Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22AHCV00722, Date: 2023-05-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22AHCV00722 Hearing Date: May 16, 2023 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
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Plaintiff(s), vs. Defendant(s). |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: Dept.
3 May
16, 2023 |
I.
INTRODUCTION
On September 26, 2022, Plaintiffs
James Whitey and Southwest Concrete Structures, Inc. (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”)
asserting claims for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and
fraudulent concealment. On January 17,
2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging that
they purchased a 2020 GMC Sierra (the “Subject Vehicle”) on October 22,
2020. (FAC, ¶ 4.)
On March 20, 2023,
Defendant filed this demurrer and motion to strike. Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause
of action for fraud on the grounds that it “fails to state facts relevant to
the elements of the claim, and therefore does not constitute an action” and
“fails to allege a transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to
disclose.” (Demurrer, p. 2.) Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiffs’
claim for punitive damages.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency
of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on
its face.¿(City
of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material
facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact
or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and
also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.]”
(Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th
1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123
Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true,
however improbable they may be”].) Allegations are to be liberally
construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) A demurrer may be brought if
insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)
Any party, within the time allowed to
respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole
or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The
court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it
deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any
pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz
(1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the
claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or
disregarded”].) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading
not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order
of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or
irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim
or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient
claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by
the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd.
(b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the
pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Meet and Confer
Defendant claims that it made a good
faith effort to meet and confer with Plaintiffs but was unsuccessful. (Declaration of Jesse Valencia, ¶ 2.) This claim is contested by Plaintiffs’
counsel, Siyun Yang, who declares that defense counsel failed to contact her
office or provide the legal reasoning underlying this demurrer and motion to
strike. (Yang Decl., ¶¶ 4.)
“A determination by the court that the
meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or
sustain a demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
430.41, subd. (a)(4).) Therefore, the
Court proceeds to analyze the demurrer and motion on its merits.
B.
Demurrer
1.
Pleading
with Specificity
Defendant claims that Plaintiffs fail
to plead with specificity the representations that they relied on in purchasing
the vehicle. (Demurrer, p. 7.) The
rule of specifically pleading how, when, where, to whom and by what means,
misrepresentations were communicated is intended to apply to affirmative
misrepresentations and not to concealment, as is the allegation here. (Alfaro
v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn, Inc. (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 1356 at 1384.) “The requirement of specificity is relaxed
when the allegations indicate that ‘the defendant must necessarily possess full
information concerning the facts of the controversy.” (Tarmann v. State Farm
(1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 58.)
Therefore,
Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is overruled.
2.
Duty
to Disclose
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot
prove that there was a duty to disclose because a duty to disclose cannot arise
between a defendant and the public at large. (Defendant pp. 8-9.) When
any claim for fraud is based on an omission, one of the following four
circumstances must apply in order to establish the defendant’s duty to disclose
information to the plaintiff: (1) the defendant is the plaintiff’s fiduciary;
(2) the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known or
reasonably accessible to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively conceals a
material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant makes partial
representations that are misleading because some other material fact has not
been disclosed. (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326,
336.)
In Bigler-Engle v. Breg, Inc.
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, on which Defendant relies, the court of appeal
reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on a claim for intentional
concealment on the grounds that there was no “transaction” arising from direct
dealings between the plaintiff and defendant manufacturer of a medical
device. However, there was no evidence in Bigler that the device
manufacturer “directly advertised its products to consumers” whereas
here, Plaintiffs allege that they interacted with Defendant’s sales
representatives and materials distributed by Defendant. (FAC, ¶ 137.)
Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer on
this ground is also overruled. C. Motion to Strike
Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s
prayer for punitive damages on the grounds that Plaintiffs fail to plead facts
with requisite specificity to support punitive damages claim.
Punitive damages are allowed in
non-contract cases when a defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice
. . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294.) Here, because Plaintiffs have alleged a viable
fraud claim, they have pleaded fraud for the purposes of entitlement to
punitive damages under Civil Code § 3294.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendant’s demurrer is
OVERRULED.
Defendant’s motion to strike is
DENIED.
Moving party to give notice.
Dated
this
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William A.
Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court |
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org.
Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear
at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and
argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If
the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on
this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court
may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the
motion off calendar.