Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22STCV27617, Date: 2022-10-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV27617    Hearing Date: October 26, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

On August 24, 2022, plaintiffs Maria Haro, Heriberto Haro, Briza Madueno, Marcus Madueno, and Jessie Luna (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendant Southern California Edison Company (“Defendant”).  Plaintiffs assert causes of action for: (1) inverse condemnation, (2) general negligence, (3) violation of California Public Utilities Code section 2106, (4) violation of California Health & Safety Code section 13007, and (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

Plaintiffs allege that on or about February 20, 2021, a fire ensued engulfing their real and personal property when Defendant’s electrical pole beside their home began exhibiting sparks and then subsequently was on fire.  (Compl, ¶¶ 12-15.)  Plaintiff Heriberto Haro was rushed to the local hospital for smoke inhalation injuries.  (Compl., ¶ 16.) 

On September 28, 2022, Defendant filed this motion to strike Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim from the Complaint, including paragraphs 44, 48, 58, 63, 69, and Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive and exemplary damages under Civil Code sections 3294, 3340, and Public Utilities Code section 2106.   

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435 subd., (b)(1).)  The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc, § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)    An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.  (Code Civ Proc, § 431.10, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

“Before filing a motion to strike . . . the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.”  (Code Civ Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).)  If no agreement is reached, the moving party shall file and serve with the motion to strike a declaration stating either: (1) the means by which the parties met and conferred and that the parties did not reach an agreement, or (2) that the party who filed the pleading failed to respond to the meet and confer request or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(3).) 

Brian A. Cardoza declares that he met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel on September 22, 2022, by sending a letter.  This is insufficient to satisfy the meet and confer requirements because section 410.41 requires that the meet and confer take place in person or by telephone.  The Court proceeds to analyze this motion on its merits but cautions the parties that failure to meet and confer as required by the Code of Civil Procedure in the future will result in the motion being taken off calendar. 

Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.) “As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Id.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)  Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.” (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155; see also Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 [“Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probably dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences”].)

An employer shall not be liable for punitive damages based on the acts of an employee, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which damages are awarded, or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)

A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)  “Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award” for punitive damages.  (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 958.)  The allegations supporting a request for punitive damages must be alleged with specificity; conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint is insufficiently pled to state a claim for punitive and exemplary damages because they lack the required degree of specificity.  Defendant also argues that no facts are alleged to support the contention that the conduct was authorized, ratified, or performed by an officer, director, or managing agent.  The Court agrees.  Plaintiffs fail to allege specific facts to support a prima facie case of authorization, ratification or performance of fraud, malice, or oppression by an officer, director, or managing agent.

Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED.  Leave to amend is not granted at this time.  If Plaintiffs later determine through discovery that there are additional facts which provide them with the ability to plead specific facts in support of a claim for punitive damages, Plaintiffs may file a motion for leave to amend the complaint. 

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.