Judge William A. Crowfoot, Case Number: 22STCV21515, Date: 2023-10-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22STCV21515, Date: 2023-10-17 Tentative Ruling

On July 1, 2022, plaintiff Danny A. Godoy (“Plaintiff”), individually and as the successor- in-interest to Ana Xanthe Chirino Godoy (“Godoy”), filed this survival action against defendants Shane S. Pak, M.D. (“Defendant”), Sergio Y. Go, M.D. (“Dr. Go”), and Alhambra Hospital Medical Center (“Alhambra Hospital”). Plaintiff alleges that Godoy, his wife, passed away on July 1, 2021, after losing over two liters of blood during a lumbar decompression surgery. (Compl., ¶¶ 2, 14-15.)

On June 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amendment designating defendant Stephen Ping-Hong Chen, M.D. (“Defendant”) as Doe 1.

On October 25, 2023, Defendant filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s action is time-barred pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 and the Doe amendment does not relate back to the Complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 474.

On November 17, 2023, Defendant filed an untimely reply brief; Defendant’s reply was due on November 13, 2023. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005(b).) Nevertheless, the Court exercises its discretion to consider the reply brief.

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. [Citations.]” (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064.) “A judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant is appropriate when the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(3)(B)(ii).)” (Kapsimallis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672.) “Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. [Citation.]” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 474 “allows a plaintiff in good faith to delay suing particular persons as named defendants until he has knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable person to believe liability is probable.” (McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 943.) “Section 474 provides a method for adding defendants after the statute of limitations has expired, but this procedure is available only when the plaintiff is actually ignorant of the facts establishing a cause of action against the party to be substituted for a Doe defendant.” (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 371-72.) “‘Ignorance of the facts giving rise to a cause of action is the ignorance required by section 474, and the pivotal question is, ‘did plaintiff know facts?’ not ‘did plaintiff know or believe that [he] had a cause of action based on those facts?’” (Id. at 372 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580, 594).) “‘Although it is true that a plaintiff’s ignorance of the defendant’s name must be genuine (in good faith) and not feigned [citations] and that a plaintiff need not be aware of each and every detail concerning a person’s involvement before the plaintiff loses his ignorance [citations], it is equally true that the plaintiff does not relinquish [his] rights under section 474 simply because [he] has a suspicion of wrongdoing arising from one or more facts [he] does know.’” (Id. (quoting General Motors, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at 594-95).) “The fact that the plaintiff had the means to obtain knowledge is irrelevant.” (General Motors, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at 594.) “In short, section 474 does not impose upon the plaintiff a duty to go in search of facts she does not actually have at the time she files her original pleading.” (Id. at 596.) “A plaintiff may use section 474 whenever he has no actual knowledge of the defendant; constructive or legal knowledge will not deprive the plaintiff of the remedy.” (Sobeck & Associates, Inc. v. B&R Investments No. 24 (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 861, 867; see also Balon v. Drost (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 483, 488 (quoting Sobeck & Associates, Inc., supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at 867).)

Defendant argues that the 1-year statute of limitations began to run on the date of Decedent’s death, July 1, 2021, and the amendment, filed on June 6, 2023, is impermissible because it was filed nearly one year after the statute of limitations expired. Defendant argues, without any reference to judicially noticeable matter or the pleadings, that Plaintiff knew when his wife died that she was treated by multiple providers and therefore, Plaintiff was on notice that Defendant was a potential defendant at the time he filed the Complaint. Therefore, Defendant concludes, the Doe amendment does not relate back.

As stated above, the relevant analysis concerns the plaintiff’s actual knowledge of facts. Defendant does not introduce evidence of facts showing that Plaintiff had actual knowledge of Defendant’s negligent conduct, nor would such extrinsic evidence be appropriate on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Furthermore, even if extrinsic evidence could be considered, Plaintiff submits a declaration stating that only in June 2023, after consulting a board-certified physician in critical care medicine, did he become aware that Defendant had acted negligently. (Godoy Decl., ¶ 27.) He was informed that the consulting physician believed Defendant—a critical care doctor on call on the evening of Decedent’s surgery—had been called by the nursing staff but failed to promptly respond or issue appropriate orders. (Ibid.) Plaintiff details the actions he took after his wife died to obtain an autopsy and any reports or medical records, and explains that he was never provided with complete documentation despite making multiple requests; he was also not advised by anyone that Defendant was a physician who was involved in critical decisions concerning Decedent’s health and contributed to her death. (Godoy Decl., ¶¶ 18-25.)

William A. Crowfoot

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.