Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22AHCV01323, Date: 2024-04-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22AHCV01323 Hearing Date: April 3, 2024 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
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Plaintiff(s), vs. Defendant(s). |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: Dept.
3 8:30
a.m. |
On December 16, 2022, plaintiff Maria de
la Luz Santacruz (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendant Aldi Supermarket
Company (“Defendant”) asserting causes of action for premises liability and
general negligence. Plaintiff alleges that on January 5, 2021, she slipped and
fell on the floor of Defendant’s store located at 1403 S. Baldwin Avenue in
Arcadia, California. On March 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for an order
quashing Defendant’s deposition subpoena directing nonparty Sedgwick Claims
Management Services, Inc. (“Sedgwick”) to produce its business records,
specifically:
ANY AND ALL INSURANCE RECORDS, MEDICAL RECORDS, BILLING,
DIGITAL IMAGING, CORRESPONDENCE, PAYMENTS, WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS, CLAIMS
AND ANY OTHER DOCUMENTS CONTAINED WITHIN THE INSURANCE FILE, EXCLUDING ANY
PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS, PERTAINING TO MARIA DE LA LUZ SANTACRUZ (DOB: 07/03/1974:
AKA: MARIA SANTACRUZ: MARIA DE LA LUZ SANCHEZ) FROM 08/23/2005 TO, AND
INCLUDING, THE PRESENT, RELATED TO THE 08/23/2005 WORK INCIDENT.
Although the caption page references a request for a
protective order, no such argument is made in the notice of motion or
memorandum of points and authorities. Accordingly, the Court treats the motion
solely as a motion to quash.
As articulated in Plaintiff’s separate
statement, Plaintiff argues that the production of her medical records relating
to an alleged incident which occurred 16 years ago in 2005 (“Work Incident”) is
irrelevant to the injuries she claims arising from the slip-and-fall underlying
this present action. Plaintiff also argues that the production of these medical
records violates her right to privacy.
A deposition subpoena may request (1)
only the attendance and testimony of a deponent, (2) only the production of
business records for copying, or (3) the attendance and testimony, as well as
the production of business records. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.020.) The court,
upon motion or the court’s own motion, “may make an order quashing the subpoena
entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or
conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In
addition, the court may make any other orders as may be appropriate to protect
the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable
violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1,
subd. (a).) “A deposition subpoena that commands only the production of
business records for copying shall designate the business records to be
produced either by specifically describing each individual item or by
reasonably particularizing each category of item . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., §2020.410, subd. (a).)
When a plaintiff puts her health and
physical condition at issue, the privacy and privileges that normally attach to
such sensitive information are “substantially lowered by the very nature of the
action.” (Heller v. Norcal Mutual Ins.
Co. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 30, 43.) However, “although in
seeking recovery for physical and mental injuries plaintiffs have
unquestionably waived their physician-patient . . . privileges as to all
information concerning the medical conditions which they have put in issue,
past cases make clear that such waiver extends only to information relating to
the medical conditions in question, and does not automatically open all of a
plaintiff’s past medical history to scrutiny.”
(Britt v. Superior Court
(1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 849.) Nevertheless,
the Court must “balance the public need against the weight of the privacy
right” and only serious invasions of
privacy will bar discovery. (Crab
Addison, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 958, 966.) There is
not an egregious invasion of privacy every time there is a request for private
information and courts must “place the burden on the party asserting a privacy
interest to establish its extent and seriousness of the prospective invasion.”
(Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3
Cal.5th 531, 557.) The burden is on the party seeking the
constitutionally protected information to establish direct relevance. (Davis
v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1017.)
Here,
the subpoena is directed to Sedgwick to obtain information about a worker’s
compensation claim filed by Plaintiff with her employer, the County of Los
Angeles’s Probation Department, in connection with injuries sustained on August
23, 2005. Plaintiff stated in her discovery responses that she sustained in
this case a right shoulder rotator cuff tear and suffers from pain to her right
arm, right knee, neck, and back. Plaintiff’s employment records show that as
part of her workers’ compensation claim for the Work Incident in 2005,
Plaintiff reported that she suffered strain to her right shoulder and back. (Def.’s
Opp., Exs. A-B.) Therefore, Defendant argues that Sedgwick’s records regarding
the Work Incident are relevant to this action because they involve injuries to
the same body part, Plaintiff’s right shoulder.
In her
reply brief, Plaintiff states that the Work Incident is irrelevant and that
Defendant should never have received any of her employer’s files from 2005 in
the first place. Plaintiff states that although she signed an authorization to
release her employment records from the County of Los Angeles’s Probation
Department, the authorization only permitted the production of records from
January 5, 2011, to the present. Plaintiff emphasizes the fact that the Work Incident
occurred 20 years ago and argues that there is an implicit limitation on
discovery because Form Interrogatory No. 11.2 only asks for the disclosure of
workers’ compensation claims made in “the past 10 years.” This argument is
unpersuasive, as Form Interrogatory No. 10.1 also asks Plaintiff whether she
had any complaints or injuries involving the same body part “[a]t any time
before the [underlying incident].” The plain language of the form interrogatory
which requires Plaintiff to provide information about injuries sustained “at
any time” overrides any complaint that Plaintiff may have about the inadvertent
production of records from her employer despite her limited authorization. The
Court further concludes that the subpoena to Sedgewick is narrowly tailored
because it only seeks Sedgwick’s records pertaining to this single Work
Incident which undeniably involves the same body part – Plaintiff’s right
shoulder – which Plaintiff claims to have injured as a result of Defendant’s
negligence. Plaintiff’s citation to a trial court opinion ruling that medical
records from 27 years ago are irrelevant is improper and unpersuasive because
trial court rulings have no precedential value. (Santa Ana Hosp. Medical
Center v. Belshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to
quash is DENIED.
The
court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s
fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without
substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the
subpoena was oppressive. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)
The
Court finds that this motion was made without substantial justification and
GRANTS Defendant’s request for sanctions. Plaintiff and counsel of record,
jointly and severally, are ordered to pay sanctions in the amount of $630
consisting of 3 hours at defense counsel’s hourly rate of $210 within 20 days
of the date of this order.
Moving party to give notice.
Dated
this
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William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court |
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.