Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 22AHCV01376, Date: 2024-03-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22AHCV01376, Date: 2024-03-14 Tentative Ruling

On December 23, 2022, plaintiffs Yesenia Loera Casas and Oscar Casas collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action asserting a single cause of action for breach of express warranty pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”). Plaintiffs allege that on September 2, 2019, they entered into a warranty contract with defendant Mazda Motor of America, Inc. (“Defendant”) regarding a 2016 Mazda Mazda6. (Compl., ¶ 14.) Plaintiff claim that defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period and Defendant was unable to conform the Subject Vehicle to the warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts by Defendant’s authorized repair facility. (Compl., ¶¶ 16-18.) Plaintiffs contend that Defendant violated the SBA by failing to promptly replace the Subject Vehicle or make restitution. (Compl., ¶ 20.)

On January 25, 2024, Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication. Defendant argues that it did not issue any warranties in connection with the sale of the Vehicle as a used vehicle by Toyota of Pasadena, an independent third-party dealer. Defendant also argues that Oscar Casas lacks standing to maintain a cause of action under the SBA because he is not a “buyer” of the Subject Vehicle. In addition, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claim for a civil penalty fails because there was no willful failure to comply with obligations under the SBA.

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to enable summary dismissal without the need for trial where an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Ritchfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Courts analyze motions for summary judgment in three steps: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition ahs demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) Summary judgment is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c); Villa v. McFarren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.) As to each claim as framed by a complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Defendant requests judicial notice of trial court orders, federal district court opinions, and a certified status certificate from the Department of Consumer Affairs attesting that Defendant operates a state-certified arbitration program. The unopposed request is GRANTED.

The facts of this case are largely undisputed and this motion presents primarily a question of law. The parties agree that Yesenia Loera Casas purchased the Subject Vehicle from Toyota of Pasadena on September 2, 2019. (Defendant’s Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) No. 1.) At the time of purchase, the Subject Vehicle had 43,291 miles. (UMF No. 2.) Defendant was the original distributor of the Subject Vehicle and made express warranties when it was new; it did not make any express warranties with respect to the sale of the Subject Vehicle as a used vehicle by Toyota of Pasadena. (UMF No. 3.) The Subject Vehicle was not sold as a certified preowned vehicle. (UMF No. 3.) The Subject Vehicle originally came with a 36 month/36,000 mile “bumper to bumper warranty” which expired prior to purchase, and the Subject Vehicle had the balance of the 60 month/60,000 powertrain warranty at the time of sale. (UMF No. 4.) This powertrain warranty covers components such as the engine, transmission, and front/rear drive system. (UMF No. 5.)

Based on these facts, Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because the Subject Vehicle was not a “new motor vehicle” because it was not purchased with a full new car warranty.

A “new motor vehicle” is defined to encompass “a dealer-owned vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty[.]” (Civ. Code § 1793.2, subd. (e)(2).) Defendant relies on Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, in which the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and held that “previously sold cars accompanied by some balance of the original warranty” did not meet the definition of a “new motor vehicle” under the SBA. In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs argued that the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty” in section 1793.22(e)(2) applied to their vehicle, which was purchased used with a balance remaining on an express warranty from the manufacturer. (Id. at p. 219.) The Court of Appeal disagreed with the plaintiffs and concluded that "the phrase ‘other motor vehicles sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty’ refers to cars sold with a full warranty, not to previously sold cars accompanied by some balance of the original warranty.”

In opposition, Plaintiffs cite to Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, in which the Court of Appeal stated that “cars sold with a balance remaining on the manufacturer's new motor vehicle warranty are included within its definition of ‘new motor vehicle.’ ” (Id. at 123.) Plaintiffs argue that the Rodriguez court mistakenly believed that the vehicle in Jensen was a demonstrator used by the dealership. (Opp., p. 6.) But the Rodriguez court found Jensen distinguishable because it involved a vehicle sold by a manufacturer-affiliated dealer who, as the manufacturer’s representative, gave a 36,000-mile warranty “on top” of the miles already on the car. The Rodriguez court did not assume that the vehicle in Jensen was a demonstrator and even acknowledged that the defendant manufacturer unsuccessfully argued that it was not a “new motor vehicle” because it was not a demonstrator. (Rodriguez, supra, at p. 224 [citing Jensen at p. 119.) The Rodriguez court also engaged in an expansive analysis of the broader statutory context of the SBA, which distinguishes between manufacturers, distributors, and sellers, as well as new and used goods. The Rodriguez court noted that express warranty protections for used goods were limited and only bind the seller or distributor if an express warranty is issued at the time of sale. (Civ. Code, § 1795.5.)

Last, Plaintiffs point out that Defendant’s express warranty was transferable and suggests that a manufacturer has ongoing obligations under the SBA. The transferability of the warranty is not disputed by Defendant. Rather, Defendant argues on reply that the Rodriguez court already considered the issue of transferability and stated that a transferrable express warranty is a separate issue from Plaintiffs’ entitlement to the SBA’s refund-or-replace remedy. (Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 225.) Instead, the Rodriguez court stated that “the beneficiary of a transferrable express warranty can sue a manufacturer for breach of an express warranty to repair defects under the California Uniform Commercial Code.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff argues that the SBA is intended to give broader protection to consumers than the Commercial Code and that consumers who cannot afford to purchase a new vehicle generally cannot afford the costs of a lawyer. (Opp.. pp. 13.) But this position ignores the protections granted under section 1795.5 of the SBA for used cars with express warranties made by a distributor or retail seller.

The Court acknowledges that the Supreme Court granted petition for review of Rodriguez on July 13, 2022, but notes that it denied requests for depublication of the opinion. Instead, the Supreme Court stated, “Pending review, the opinion of the Court of Appeal [in Rodriguez] . . . may be cited, not only for its persuasive value, but also for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of a conflict in authority that would in turn allow trial courts to exercise discretion under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456 . . ., to choose between sides of any such conflict.” (Rodriguez v. FCA US (Cal. 2022) 512 P.3d 654; see Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, subd. (e).) The Court chooses to exercise its discretion here and follow Rodriguez instead of Jensen as the more factually apposite authority. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.