Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22AHCV00938, Date: 2023-02-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV00938    Hearing Date: February 1, 2023    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT

 

MARCOS ANTONIO VELASQUEZ,               Plaintiff,

          vs.

 

KECHENG CHEN, et al.,

 

                   Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 22AHCV00938

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

 

Dept. 3

8:30 a.m.

February 1, 2023

 

I.            INTRODUCTION

On October 27, 2022, plaintiff Marcos Antonio VElasquez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Kecheng Chen, Huu U Duong, and Does 1-50, inclusive, (“Defendants”).  This action arises from an automobile accident which reportedly occurred on June 10, 2020.  Plaintiff claims he suffered personal injuries as a result of Defendants’ negligence.  There is no trial date yet set.

On November 11, 2022, Defendants filed this instant demurrer.

On January 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition.

As of January 27, 2023, no reply has been filed.

II.          LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)  For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded.  (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.)  A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

III.        REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice in full.

IV.         DISCUSSION

Defendants bring the instant demurrer on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action because it is barred by the statute of limitations since the Complaint was filed more than two years after the cause of action arose.

Defendants contend that the tolling period extends the statute of limitations by 103 days, which they calculate from when the cause of action arose on June 10, 2020, to October 1, 2020.  Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s last day to file was Monday, October 3, 2022, which is found after adding 103 days to the initial limitations date of June 10, 2022.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that 178 days, or the period of tolling from April 6, 2020 to October 1, 2020, should be added to the initial limitations date of June 10, 2022.  Plaintiff claims that the plain meaning of “tolling,” is to add the dates of the tolled period to the end of the limitations period.  (See Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 370-71 [“[T]he effect of equitable tolling is that the limitations period stops running during the tolling event, and begins to run again only when the tolling event has concluded.  As a consequence, the tolled interval, no matter when it took place, is tacked onto the end of the limitations period, thus extending the deadline for suit by the entire length of time during which the tolling event previously occurred.”].)  The Court agrees.

“‘A tolling provision suspends the running of a limitations period.’  [Citation.]  In other words, ‘the limitations period stops running during the tolling event, and begins to run again only when the tolling event has concluded.  As a consequence, the tolled interval, no matter when it took place, is tacked onto the end of the limitations period, thus extending the deadline for suit by the entire length of time during which the tolling event previously occurred.’  [Citation.]”  (Committee for Sound Water & Land Development v. City of Seaside (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 389, 403.)

Here, Plaintiff correctly applies the tolling interval in Emergency Rule 9.  Defendants provide no statutory authority for calculating the period of time tolled as between June 10, 2020 to October 1, 2020, rather than the whole period of tolling as provided in the statute (April 6, 2020 to October 1, 2020).  Notwithstanding, Defendants incorrectly calculate that time period as being 103 days, when it is 113.  The Court finds that the two-year statute of limitations for Plaintiffs claim (June 10, 2020 - June 10, 2022) included the tolling period of April 6, 2020 and October 1, 2020.  Plaintiff properly relied on the Emergency Order to add 178 days to their original June 10, 2022, deadline.  Thus, the statute of limitations ran on December 05, 2022.  (Okhovat Deci. 19, Exh. 2)  Consequently, Plaintiff’s October 27, 2022 Complaint was timely.

V.           CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Defendants’ demurrer.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at alhdept3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.