Judge: William A. Crowfoot, Case: 22STCV28122, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV28122    Hearing Date: December 15, 2022    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

I.      Procedural and Background Facts

The Complaint filed on August 29, 2022, arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on July 21, 2022.  Defendant Clayton Damian Fischer (“Fischer”) allegedly made an unsafe and illegal left turn, colliding with Plaintiff Michael William Wilson (“Plaintiff”).  Plaintiff alleges claims for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and for negligent entrustment.  At the time of the collision, Fischer was allegedly working in the course and scope of his employment with co-defendant Southwark Metal Manufacturing (“Defendant”).

On November 7 2022, Defendant filed a First Amended Answer (“FAA”). Plaintiff now demurs to the FAA on the grounds that the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Affirmative Defenses fail to state sufficient facts.    

III.     Legal Standards

          A demurrer reaches defects that appear on the face of the pleading. The court considers the allegations and matters that are subject to judicial notice. All facts are accepted as true. Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, 838. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations. It does not test their truth, the plaintiff’s ability to prove them, or the possible difficulty in making such proof. Id. at 840.

          The sufficiency of an answer depends on the complaint to which it purports to answer. South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 733. Therefore, the answer does not stand alone; rather it is read with reference to the facts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint. The pleading must “minimally advise the opposing party of the nature of the defense even if defective as conclusory.” FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashimi (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 385. Specificity in pleading is not required since “modern discovery procedures necessarily affect the amount of detail that should be required in a pleading.” Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.

          Unlike federal courts, California state courts are not a notice pleading jurisdiction, and notice alone is not a sufficient basis for any pleading. California is a fact pleading jurisdiction. Merely putting an opposing party on notice is not sufficient. Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 561; see Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 244, 250.

          The critical inquiry when a plaintiff demurs to an answer is whether the answer raises a defense to plaintiff’s stated cause of action. Timberidge Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 873, 879-880. The demurrer raises the objection that the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. Id. at 880.  The answer to a complaint must include any statement of any matter constituting a defense. Code Civ. Proc., § 431.430(b)(2).

          “New matter” refers to “something relied on by a defendant which is not put in issue by the plaintiff. [Citation.] Thus, where matters are not responsive to essential allegations of the complaint, they must be raised in the answer as ‘new matter.’ Walsh v. West Valley Mission Community College Dist. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1546. Thus, “new matter” is “any ground urged in avoidance of the complaint, ie., some independent reason why plaintiff should be barred from recovery, even if everything alleged in the complaint was true.” Id. [“all facts which do not thus directly tend to disprove some one or more of these averments, but tend to establish a defense independently of them, cannot be offered under the denial; they are new matter, and must be specially pleaded.”].

The answer is liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties. The answer should make clear what issues the adverse parties must meet such that when taken in connection with the complaint, “no reasonable person could be in any doubt about the issues to be met.” Hoelzle v. Fresno County (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 478, 483. FPI, supra at 384.

II.    Discussion

A.   First and Second Affirmative Defenses

The first affirmative defense for “Plaintiff’s Negligence” contends that Plaintiff was the primary and sole cause of the subject accident.  This is not “new matter” but a denial of Defendant’s liability.  

The second affirmative defense for “Comparative Fault” alleges that Plaintiff “was driving at too high a rate of speed under the conditions and did not keep a proper look out for his own safety.”  This is sufficiently pleaded.

B.   Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Affirmative Defenses

The fourth affirmative defense for “Superseding Cause”, sixth affirmative defense for “Joint and Several Liability”, and seventh affirmative action for “Wtt v. Jackson” alleges that any liability should be apportioned according to fault.  However, no facts are stating in support of these affirmative defenses. 

Defendant’s eighth affirmative defense for “Howell Doctrine” alleges that Plaintiff is only entitled to recover medical expenses that were actually incurred, adjusted, or paid because he treated through Medi-Cal or private health insurance.  This states sufficient facts.    

Last, Defendant’s ninth affirmative defense reserving the right to assert additional affirmative defenses is not recognizable at law. 

III.        CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s demurrer to the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Affirmative Defenses is SUSTAINED.  As Defendant admits, there has been "little or no discovery” and additional facts to support each cause of action are not immediately apparent.  Therefore, leave to amend the answer is not granted at this time.  If Defendant later determines that there are facts to support a specific affirmative defense, Defendant may seek leave to file an amended answer.

Plaintiff’s demurrer to the Second and Eighth Affirmative Defenses is OVERRULED.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.