Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22STCV03035, Date: 2022-07-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV03035    Hearing Date: July 25, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

1. INTRODUCTION

On January 25, 2022, Plaintiff Milton Guinses filed a complaint against Defendants City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles World Airports, and Los Angeles International Airport for premises liability and general negligence.

On March 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for (1) negligence, (2) premises liability, and (3) premises liability.

On June 17, 2022, Defendants City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles World Airports (erroneously sued as Los Angeles International Airport) (collectively “Defendants”) filed a demurrer to FAC and motion to strike.  No oppositions have been filed.

1. LEGAL STANDARDS

1. Demurrer

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face.¿(City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.)  “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.  [Citation.]”  (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].)  Allegations are to be liberally construed.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)   

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)  The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).)  An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment.  (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully.  (Ibid.) 

1. Motion to Strike

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.  (Code of Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)  The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

1. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request judicial notice of the webpage of Los Angeles World Airports indicating that Los Angeles World Airports is a department of The City of Los Angeles, a public entity, and that the same owns and operates the Los Angeles International Airport.

“[A] precondition to the taking of judicial notice in either its mandatory or permissive form—any matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to the material issue.”  (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422 fn. 2 (citing Mangini v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled by In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257 on other grounds).)

Here, it is unclear why Defendants are requesting judicial notice of the Los Angeles World Airports webpage.  To the extent it is to show that Defendants were erroneously sued as Los Angeles International Airport, the Court finds this is irrelevant to the material issues in the demurer and motion to strike.  Defendants may simply indicate they were erroneously sued as such, which they have so indicated.  To the extent it is to show Defendants are public entities, there is no need to do so when the FAC has already alleged each of the defendants are government entities.  (FAC, ¶¶ 2-4.)  Defendants’ request for judicial notice is DENIED.

The Court notes that even if the information on the webpage were relevant, the webpage is not judicially noticeable under Evidence Code sections 452(g) and (h).  The webpage is not a fact or proposition that is of such common knowledge that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute.  Further, information on websites can be reasonably subject to dispute.  (Huitt v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1605 fn. 10.)

1. DISCUSSION

1. Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer or motion to strike, the demurring or moving party shall meet and confer with the party who has filed the pleading and shall file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, subd. (a); 435.5, subd. (a).) 

          Defendants have satisfied the meet and confer requirements.  (Putney Decl., ¶¶ 8-14.)

1. Demurrer

Defendants demur to the first and second causes of action asserted in Plaintiff’s FAC.  Defendants argue the first and second causes of action fail because none of the statutes incorporated by reference into the first and second causes of action or specifically referenced—i.e., Government Code sections 815.2 and 820 and Civil Code section 1714—can serve as proper bases for imposing liability on Defendants as public entities.  Defendants’ arguments are well-taken.

Government Code section 815 provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person” except as provided by statute.  (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a); Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932.)

Here, Plaintiff appears to be seeking to hold Defendants liable on the first cause of action for negligence and second cause of action for premises liability based on Civil Code section 1714(a).  (FAC, ¶¶ 23, 33.)  “[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714.  Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.”  (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.)  Defendants thus cannot be held liable for negligence and premises liability under Civil Code section 1714(a).

The first and second causes of action also incorporate allegations referencing Government Code sections 815.2 and 820.  (FAC, ¶¶ 11-12, 17, 31.) 

Government Code section 820 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute (including Section 820.2), a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person.”  (Gov. Code, § 820, subd. (a).)  Section 820, at least alone, does not apply to public entities and thus cannot form a statutory basis for liability against Defendants.

Government Code section 815.2 provides that a public entity is vicariously liable for the torts of their employees committed within the scope of employment if the employee is liable.  (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a); Chambi v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 822, 827; Hoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 932.)  To this extent, it would seem that, when coupled with Government Code section 820, Defendants can be held liable if their employees are liable for negligence and premises liability.

However, a review of Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action show Plaintiff is seeking to hold Defendants liable for a dangerous condition of property consisting of a slippery wet substance on the floor.  (FAC, ¶¶ 13, 17, 22, 24, 25, 31, 35-36.)  “[P]ublic entity liability for property defects is not governed by the general rule of vicarious liability provided in section 815.2, but instead by the specific provisions set forth in sections 830-835.4.”  (Van Kempen v. Hayward Area Park etc. Dist. (1972) 23 cal.App.3d 822, 825.)  As the first and second causes of action are premised on a dangerous condition of property, Defendants cannot be held liable under Government Code section 815.2.

As Plaintiff has failed to allege a proper statutory basis for holding Defendants liable under the first and second causes of action, the demurrer to the first and second causes of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

1. Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike paragraph 16 from the FAC as irrelevant and improper.

Paragraph 16 of the FAC alleges as follows:

Pursuant to Evidence Code § 646 and in accordance with California Civil Jury Instruction (CACI) No. 417, Plaintiff asserts the judicial doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, in that (i) the ceiling would not have collapsed unless someone was negligent; (ii) the ceiling collapsing on Plaintiff was an area that only Defendant controlled; and (iii) Plaintiff’s voluntary actions did not cause or contribute, wholly or in part, to the cracking and collapsing of the ceiling.  Therefore, the Court or jury must find that the Plaintiff’s injuries resulted from Defendants’ negligence unless Defendants present evidence that would support a contrary finding.

(FAC, ¶ 16.) 

          Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are premised on Plaintiff slipping and falling on a wet substance on the floor.  (FAC, ¶¶ 13, 24, 35, 40.)  Other than paragraph 16, there are no other allegations regarding a ceiling collapsing on Plaintiff.  Inasmuch as paragraph 9 of the FAC asserts that “[v]enue is proper in this Court under Civ. Proc. Code § 395 as all injuries occurred in the County of Orange,” which is clearly mistaken, the Court surmises that paragraph 16 is similarly the vestigial remnant of some other lawsuit that somehow failed to catch the proofreader’s eye.  Paragraph 16 is irrelevant and the motion to strike is GRANTED without leave to amend.

VI.     CONCLUSION

          In light of the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer to the first and second causes of action of the First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

          Defendants’ Motion to Strike is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Moving party to give notice. 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.