Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22AHCV00922, Date: 2023-09-15 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22AHCV00922    Hearing Date: January 30, 2024    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT

 

WILLIAM HENRY MEURER,

                   Plaintiff(s),

          vs.

 

QINPEI LI,

 

                   Defendant(s).

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     CASE NO.:  22AHCV00922

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT  

 

Dept. 3

8:30 a.m.

January 30, 2024

 

I.            INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff William Henry Meurer (“Plaintiff”) seeks a partition by sale of real property located at 1109 Avon Place in South Pasadena, California (the “Property”).  The Property is allegedly held equally as joint tenants by Plaintiff and defendant Qinpei Li (“Defendant”).  Plaintiff alleges Defendant, who is the tenant-in-possession, refuses to voluntarily sell the Property or buy out his interest in the Property.

 

On September 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. 

On January 16, 2024, Defendant filed her opposition brief and supporting papers.

No reply papers are on file.

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

When a plaintiff moves for summary judgment, they must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts proving the essential elements of a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

III.        Discussion

“A partition action may be commenced and maintained by … an owner of an estate for life. . . in real property where such property or estate therein is owned by several persons concurrently or in successive estates.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 872.210, subd. (a).) “If the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to partition, it shall make an interlocutory judgment that determines the interests of the parties in the property and orders the partition of the property and, unless it is to be later determined, the manner of partition.” (Id., § 872.810.) “Notwithstanding¿Section 872.810, the court shall order that the property be sold and the proceeds be divided among the parties in accordance with their interests in the property as determined in the interlocutory judgment in the following situations: (a) The parties agree to such relief, by their pleadings or otherwise. (b) The court determines that, under the circumstances, sale and division of the proceeds would be more equitable¿than division of the property. For the purpose of making the determination, the court may appoint a¿referee and take into account [the referee’s]¿report.” (Code Civ.Proc. § 872.820.)¿

The co-owner of a property has “an absolute right to partition unless barred by a valid waiver.” (LEG Investments v.¿Boxler¿(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 484, 493.) “In many modern transactions, sale of the property is preferable to physical division since the value of the divided parcels frequently will not equal the value of the whole parcel before division. Moreover, physical division may be impossible due to zoning restrictions or may be highly impractical, particularly in the case of urban property.” (Butte Creek Island Ranch v. Crim¿(1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 360, 365.) However, the party seeking partition still has the burden to show that the sale and division of the proceeds is “more equitable” than a physical division. (Ibd.)

¿The judgment of partition is left to the discretion of the trial court and the determination of whether partition by sale is more equitable than physical division requires a factual inquiry by the court. (See¿Richmond v.¿Dofflemyer¿(1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 745, 758-59, 765-66;¿Formosa Corp. v. Rogers¿(1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 397, 411-12 [abuse of discretion standard applied under prior version of partition law requiring showing of “great prejudice” for finding of partition by sale.]) This is because “a partition suit is in equity” and “a court of equity has broad powers and comparatively unlimited discretion to apply.” (Richmond, 105 Cal.App.3d at p. 758;¿Cunningham v.¿Frymire¿(1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 726, 729 [the trial court’s decision will not be disturbed “if there is any substantial evidence” in support and an appellate court will not weigh questions of fact determined by the trial court in a partition action.])

Plaintiff presents evidence that they are entitled to a partition by sale. Plaintiff declares Plaintiff and Defendant are co-owners of the Property.  (UMF Nos. 1-3.) Plaintiff has a 50% interest in the Property and Defendant also has a 50% in the Property. (UMF Nos. 1-3) Plaintiff declares that the Property is a single-family residence in a South Pasadena subdivision and that partition by appraisal is not possible. (UMF Nos. 4-6.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff lost his interest in the Property and that she became the sole owner through adverse possession when she built a fence around the Property and changed the locks. (Li Decl., ¶ 3.) Defendant states she explicitly told Plaintiff not to come onto the Property without her invitation and in September 2019, she purchased and installed a metal door for “further safety concerns” after “Plaintiff broke into [her] house, forcing his entrance against my pushing the door to close him out.” (Li Decl., ¶ 3.) Defendant submits copies of checks showing that she paid for property taxes from 2015 until 2023 and declares that Plaintiff did not pay for the Property’s maintenance or its property taxes. (Ex. 23; Response to UMF No. 3.) Defendant also argues that the Property can be divided and is not required to be sold because the city of South Pasadena permits construction of an accessory dwelling unit on the lot. (Response to UMF No. 4.) Defendant also identifies another property in South Pasadena with two single-family houses on one lot which recently sold for $1.2 million. Defendant additionally claims that Plaintiff owes Defendant a significant amount of money since 2001 and that Plaintiff promised Defendant he would not sell the property without her consent in order to avoid taxes. (Response to UMF No. 7.)

Defendant’s submitted evidence raises a triable issue of material fact regarding the nature of Plaintiff’s interest in the house and whether a partition by sale is preferable to subdivision. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Moving party to give notice.

Dated this 30th day of January, 2024

 

 

 

 

       William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

 

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.