Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case 22AHCV01070 2023-03-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22AHCV01070, Date: 2023-03-15 Tentative Ruling

On November 14, 2022, plaintiff Rashyn R. Reynolds (“Plaintiff”), appearing in pro per, filed this action against defendant Optimist Boys Home and Ranch, Inc. (“Defendant”) (erroneously sued as Optimist Boys’ Home & Ranch”) asserting causes of action for intentional tort and violation of the Crown Act, general negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in improper conduct while providing childcare for her son by cutting his hair in accordance with a court order. Defendant demurs to the entire Complaint on the grounds that it fails to state a claim. The demurrer is unopposed.

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face. (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.]” (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s cause of action for general negligence is SUSTAINED. “The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are ‘(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.) “In the absence of physical injury or impact to the plaintiff himself, damages for emotional distress should be recoverable only if the plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim, (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim and, (3) as a result suffers emotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness.” (Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 647.)

Plaintiff’s cause of action for general negligence is a claim for injuries allegedly sustained by Plaintiff herself, not her child; Plaintiff does not allege that she sustained any physical injuries. Therefore, she may only recover for her emotional distress as a bystander. However, she was not present and did not perceive the alleged haircut when it occurred. Accordingly, she fails to state a cause of action for general negligence.

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s intentional tort cause of action is SUSTAINED. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant committed a tort when they shaved her son’s head. Even if the Court assumed that Plaintiff was alleging a cause of action for assault, Plaintiff still fails to state a claim.

The essential elements of a cause of action for assault require that: (1) the defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believed he was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to defendant's conduct; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm. (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-69.) Here, Plaintiff does not allege that she herself was contacted or touched. Also, whether she consented to her son’s hair being cut is irrelevant to her claim for assault.

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s IIED claim is SUSTAINED. A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. A defendant's conduct is “outrageous” when it is so “extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” And the defendant’s conduct must be “intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51.) The conduct alleged must be so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. (Hailey v. California Physicians' Service (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 452.) Generally, a plaintiff may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress unless the distress suffered has been severe. (Ibid.) Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal 3d 932, 946.)

Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that Defendant’s conduct was “outrageous.” Merely cutting the son’s hair does not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct. Also, the hair cut was performed in accordance with a court order. Second, Plaintiff does not allege that: (1) Defendant acted with the intent to cause Plaintiff or her son emotional distress or (2) Defendant acted with reckless disregard of the probability that Plaintiff or her son would suffer emotional distress. Third, Plaintiff was not present when the haircut occurred. (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903-04 [conduct must be “directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware].) Last, Plaintiff does not allege severe emotional distress. She claims she suffers from anxiety and stress associated with the alleged haircut. She also alleges that her son allegedly sustained injuries including having problems “identifying with his own race … after defendant shaved minor child bald.” These allegations are insufficient for an IIED claim.

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s cause of action for violation of the Crown Act is SUSTAINED. In 2019, the California Legislature passed the Crown Act, formally known as California Senate Bill (SB) 188, titled the “Creating a Respectful and Open Workplace for Natural Hair Act” (“Crown Act”). Under the Crown Act, employers, landlords, and schools may not discriminate on the basis of an individual’s hairstyle or hair texture historically associated with race.

Plaintiff’s claim fails on its face because the Crown Act only relates to alleged discrimination in employment, housing, and educational settings, none of which are implicated in this case.

Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED. As Plaintiff did not submit an opposition and has not shown that amendment is possible, no leave to amend is granted. The motion to strike is taken off calendar.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court