Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22AHCV01047, Date: 2023-12-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22AHCV01047    Hearing Date: December 27, 2023    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT

I.            INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jose Pena (“Plaintiff”) moves to compel further responses to the following interrogatories propounded on defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Defendant”) as part of his Special Interrogatories (Set One): SROG Nos. 25, 30-31, 42, and 46-48.

          Defendant served further responses to SROG Nos. 30 and 42 after this motion was filed and Plaintiff does not dispute the sufficiency of these responses. Accordingly, the motion is moot with respect to these discovery requests.

II.          DISCUSSION

SROG No. 25 asks Defendant to describe the training provided to individuals tasked with evaluating eligibility for vehicle repurchases pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act. Defendant objects on the grounds of attorney-client privilege and argues that training is provided by counsel and the content of such training is therefore privileged.

The attorney-client privilege only protects disclosure of communications between the attorney and the client; it does not protect disclosure of underlying facts which may be referenced within a qualifying communication. (Aerojet–General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Insurance (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 996, 1004–1005.) The attorney-client privilege also does not protect independent facts related to a communication, such as the fact that a communication took place, and the time, date and participants in the communication. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 219–220.) Nor does it protect the existence of documents (which is why privilege logs are regularly prepared). (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285, 293.) Therefore, information about Defendant’s training programs, practices and procedures, and the existence of training manuals and other documents which are normally utilized by Defendant in the operation of its business, are not privileged. (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 625, 639, as modified (May 1, 1997).)

Here, Plaintiff identifies certain aspects of Defendant’s training programs which would not be privileged and can be disclosed in an interrogatory response, including the length of any training and the frequency with which employees are trained. Adopting Defendant’s interpretation of the attorney-client privilege would render any information about business practices and policies provided to employees undiscoverable simply because they were communicated by an attorney. Describing the training provided is not the same as describing the contents of the training or communications made within the training sessions which may be attorney-client privileged.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to SROG No. 25.

SROG No. 31 asks Defendant to describe its “policies and procedures for proactively complying with the Song-Beverly Act in California by offering a repurchase of a qualifying vehicle without a consumer request to do so.”

Defendant argues that it is not required to proactively repurchase a vehicle without a customer request to do so and that the lack of any proactive repurchase policy is not determinative of whether it has willfully violated the Song-Beverly Act. Although this information may not be determinative, it is still relevant to whether Defendant knew that Plaintiff’s vehicle was defective and decided not to repurchase it anyway.

The motion is GRANTED as to SROG No. 31.

SROG Nos. 46 through 48 request information about “the repairs per thousand vehicles sold (R/1000) for 2019 Honda Accord vehicles”, the “five symptoms with the highest repairs per thousand (R/1000) for 2019 Honda Accord vehicles, and the corresponding repairs per thousand, and the “five components with the highest repairs per thousand (R/1000) for 2019 Honda Accord vehicles, and the corresponding repairs per thousand.”

Plaintiff argues that discovery into these common symptoms and components with high repair rates is relevant to whether a vehicle has undergone a reasonable number of repair attempts and Defendant’s knowledge that Plaintiff’s vehicle was nonconforming. Plaintiff argues that the information sought in these special interrogatories is relevant to refute Defendant’s affirmative defense that the defects in the Subject Vehicle were caused by misuse or abuse, lack of maintenance, or modifications to Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff also argues that, in the event that the symptoms or components repaired on Plaintiff’s Subject Vehicle are among the top five most commonly repaired components or among the five most common symptoms, this information would be relevant to show that Defendant may not have used all of the information at its disposal when determining if Plaintiff’s vehicle qualified for repurchase or replacement under the Song-Beverly Act and that Defendant for willfully violated the Song Beverly Act.

The Court agrees with Defendant’s characterization of these interrogatories as an “improper fishing expedition.” Even if Defendant tracked this information regarding repairs, symptoms, and components, which Defendant states it does not, this information would not be relevant or even reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence if it does not relate to any of the repairs, symptoms, or components related to Plaintiff’s own vehicle.  Plaintiff has not shown a connection between Plaintiff’s own vehicle and the information sought. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to SROG Nos. 46 through 48.

III.        CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED with respect to SROG Nos. 25 and 31, and DENIED with respect to SROG Nos. 46 through 48. Defendant is ordered to serve further responses within 20 days of the date of this order.

As Defendant was substantially justified in opposing this motion, Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is DENIED.  

Dated this 27th day of December, 2023

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.