Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22AHCV00547, Date: 2023-03-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV00547    Hearing Date: March 28, 2023    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT

I.            INTRODUCTION

On August 4, 2022, plaintiff Dora Rivas (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Artisan Glass & Design (“Artisan Glass”), Renee Heston (“Heston”), Tom Garlock (“Garlock”), Angela Serranzana (“Serranzana”), and Hackler, Flynn & Associates, A.P.C. (“Hackler Flynn”) alleging contractual fraud involving a purported settlement agreement in a wrongful termination action pending in Orange County Superior Court, captioned Rivas v. Artisan Glass and Design, Inc. (Case No. 30-2021-01181131-CU-WT-CJC). 

On September 16, 2022, defendants Serranzana and Hackler Flynn filed an anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that their alleged conduct was protected by the litigation privilege.  The motion was scheduled to be heard on December 30, 2022. 

On September 20, 2022, Artisan Glass, Heston, and Garlock filed an anti-SLAPP motion on the same grounds. This motion was granted on December 6, 2022 by the Honorable Colin P. Leis.  Judge Leis ordered Plaintiff to pay $8,662.50 within 30 days for fees (based on 17.9 hours at an hourly rate of $495) and ordered Plaintiff to also pay $1,467 for costs incurred. 

On December 16, 2022, Plaintiff dismissed Serranzana and Hackler Flynn. On December 30, 2022, which was the original hearing date for Serranzana and Hackler Flynn’s anti-SLAPP motion, Judge Leis continued the hearing to April 19, 2023, and ruled that the anti-SLAPP motion would be advanced to the hearing date for any motion for attorneys’ fees. 

On January 26, 2023, Serranzana and Hackler Flynn filed this motion for attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff filed an opposition brief on March 14, 2023.  Serranzana and Hackler Flynn filed a reply brief on March 21, 2023. 

Serranzana and Hackler Flynn request $33,103.90 in fees plus $930 in costs for the anti-SLAPP motion, in addition to any fees and costs incurred in connection with this motion.  Plaintiff argues that this amount should be reduced to no more than $4,000 in fees and costs. 

II.          DISCUSSION

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c) authorizes the court to make an award of reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing defendant, which will adequately compensate the defendant for the expense of responding to a baseless lawsuit.  (Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785.)  An award of attorney fees to a prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion is mandatory. (Marshall v. Webster (2020) 54 Cal. App. 5th 275, 285, rev. denied (Dec. 23, 2020).) 

“[T]he starting point of every fee award ... must be a calculation of the attorney's services in terms of the time he has expended on the case. Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.”  In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1058 [quoting Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 322]).  Furthermore, in Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833, the Court of Appeal stated:  “[T]he primary method for establishing the amount of ‘reasonable’ attorney fees is the lodestar method. The lodestar (or touchstone) is produced by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate.”  Under this approach, a base amount is calculated from a compilation of time reasonably spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney.  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48.)  “’[P]adding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.”  (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 556.)  Parties opposing motions for attorneys' fees fail to show any abuse of discretion where they merely contend that amounts of attorneys' fees are excessive without providing an analysis or factual support.  (Villanueva v. City of Colton (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1204 [opposing party “offered no evidence of any kind which might have warranted a reduced fee award.”])  

The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134.)  “The basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time.”  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.)  Trial courts properly may use equitable considerations to reduce the lodestar amount of attorney fees, including on the basis that certain fees were unnecessary.  (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitlerz (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 778.)   

Here, it is undisputed that Serranzana and Hackler Flynn are entitled to fees; Plaintiff only challenges the amount sought as duplicative and excessive.  Daniel W. Hager and Kyle Montes de Oca each submit declarations describing the work performed in connection with the anti-SLAPP motion as well as this motion for fees.  Mr. Hager attaches a matrix of hourly rates (“Laffey Matrix”) prepared by the Civil Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia to evaluate requests for attorney’s fees in civil cases in District of Columbia courts, as well as other charts providing for increased cost-of-living expenses in the D.C. and Los Angeles areas.  (Hager Decl., Ex. A.)  Mr. Hager and Mr. Montes de Oca each declare that that under the Laffey Matrix and a cost-of-living rate adjustment of 8.6%, Mr. Hager’s hourly rate of $722 is reasonable based on his 37 years of experience as a civil litigator in California specializing in the defense of lawyers.  (Hager Decl., ¶ 34; Montes de Oca Decl., 13; Memo., 14:10-24.)  They also declare that an hourly rate of $452 or $532 (depending on whether the work was done before or after December 1, 2022) accurately reflects the reasonable fair market rates for a lawyer with Mr. Montes de Oca’s education and experience, namely 11 years of civil litigation experience with a dominant focus in professional liability for lawyers.  (Hager Decl., ¶ 35; Montes de Oca Decl., ¶ 14.) 

          According to the supporting papers, Mr. Hager spent 12.9 hours on the anti-SLAPP motion and 26.6 hours on this motion for attorneys’ fees, while Mr. Montes de Oca spent 5.1 hours on the anti-SLAPP motion and 3.6 hours on this motion for attorneys’ fees.  The amount of time Mr. Hager claims he spent drafting this motion for fees (22.2 hours) is excessive, especially given the fact that this motion is essentially duplicative of the earlier anti-SLAPP motion (and even identical in some places) and does not address any novel legal issues.  In fact, Serranzana and Hackler Flynn even concede in their motion that this is a “textbook SLAPP suit.”  (Motion, 2:7.)  Furthermore, the request for fees is excessive given Mr. Hager’s self-proclaimed extensive experience with anti-SLAPP motions and the recovery of attorneys’ fees.  For example, Hager claims to have spent 4.4 hours analyzing the fees and costs for this motion, including the determination of current Laffey matrix hourly rates, and 1.8 hours for legal research for the fee motion after Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal.  These tasks should not have taken an experienced specialist practitioner this long to complete or, in the alternative, they should have been delegated to Mr. Monte de Oca or another attorney with a lower billing rate. 

          Accordingly, using the lodestar method, the Court calculates an award of $17,216.40 based on 18 hours at a reasonable hourly rate of $722 for Mr. Hager, 5.1 hours at a reasonable hourly rate of $452 for Mr. Montes de Oca’s work performed before December 1, 2022, and 3.6 hours at a reasonable hourly rate of $532 for Mr. Montes de Oca’s work performed after December 1, 2022.  The Court also awards costs in the amount of $930 as requested, consisting of 2 first appearance fees of $435 and a filing fee of $60 for the anti-SLAPP motion.

III.        CONCLUSION

The motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff is ordered to pay counsel for Serranzana and Hackler Flynn $18,146.40 for fees and costs within 30 days of the date of this order.   

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Dated this 28th day of March, 2023