion to strike itself.

As for the motion for attorney’s fees, the Court finds that the motion is a straightforward request involving no unusual legal or factual issues. The Court finds that 13 hours (8.5 + 3.5 + 1.0 for Muller’s, Fink’s, and Hernandez’s time, respectively) is a reasonable amount of time to have prepared the motion. However, an attorney less experienced (and thus less expensive) could have handled the fee motion at an hourly rate less than Fink’s and Hernandez’s $997 per hour and Muller’s $829 per hour. Accordingly, the Court reduces for the fee motion the lodestar hourly rate based on its familiarity with hourly rates in the relevant market to $600 per hour. Thus, the Court awards Defendants $7,800 (17 hours x $600/hour) for the fee motion itself.

V.        CONCLUSION

          Defendants Mega Bank, Julian Fong, and Shirley Fu-Chang’s motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $40,960.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at alhdept3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.